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Chapter 1 
Introduction
Katherine A.H. Graham and Allan M. Maslove
As this edition of How Ottawa Spends: Next? is published, the Trudeau Liberal government and the opposition parties are already in the opening stages of the campaign for the October 2019 election. For the 
Liberals, this election (as all elections) will be about defending their record 
and proposing new initiatives to the electorate. However, in October 2019 a 
third factor will be added to the mix: the uncertainly and in some respects, the 
chaos engendered by President Donald Trump and how the Canadian govern-
ment should respond. 
First, the record that the Trudeau Liberals will defend is probably not appre-
ciably better or worse than that of most governments. Some promises from 
the 2015 election have been essentially fulfilled (or will have been by the time 
of the next election). As examples, among these are the restructuring and 
enrichment of the Canada Child Benefit that goes a long way to addressing 
family poverty, and the legalization of cannabis consumption. Other initiatives 
from the 2015 platform are arguably works in progress, such as the reset of 
Canada’s relationship with Indigenous peoples, and moving forward with 
energy development balanced by addressing climate change, mainly through 
carbon pricing. These files have proved to be much more complex and conten-
tious than expected. For example, both, especially the energy/environment file, 
have become caught up in federal-provincial and inter-provincial conflict. And 
some promises from 2015 have been abandoned altogether, perhaps the most 
notable example being electoral reform.
As for new initiatives that may appear in the 2019 platform, all three major 
parties have yet to step forward. For the Liberals, one area that does seem 
to be on their agenda is some move towards publically funded pharmacare. 
Immigration and refugee issues may also be front and centre, compelling the 
Liberals to offer new approaches, particularly to refugee determination and 
settlement.
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The third factor—Trump—may emerge as highly significant. Among the issues 
that the President has raised that could impact the next election are how to 
respond to his challenges with respect to NAFTA and tariffs on steel, alumi-
num, and possibly vehicles; NATO and defence spending; oil pipelines; and 
migrants and border security.1 Beyond all these specific issues is the general 
challenge of determining an appropriate strategy to deal with an emotional 
and unpredictable President of whom the vast majority of Canadians disap-
prove.2 All the party leaders with a realistic chance of being Prime Minister 
after the election will be trying to find a balance between not being too hostile 
to Trump and not appearing weak or appeasing.
2018 BUDGET
As Table 1 shows, the fiscal position of the government remained stable or 
slightly improved between the 2017 and 2018 budgets. In part because of 
slightly better economic growth scenarios, federal revenues improved and 
expenditures remained stable or declined slightly between the two budgets. 
As a result, the government projected smaller deficits in the 2018 budget than 
they forecast in 2017, even after enriching the Canada Child Benefit and the 
tax credit for low-income earners. 
The 2018 Budget itself was a relatively bland document in terms of spending or 
tax initiatives. The Budget emphasized the government’s new “gender results 
framework,” which is intended to measure distribution impacts of government 
fiscal measures, not only along gender lines but across other dimensions as 
well. 
In terms of specific tax and spending initiatives this was quite a modest 
budget. There was little in the way of major program announcements, with the 
possible exception of spending on research and innovation. A modest set of 
budget initiatives is not unusual for a third year of a mandate. Major platform 
promises from the previous election have likely already been introduced, and 
significant new proposals are being held for inclusion in the final budget of the 
mandate, which in part becomes the governing party’s platform for the next 
election. 
Without explicitly acknowledging it, the government seems to be content 
with the debt/GDP ratio being capped at about 30%, and (hopefully) slowly 
declining over the next few years. That is not a bad strategy in itself; the 30% 
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ratio is quite manageable and certainly over long periods of time (most notably 
over the decade or so before the landmark anti-deficit budget of 1995) it has 
been much higher. However, the risk in this position is that the debt/GDP ratio 
would likely rapidly increase in a recession, even a relatively mild one. The risk 
of a recession is not negligible; some analysts argue that because the economy 
has been expanding for several years since its recovery from the 2008 reces-
sion, the “natural” cycle could soon generate a downturn. As well, the uncer-








REAL GDP GROWTH (%)    
2018 2 2.1 2.2
2019 1.7 1.6 1.6
2020 1.7 1.7 1.7
OIL PRICE ($US PER 
BARREL)
   
2018 59 53 56
2019 56 54 57
2020 59 56 57
BUDGET DEFICIT $B    
2017/2018 28.5 19.9 19.4
2018/2019 27.4 18.6 18.1
2019/2020 23.4 17.3 17.5
DEBT TO GDP RATIO (%)    
2017/2018 31.6 30.5 30.4
2018/2019 31.6 30.2 30.1
2019/2020 31.5 29.9 29.8
REVENUE $B    
2017/2018 304.7 310.7 309.6
2018/2019 315.6 323.1 323.4
2019/2020 327.7 333.3 335.5
PROGRAM EXPENDITURES 
$B
   
2017/2018 305.4 304.9 304.6
2018/2019 313.7 312.2 312.2
2019/2020 319.8 319.0 321.5
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OVERVIEW OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS VOLUME
This year’s edition of How Ottawa Spends contains eight chapters. Six of these 
are policy briefs, intended to put forward early stage research and analysis. 
Two are extended chapters that engage with their subject matter in a more 
fulsome way. These are the chapters by Dutil and Ryan and the contribution by 
Dagg, Lippett, Masters, and Toner.
Two subjects receive significant attention in this volume. Fiscal and budgetary 
issues are the focus of two chapters, with the analysis of budgets by Dutil and 
Ryan and the chapter by James McAllister on fiscal issues. Energy and envi-
ronment issues and the importance of Indigenous interests and perspectives 
on environmental issues receive the most attention. Policy briefs on Social 
policy and the innovation agenda round out this volume.
In one of the two policy research studies in this volume, Patrice Dutil and 
Peter Ryan analyze 40 budget speeches delivered by twelve finance ministers 
in order to identify how political marketing strategies have influenced changes 
to the budget speech over time. The importance of this research is twofold. 
First, it provides an historical overview of professional and thematic changes 
to the budget speeches as a communication document going back to the start 
of its modernized format in 1978. Secondly, it documents the impact of the 
permanent campaign strategy outlined by political marketing scholars. The 
research highlights changes in language use that in term reveal branding 
decisions and a micro-targeting of political clients through language. 
James McAllister begins with the federal government’s new focus on gen-
der-bases analysis in the last budget, and in particular what it would mean to 
seriously consider the geographic dimension of fiscal distribution. In addition 
to the Fiscal Equalization Program, which is the main explicit program to 
address this (in this case provincial distributions), McAllister shows how many 
other spending and tax policies also have regional impacts. He argues for a 
robust and systematic reporting of regional impacts of major federal programs.
Mary Gramiak and Stephan Schott examine the evolution of the concept of 
sustainable development since the 1987 Bruntland Report. They argue that the 
definition of this term has narrowed to focus on environmental sustainability 
while reducing the focus on the social, political, and wider economic aspects of 
7 How Ottawa Spends
development. They argue that this shift has been detrimental to the needs and 
interests of Indigenous peoples within Canada.
The chapters by Retallack et al. and Usher and Abele focus on Bill C-69, the 
Impact Assessment Act of 2018.
Matthew Retallack, Graeme Auld, Lisa Mills, and Alexandra Mallett take a 
broad look at Bill C-69. In their view, it represents a potentially radical trans-
formation of the Canadian environmental assessment regime. They compare 
the 2018 legislation to its predecessors (2012 and 1992) and conclude that, at 
a minimum, the potential for greater inclusion of Indigenous knowledges and 
perspectives in the environmental assessment process could result in new 
approaches to economic development.
Peter Usher and Frances Abele examine specific issues related to the Review 
Panels established under the new Impact Assessment Act to review proposed 
projects. They raise potential concerns about how these review panels are 
structured, how they conduct their reviews, and how the government might 
respond to their recommendations.
Travis Dagg, Jonathan Lippett, Derek Masters, and Glen Toner conclude a 
series of four chapters in successive How Ottawa Spends volumes on the 
politics of the energy/environment policy domain under the Harper and 
Trudeau governments. In this edition, they examine whether or not the posi-
tive momentum generated by the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth 
and Climate Change (PCF) can be sustained. They conclude that the clash of 
ideas, competing interests, and issues related to jurisdictional authority pose 
risks for continued implementation of the PCF.
Allan Moscovitch and Ginette Thomas put forward a case for a new Canada 
Social Care Act. They argue that the termination of the Canada Assistance 
Plan in 1996 was a major setback to the progress of social policy, resulting 
in diminished provincial programming and increased unevenness across 
provinces. A new Canada Social Care Act, they argue, should mirror the five 
principles of the Canada Health Act and add five additional principles, with 
the objective of reengaging the federal government in the delivery of social 
services and improving the quality and consistency of access to services across 
Canada.
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Peter Phillips and Aaron Hertes focus on the “innovation agenda” in the 2017 
and 2018 budgets. This potentially important federal initiative is occurring in 
the context of diminishing productivity and slow economic growth. They laud 
the government for taking important steps to develop an innovation strategy, 
but point out that it is not yet clear whether there will be significant impacts on 
national innovation and productivity.
This is the final edition of How Ottawa Spends. It has been published as an 
annual volume continuously since 1980. Cumulatively, it contains a significant 
historical record of important policy issues affecting Canada and perspectives 
on those issues. Its annual review of the federal budget shows how successive 
governments have allocated priorities and displayed their values through that 
process and through their choice of spending instruments.
Although, as editors of this volume, we regret being the ones to “close the 
book” we look forward to our colleagues’ collective effort to foster debate and 
understanding of important Canadian public policy issues and debates going 
forward. We conclude by saluting all past editors and others in the School of 
Public Policy and Administration at Carleton University who have made this 
publication possible.
ENDNOTES
1 We note that in the cabinet shuffle in July 2018 a new portfolio on migrants was created.
2 For example, a June 20, 2018 National Campaign research Poll found that 81% of 
Canadians disapprove of Trump.
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Chapter 2 
Anchors, Followers, and Mavericks: 
The Permanent Campaign’s Effects 
on the Canadian Federal Budget 
Speeches, 1978-2017
Peter M. Ryan and Patrice Dutil
INTRODUCTION
The budget has always been the touchstone of responsible government in Canada. It is tabled annually following a speech by the minister of finance, a process that is accompanied by added pomp and formality. 
The subsequent House of Commons vote on the various money bills is the 
ultimate vote of confidence in the government. Without this vital expression 
of legitimacy, government must resign. Its ceremonial importance has grown 
over the past two generations as the budget speech was broadcast, and even-
tually streamed “live,” followed by the opposition’s response and a full week 
of debate. The discussion of the government’s estimates takes up a significant 
portion of parliament’s time during the winter and spring sessions of parlia-
ment. The budget document has also become an artifact of partisan branding 
as it features partisan colours, attractive graphics, and compelling pull-quotes.
The media contributes to the hype, and governments work hard to extend 
the “event” of the budget by delivering hints about new expenditures during 
the weeks before the actual tabling of the document, frequently followed by a 
cross-country tour by the prime minister and minister of finance to promote 
the selected approach. In The Politics of Public Money (2007), David Good 
argued that the speech has assumed a greater importance in the government’s 
calendar over the past fifty years, particularly during minority governments 
when opposition parties determine the fate of whether or not the budget passes 
or requires substantial changes to garner support. Announcements on all sorts 
of programs and initiatives are declared in the “budgetary season,” each giving 
the impression that the government is striking out in a new direction or at 
least one consistent with their master brand, as identified in the scholarship of 
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political marketing (for example, Giasson and Marland 2012; Marland 2016; 
2017).
For all their importance, budget speeches as a form of communication have 
not been examined at the federal Canadian level. Certainly, the numbers-anal-
ysis approach to budgets has dominated inquiry in Canada as scholars con-
sidered the ways and means attached to new initiatives (for example, the How 
Ottawa Spends series; see Doern 2005; 2006). In terms of textual analyses, 
Imbeau (2005) studied throne speeches by tracking deficit spending language 
use as compared to the actual budget spending; Dutil and Ryan studied pro-
vincial Ontario budget speeches using textual analysis software to identify 
historical and partisan shifts in language use and Lowe and Benoit (2013) used 
Irish budget documents as a data sample.
This study seeks to answer a basic question: how has the Canadian federal 
budget speech changed over these past two generations? It builds upon 
recent developments in political communication and digital humanities (DH) 
research that demonstrate how new methods of tracking language can shed 
light on changing institutional language and policy trends (for example, Dutil 
and Ryan 2013; Kearney and Banwart 2017; Piersma et al. 2014; Raney and 
Nieguth 2017; Ryan 2015; Soroka 2012; Yu 2014). It considers 40 budgets 
delivered during the 30th to 42nd Parliaments, from 1978 to 2017, delivered by 
twelve different finance ministers. 1
A combination of traditional content analysis and new political communica-
tion and DH textual analysis software are used to identify how the speeches 
capture the priorities of each government. The departure point of 1978 is sig-
nificant in that this speech was created in the context of the G7 Bonn Summit, 
which rattled the Trudeau government to the point of prompting the beginning 
of a relatively austere era in budgeting, part of a global trend. The 1978 budget 
speech was the first to be televised. Not least, it marked a modernization point 
of the budget speech: its language becomes more complex with the added 
attentions of both the PMO and the PCO. Finally, there was a practical reason: 
the Government of Canada Archive documents change at this period to include 
only Hansard verbatim transcripts of the speech instead of simply reproducing 
the written text provided by the government.
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Can textual analysis tools help researchers identify (1) new professional sty-
listic trends prompted by leadership teams that created new, more politically 
targeted vocabularies, or (2) changes to the entire speech genre influenced 
by strategic shifts like the permanent campaign’s use of micro-targeting lan-
guage? We think so. Identifying such shifts would provide similar to findings 
from research on other political communication documents in the burgeoning 
areas of political communication and DH textual analysis research (see for 
example, Dutil et al. 2010; Imbeau 2005).
The first major trend identified in this study is that while the different 
speeches have distinct features that reflect the demands of unique historical 
eras, they do share a high degree of partisan consistency of language. Clearly, 
the budget speech is, at its core, an institutional document. It is largely the 
product of the public service, namely officials in the department of finance 
and, to some degree, staff in the Privy Council Office (PCO) and some select 
line departments. All the same, the speeches also demonstrate some distin-
guishing characteristics marked by the input of each finance minister and his 
staff (notably, there has never been a female minister of finance in Ottawa), 
particularly when tracking language around inflation, surpluses or deficits, 
and stimulus or cuts to spending.
Second, this study also depicts and statistically categorizes speeches. It argues 
that there are perceptibly distinct partisan speech “families,” as well as “mav-
ericks:” singular texts that staked new ground at a distance from their respec-
tive families, but without lasting effect. It also identifies leading “anchor” texts 
that had an enduring influence in terms of top new key words that differenti-
ated the document from its predecessors. The “anchor” speeches distinguish 
themselves by the degree to which “followers” borrowed very similar language 
(using issue network terminology, the anchor speeches were the largest hubs in 
the network, with more speeches using their words). Though numbers tend to 
speak loudest in categorizing budgets, textual analysis software as an instru-
ment can also isolate “spending” speeches from “neutral” and “austerity” ones.
Finally, this study shows that as governments move deeper into their man-
dates, the styles of the budget become increasingly consistent, often re-using 
the language from their first budget. This trend could be viewed as aligning 
budget values with partisan “brand” values after a strong first impression 
in some cases, or a diminishment of intellectual capital in others. In the late 
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1990s, particular words and concepts emerge with more frequency with the 
use of micro-targeting key words that have the earmarks of a sustained public 
relations approach, also commonly known as the prime minister’s office (PMO) 
“permanent campaign.” In such a communications strategy, target-seeking 
messages are repeated to attract specific voter segments, aligning the budget 
with the party brand, based on data-driven focus group and survey analyses 
used to inform the party’s language use (see for example, Giasson and Marland 
2012; Marland 2016; 2017). Micro-targeting here is understood as “the targeted 
pitch to specific slices of the electorate backed by domestic and foreign policy 
signals” (Marland 2016, 4; Patten 2015).
In other words, micro-targeting is the conscious selection and testing of 
language aligned with the master brand of the party, but used in the budget 
speech to attract specific target audiences or publics in the party base or, if 
possible, swing voters. This rise of a distinct language confirms analyses of 
other forms of political communication focusing on framing and the perma-
nent campaign (such as in, for example, congressional speeches, media, plat-
forms, policy documents, presidential addresses, prime minister’s speeches, 
etc.; for instance, see Giasson and Marland 2012; Lawlor 2015; Piersma et al. 
2014; Raney and Nieguth 2017; Ryan 2015; Yu 2014).
LITERATURE REVIEW: TRENDS IN POLITICAL MARKETING 
AND DISCOURSE INSTITUTIONALISM
Two major developments in political communication and marketing research 
have prompted the search for methods to probe how government documents 
display partisan branding as well as an institutional discourse. Lees-Marsh-
ment (2001; 2004) analyzed how British government communications became 
increasingly partisan and strategic, using party funds to finance what has now 
become known as the “permanent campaign.” The permanent campaign is 
defined as: “a theory that the strategies and tactics practiced in the heat of an 
election campaign persist during governance and that all available resources 
are leveraged to maximize communications advantages” (Marland 2016, 40). 
Delacourt (2016) and Marland (2016; 2017) have documented the Canadian 
parallel to Lees-Marshment’s groundbreaking work. They described in detail 
the PMO’s use of “master brand” political marketing strategies, focusing on the 
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Harper Conservative government and its focus on centralized party communi-
cations from 2006 onward.
Three distinct periods have been identified for the development of “permanent 
campaign” tactics, based around the emerging data-driven research tools in 
each era:
1) Modernizing Traditional Market Analyses (1980s-2000s): Tra-
ditional market analyses using such methods as focus groups or surveys 
were the first research tools to increase with sophistication and refinement 
as personal and networked computers became more ubiquitous, prior to 
Lees-Marshment’s identification of permanent campaigning at the turn of 
the millennium (2001; 2004).
2) Data-Driven Market Intelligence (2000s-2010s): The advent of the 
public Internet in 1992 took some time to influence politics in Canada, but 
after the millennium the creation of data metrics for tracking blogs, online 
users, links to voter databases, and eventually social media, all propelled 
the “permanent campaign” as parties began to use networked tools to 
increase the sophistication of coordinated political marketing campaigns 
online and off (for example, Giasson and Marland 2012; Marland and 
Giasson 2015; Patten 2015).
3) Market Surveillance (The Present): Most recently, targeted messag-
ing tactics have become more refined including the use of algorithms and 
bots to maintain and analyze interactive feedback loops with the electorate. 
Potential voters can also now use partisan applications, also known as 
software “apps,” that allow for immediate analysis of on-going responses 
and interaction of the participating users’ activities (for example, Trudeau’s 
2015 election “apps” that fed into a central data portal, and the use of policy 
“deliverology” inspired by the Prime Ministerial Delivery Unit that Michael 
Barber headed under Blair).
Strikingly, the Canadian federal budget has not been examined in such a 
way. Yet it is clear that it is part of a political marketing strategy that aligns 
itself with other major pronouncements such as in political platforms prior 
to elections, throne speeches, and coordinated media communications (see 
for example Imbeau 2005; Ryan 2015; Soroka 2012). This analysis focuses on 
the budget speech itself as a limitation of scope; however, the results provide 
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avenues for future research into how the budget speech is related to the 
budget, platform, throne speeches, or media accounts. The budget speech is 
unique, all the same, in that a sophisticated institutional apparatus (the Minis-
try of Finance) dominates the drafting of the document.
DISCOURSE INSTUTIONALISM METHODS AND DH SOFTWARE 
INNOVATIONS
Two key methods were used for this study: first, a traditional discourse 
analysis of the official government records following contemporary discourse 
institutionalists approaches (for example, Dutil and Ryan 2013; Schmidt 2011), 
and second, an automated textual analysis of the same documents (see for 
example, Dutil and Ryan 2013; Piersma et al. 2014; Ryan 2015; Wilkerson 
and Casas 2017; Yu 2014). The importance of this research is twofold: first the 
discourse institutionalism approach provides an historical overview of profes-
sional and thematic changes to the budget speeches as a communication docu-
ment going back to the start of its modernized format in 1978; and second, the 
textual analysis provides evidence of the impact of the historical shifts, such as 
the permanent campaign strategies outlined in political marketing research, 
particularly as the findings document key changes in language use emblematic 
of conscious branding differentiation decisions and micro-targeting sectors of 
Canadians through language.
In terms of political communication textual analyses, the literature has made 
some progress in identifying how new digital tools help to reveal and visualize 
professionalization and targeted language trends in discourse and texts (for 
example, Cambrosio et al. 2013; Dutil and Ryan 2013; Kearney and Banwart 
2017), though all methods still struggle with distinguishing complex language 
constructions such as synonyms, metaphor, negatives, irony, parody, sarcasm, 
or satire, as well as measuring levels of error (for example, see methodological 
discussions in Craig 2002; Kearney and Banwart 2017; Laver et al. 2003; Lowe 
and Benoit 2013; Piersma et al. 2014; Yu 2014). There are many studies using 
the fixed dictionary Lexicoder methodology to textual analysis (Lawlor 2015; 
Soroka 2012), while fewer provide rich descriptive explorations of word use 
(Dutil et al. 2010; Dutil and Ryan 2013; Imbeau 2005; Raney and Nieguth 
2017).
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Part one of the following analysis focuses on the visualization of automated 
textual analysis data, using the top key words in a document as the raw data, 
compiled by the Voyant Tools concordance software (see: voyant-tools.org). 
The coefficients for the top words, as a ratio to the total words in each budget 
speech, are then visualized using a RéseauLu network, which is a propriety 
mapping software similar to common network analysis tools such as Pajek or 
UCINET (see for instance, Cambrosio et al. 2013; Dutil and Ryan 2013). The 
analysis excludes some 300 stop words (for example, articles, prepositions, 
and auxiliary verbs), so as to focus on the top 30 to 40 per cent of subjects 
in each speech, and is similar to creating word clouds to visualize trends in 
documents.
The network visualization map developed below can be read using basic 
network visualization analysis cues (see Figure 1 below); for example, a 
speech’s node is depicted as a larger circular hub if other speeches use, or link 
to, its words more than other individual speech nodes. In this way, an “anchor” 
speech would be a dominant hub in the network with more relational links to 
speeches that were delivered later, whereas “follower” speeches would simply 
be speech nodes that are statistically plotted and clustered closer to that larger 
hub due to the number of relational links. Overall, the relational clusters depict 
similarity the closer the speeches are plotted together, and the lines simply 
identify a link in the network between nodes (using the terms of relational 
network theorists, the trends are visualized as homogeneous or heterogeneous 
relation networks; for example Cambrosio et al. 2013).
Part two of the analysis is a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) of the 
top 250 key words, excluding stop words, which complements the RéseauLu 
network visualization by using a larger number of variables factoring into 
the stylistic linkages and differences among the speeches (see for example as 
models, Craig 2002; Dutil and Ryan 2013; Ryan 2015). The PCA in this study 
highlights the change of consistent word use in particular periods, demon-
strating at once the importance of “anchor” speeches as well as the rise of 
“permanent campaign” political marketing strategies. Such political commu-
nication and DH software techniques have the potential to allow researchers 
to go beyond the theoretical constructs of institutionalism and examine using 
direct evidence to identify how ideas are “framed” over time. By “mining” the 
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discourse and key words, different analytic software can demonstrate consis-
tencies in what is emphasized and, just as well, what is ignored.
I. Budget Partisan Families: Visualizing Speeches in Historical Context
The discourse institutional analysis of the format changes for the budget 
speech documents reveals the increasingly partisan language and develop-
ing sophistication of strategic communication and political marketing (see 
Appendix 1). Clearly, the budget speech format has changed as technological 
innovations appeared. When electronic typewriters gave way to computers in 
the late 1980s, the ministry of finance formatted budget speech documents to 
include more complex charts and, a few years later, infographics. Advances in 
political marketing also influenced the branding of budgets. The use of giving 
particular titles to budgets, starting in 1993 during Mazankowski’s last year as 
finance minister, announced this new approach.
The budget speeches for the 1978 to 2017 period were fairly consistent in size: 
approximately 22 pages long, with an average of 8608 words. Flaherty’s June 
6, 2011 budget speech was the shortest of the speeches, at seven pages (1,578 
words): it was more of a symbolic gesture as he had delivered a budget speech 
the previous March for the fiscal year 2011-2012 prior to the 2011 election. 
The longest budget speech was delivered by Crosbie in 1979 (48 pages; 17,082 
words), due to the inclusion of 28 pages of tables.
By comparison, the second longest was Martin’s 1995 speech at 36 pages (but 
only 9,853 words). The 1995 speech, beyond signaling a historic turn in gov-
ernment spending, was significant because it included the branded design of 
the Liberal party’s 1993 election program, the Red Book (that is, the conscious 
use of white space, callout highlight boxes, and tables), irrevocably changing 
the document’s traditionally partisan-neutral appearance: the age of perma-
nent political branding was born. Along with the format changes, however, 
exploratory digital analyses help to illuminate how the text of the speech has 
also been branded by partisan concerns over time.
Table 1 presents the dominant key word themes by period, using a combination 
of discourse analysis and a review of the top 35 key words identified using the 
concordance software of Voyant Tools. To note, a comparison to the verbatim 
speeches delivered in the House against the original budget speech was also 
performed. In the verbatim transcript, it was common practice for finance 
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ministers to add extra “Mr. Speakers,” occasional changes to French, or more 
extemporaneous sentences that helped to explain details of the budget. None 
of these additions changed the meaning of the speech.
TABLE 1
TOP BUDGET SPEECH KEY WORD THEMES BY PERIOD, 1978-2015
Budget Speeches (by Period) Dominant Themes Speeches / Pages (Words)
1. The Trudeau Liberals (1978): FM 
Jean Chrétien’s Budget Speech (LPC)
- Price and wage inflation; high 
interest rates
1 speech / 30 pages  
(6,348 words)
2. The Progressive Conservatives 
under Clark (1979): FM John Crosbie’s 
Budget Speech (PC)
- Cuts, deficit repayment, and energy 
stability
1 speech / 48 pages (17,082 words)
3. The Return of the Trudeau 
Liberals (1980 – 1984): FMs Allan 
MacEachen and Marc Lalonde (LPC)
- Deficit control and economic 
recovery
5 speeches / 85 pages (38,628 
words)
4. Mulroney and Campbell’s 
Progressive Conservatives (1985 – 
1993): FMs Michael Wilson and Don 
Mazankowski (PC)
- Jobs, deficit control, and cutting 
taxes (and starting in 1991, the GST)
9 speeches / 240 pages (64,837 
words)
5. The Chrétien and Martin Liberals 
(1994 – 2005): FMs Paul Martin, 
John Manley, and Ralph Goodale 
(LPC)
- Cutting the deficit; focuses on child 
care, education, and research
11 speeches / 285 pages (166,937 
words)
6. Harper’s Minority and Majority 
Governments (2006 – 2015): FMs 
Jim Flaherty and Joe Oliver (CPC)
- The Economic Action Plan, jobs, 
infrastructure, and recession
11 speeches / 183 pages (42,338 
words)
7. The Trudeau Liberals Majority 
Government (2015-2017)
- Middle class families, education, 
and innovation
2 speeches / 25 pages (8,147 words)
AVERAGE TOTALS: 22.4 pages 
(8607.925 words) 
40 speeches / 871 pages (336,170 
words)
NOTE: Abbreviations used in this table include Finance Minister (FM), and their party affiliations of the Conservative 
Party of Canada (CPC), Liberal Party of Canada (LPC), and the Progressive Conservatives (PC). Only the last names of 
the FMs are used throughout this analysis because they are listed here in this table.
Hansard would also include comments from MPs, which would lead to spon-
taneous supportive dialogue between the party and the finance minister (see 
especially Crosbie’s 1978 budget speech). MacEachen’s 1980 budget speech 
started another novel practice: skipping entire paragraphs of the text during 
the speech delivery. This practice demonstrated how the speech document was 
developing a new conventional format: one that might be spoken in the House, 
but also designed to be read by a wide-ranging audience as an entirely sepa-
rate, professionally printed document.
The dominant themes identified in Table 1 are explored in more detail using 
the RéseauLu network mapping software. The use of this tool allows for an 
analysis of word usage and issue framing that was simply not readily available 
prior to the advent of social media. RéseauLu groups texts based on similar-
ities of expression using the top 35 key words and displays them through a 
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relational network (excluding a list of common stop words). Figure 1 shows 
how the speeches from 1978 to 2017 relate to each other in either homogenous 
or heterogeneous network relationships (as described above, for more about 
RéseauLu, see Cambrosio et al. 2013).2  Speeches that the software places 
close to each other have more language in common. Three broad patterns are 
evident in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1
Budget Speech Keywords Visualized Using Réseaulu, 1978-2017
First, there were four clear partisan rhetorical camps, shaped by a high degree 
of consistency in each camp’s use of language. On the top and bottom half of 
the diagram, the affinity of Progressive-Conservative and Conservative budget 
speeches are evident (see Figure 1, the solid line highlighted circles). These two 
groups include the speeches delivered by Wilson in the 1980s, Mazankowski 
in the early 1990s, Flaherty in the 2006-2014 period, and Oliver in 2015. 
The figure shows a remarkable degree of common word usage that indicates 
that the party name change from the PCs to the CPCs in 2004 under Stephen 
Harper hardly affected its choice of vocabulary in drafting the budget.
In contrast, the Liberal government budget speeches are evident in their own 
two groupings on the left and right of the diagram (see Figure 1, encircled by 
a dashed line). These include the Martin speeches of the 1990s, along with 
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Goodale and Manley’s in the early 2000s, all of which used similar top key 
words with a striking amount of consistency.
Beyond those two dominant lexical networks, Figure 1 is interpreted within 
the partisan historical context of each speech in the following four sections, 
which chronologically identify the “families” and vocabularies used by the 
leaders, followers, anchors, and mavericks who built upon the political market-
ing strategies of each era.
1) “Anchor” Speeches and the Rise of Distinctly Partisan Budget Speeches
Along with the partisan families, the diagrams generated by the software 
reveal core “anchor” speeches: texts delivered that set a pattern of rhetoric 
that was followed by successive orations that cluster near that hub. RéseauLu 
shows two fundamental speeches: The Crosbie 1979 speech as well as the 
Wilson 1985 stand as “anchor” speeches, depicted by the large hubs that are 
generated to represent a greater number of links. The Crosbie 1979 stands as 
the pivot point between a family of Liberal speeches (in the pink bubble below 
it) and a widely dispersed cloud of PC and CPC speeches above it in blue. The 
Wilson 1985 speech also stands out, showing how its thinking was recast 
noticeably by Mazankowski, and in part by Flaherty (in the top of Figure 1), as 
the Conservative budget speeches were more likely to emphasize words such as 
“trade,” “savings,” “expenditure,” “competitive,” “private,” “social,” “progress,” 
“unemployment,” and “recession.”
Noticeably, select Liberal speeches from the 1980s, ’90s and 2000s appear 
strongly connected to the Wilson 1985 speech. The most remembered “anchor” 
or “leader” speech was delivered by Martin in 1995, one that carries through to 
Manley in the mid-2000s (and which is also positioned closely with Lalonde’s 
two). The Liberals invoked words such as “education,” “health care,” “increase,” 
“spending,” “energy,” “research,” and “work” more often, which aligned with 
the Red Book master brand during the period (to note, Part II below similarly 
identifies how this “anchor” speech can also be the starting point for perma-
nent campaign brand differences), but still borrowed heavily from Wilson. 
Martin’s 1995 speech was setting the course for the elimination of the deficit 
and a decade of budget surpluses that could fund the common Liberal projects 
as represented in those words.
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2) The Liberal Party of Canada’s Budget Speeches: Leaders and Followers
The impact of the Bonn summit of the G8 in 1978 shows clearly in the Chré-
tien speech of that year, as it sits in the middle of the diagram along with the 
sample of Liberal speeches (see Figure 1). Chrétien had been finance minister 
since 1977 and was determined to continue the Anti-Inflation Program that 
had begun in 1975. However, slower growth and inflation continued to impact 
Canada. As Chrétien remarked: “[a] renewed outburst of inflation was not 
the result of any acceleration in our own incomes or our own domestic costs. 
It was the result of higher food prices and the decline in the dollar” (Budget 
Speech 1978, 5). Overall, 1978’s budget would include another massive deficit, 
the largest in Canadian history up to that time, so as to focus on attempts to 
stimulate growth, while controlling price and wage inflations.
When the Liberals were returned to power, with MacEachen as Minister of 
Finance in 1980, the government’s shift to the right in its use of language 
becomes noticeable. The Trudeau government of 1979-84 was clearly tacking 
towards a more austere budgetary policy, attempting to cope with a severe 
economic recession in 1982-83 while trying to live up to newly emerging 
conservative budgetary principles. The speech of 1980 begins a migration 
towards consistent Progressive Conservative party language use, reaching 
its extreme in the highly controversial speech of 1982 that would eventually 
cost MacEachen his job (it is located near Wilson’s 1985 speech in Figure 1, 
showing a PC use of language). MacEachen presented the first three budget 
speeches delivered during Trudeau’s second majority and final term as prime 
minister.
Canada was still facing large trade deficits, along with high inflation and inter-
est rates. MacEachen discussed the importance of moving away from “quick 
solutions” and creating “a plan in a longer-term framework” by fostering an 
international economic system (Budget Speech 1980, 4184-4185). He proposed 
to maintain or reduce government expenditures, reduce the government deficit 
and financial requirements, avoid personal and corporate tax increases and 
support the Bank of Canada’s monetary policies that helped reduce inflation, 
while fostering an environment that offered minimal government regulation 
and strong competitive forces (Budget Speech 1980, 4185). He also resolved 
to sustain social and economic assistance to the developing world and create 
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manufacturing investments for parts of the country facing high unemployment 
rates.
In his second speech, in 1981, MacEachen wanted to create “equity” through 
an “overhaul of the personal tax system” (Budget Speech 1980, 1). His budget 
projected a reduction in personal income tax for high-earning citizens, a 
reduction of expenditures, and a restriction of several corporate tax income 
measures. This budget aimed to reduce borrowing through the net gain in tax 
revenues and to rescind the manufacturers’ sales tax in order to introduce a 
reworked sales tax (Gillespie 1991, 197). This reform was met with a negative 
response from special interest groups and in his final speech he made no refer-
ence to equity, after changes in the 1981 budget minimized his “plea for equity 
in the November budget” (Gillespie 1991, 198-200).
Instead, MacEachen’s final speech as the finance minister, in 1982, focused 
on a plan to resolve the taxation issues from the November budget (Budget 
Speech 1982, 18876), as the tax reform was still receiving strong opposition 
(Gillespie 1991, 200). The speech places it near the PC camp and Wilson’s 1985-
1989 speeches. MacEachen introduced measures targeted to create jobs and 
economic activity (Budget Speech 1982). All three of MacEachen’s speeches, 
from 1980 to 1982, depict a Liberal government marching towards the right. 
The last speech, however, went too far. The negative reaction was swift and 
MacEachen was removed from the portfolio.
Lalonde took over the finance ministry for the remainder of the Trudeau 
regime and moved the next budget towards more traditional Liberal rhetoric 
as the next election appeared on the horizon. Lalonde’s two budget speeches, 
in 1983 and 1984, focused on Canada’s economic recovery, as industrial pro-
duction and housing prices were rising and inflation and interest rates were 
declining (Budget Speech 1983, 1-3). His 1984 tacking back towards Liberal 
language was only temporarily, as it was the last of the Liberal budgets under 
Trudeau. In spite of the recovery, unemployment rates were still high. Not 
surprisingly, the dominant theme in Lalonde’s speeches was job creation, while 
the primary goal was to ensure sustained economic growth (Budget Speech 
1983, 1).
Lalonde’s final budget speech, in 1984, highlighted how Canada’s economic 
growth was increasing thanks to the success of MacEachen’s 6&5 Program, 
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and inflation had started to decrease (Budget Speech 1984, 1-3). Employment 
was also on the rise, although 1.4 million Canadians were still unable to find 
work. To help ensure the continued growth, Lalonde proposed the continu-
ation of expenditure restraint, measures aimed at strengthening the private 
sector, job creation, particularly for youth, and the creation of policies that 
would allow Canada to compete on the world stage (Budget Speech 1984, 2-3; 
7-8). The visualization demonstrates clearly how the Trudeau administration 
swung wildly in the 1980s, hoping to find solutions to Canada’s economic prob-
lems of inflation, global competition, economic recession, and the demands of 
continued growth.
The Liberals returned to power in 1993 and the budget speeches delivered 
during the Chrétien administration prove very different. All the speeches 
delivered by then Finance Minister Martin (1994-2001) cluster closely to 
other Liberal speeches. Martin’s first budget speech set the precedent as it 
focused on new strategies for job creation and economic growth, while slash-
ing expenses. Notably, Martin’s 1995 speech is the largest node in the Liberal 
cluster here, next to Lalonde’s 1983 speech, which means that it has the most 
relational links to other speeches. This can be interpreted as Lalonde and Mar-
tin’s speeches being key anchors in the cluster, as the remaining speeches have 
smaller nodes, particularly as Martin’s 1995 speech began the cost cutting 
approach that would eventually lead to Liberal surpluses after the turn of the 
millennium. For example, Manley’s sole 2003 budget in the Martin adminis-
tration followed very similar rhetoric (to note, there was no budget presented 
in the calendar year 2002).
Goodale’s speech in 2004 after the election focused on the realities of minority 
government, shifting the Martin administration’s priorities. The second budget 
presented in 2005, again by Goodale, listed priorities that recalled earlier 
commitments but were slightly recast to appease the Bloc and NDP with new 
spending (for example, see Doern 2005). Remarkably, the same speech veered 
dramatically to the political right, using language very similar to Flaherty’s 
“Great Recession” speeches. Like MacEachen and Lalonde, Goodale was 
capable of giant leaps and contrasts in his speech, but it did not work. The 
Liberals were defeated in January 2006.
In 2015, the return of a Liberal majority under Justin Trudeau brought Bill 
Morneau’s unique 2016 speech that is the lone Liberal speech positioned in 
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Figure 1’s top CPC/PC family, near Flaherty’s recession speeches, and between 
the two major hubs of Crosbie’s 1979 austerity budget, and Wilson’s 1988 
spending budget. This lone exception might give weight to the suspicion that 
Morneau is a fiscal conservative, especially given his corporate background. 
However, Morneau’s 2017 speech is firmly situated in the Liberal family of 
speeches (on the left of Figure 1). Party branding of the budget became all the 
more controversial as the design costs of the cover page for the 2017 budget 
amounted to $212,234. The government also set aside $750,000 to promote 
the budget.
3) The CPC Budget Speeches: Leaders and Followers
The Progressive Conservative budget speeches delivered by the Mulroney 
administration and the Conservative government led by Harper huddle 
together in two distinct clusters, evidently tied by a stricter set of principles 
and vocabulary. There were a few exceptions, which were delivered in times 
of financial distress: the Wilson speeches of 1989-90 and the Flaherty speech 
of 2008. The former set tacked towards the more redistributive rhetoric that 
is typical of Canadian Liberalism, while Flaherty’s 2008 speech—the highly 
controversial one that prompted a Liberal-NDP-Bloc coalition to threaten a 
non-confidence vote—is firmly in the Liberal family.
The Wilson speech of 1985, the first one delivered by the Mulroney govern-
ment, presented itself as a clear large hub in Figure 1 (making it an “anchor”). 
It manifestly borrows concepts from both the left and the right. Wilson 
delivered seven budget speeches in his time. In 1985, the new government 
stated that they had inherited an economy that was not growing. There was a 
substantial deficit and they pledged to reduce it by $4.4 billion down to $33.8 
billion through expenditure reductions and tax increases (Budget Speech 1985, 
5). Furthermore, Wilson prioritized job creation for Canadians through “a 
major change in the taxation of capital gains” in order to encourage investment 
from Canadian citizens (Budget Speech 1985, 6).
Wilson’s first two speeches had a heavy focus on job creation and deficit 
reduction. His 1986 budget speech’s primary concern was reducing the current 
deficit even further to $29.8 billion in the coming fiscal year, again through an 
increase in taxation and spending cuts (Budget Speech 1986, 2). In terms of 
new formatting, this budget speech was also notable in that it marked the first 
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time graphs and charts were used throughout the body of the speech: a sign 
that computers were becoming more ubiquitous. This allowed the government 
to format documents more creatively, as compared to the previous electronic 
typewriters, where tables were included only after the body of the speech.
In his third and fourth speeches, Wilson was finally able to deliver good news 
regarding the recovery of Canada’s economy, as Canada’s “rates of economic 
growth and job creation exceeded those of all the major industrial countries” 
(Budget Speech 1985, 1). However, some viewed his 1988 speech as a “self-con-
gratulatory accounting document” (Graham 1988, 8). Similar to his first two 
speeches, Wilson focused heavily on job creation and deficit reduction while 
also beginning a discussion of deregulation and Canada’s ability to compete in 
the world trading market in order to further economic growth. Furthermore, 
Wilson announced a tax reform in order to make the tax system “more fair, 
less complex” and encouraging of productive economic activity (Budget Speech 
1985, 3).
In 1988 the Mulroney government was re-elected and Wilson continued as 
finance minister as the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement was implemented. 
Interestingly, Wilson migrated back to the style of his inaugural budget speech 
in his address. The deficit proved implacable and once again Wilson’s speech 
centered around its reduction through government expenditure cutbacks. His 
final two speeches also focused on deficit reduction; however, from his first 
year as finance minister to his last he was only able to reduce the deficit from 
$38.2 billion to $31.4 billion.
All the same, Wilson’s speeches in the second Mulroney term showing them-
selves as moderate, pushing the language into new territory and will stay in 
this middle range until he is succeeded by Mazankowski, whose speeches 
are more traditionally Conservative. It is striking to see the degree to which 
some of Martin speeches were crafted along Wilson’s lines. Mazankowski’s 
approach, in contrast, would be pursued by the Flaherty speeches. Mazankow-
ski took over the finance ministry for the last two years of Mulroney’s second 
term as prime minister. Like his predecessors, Mazankowski aimed to find 
“lasting solutions” to Canada’s economic problems and to cut the deficit, but 
unlike Wilson, Mazankowski aimed to do this while simultaneously cutting 
taxes. However, the deficit had risen to $45.7 billion by the end of his two-year 
term as finance minister.
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In 2006, the Conservatives’ five priorities election platform was translated 
into the budget, in light of the larger promise to preserve social programs “and 
to increase overall spending by $30 billion over five years” aimed at attract-
ing middle-class voters that they had gained at the Liberals’ expense in the 
election (Doern 2006, 8). These themes are evident in Figure 1, as many of 
Flaherty’s minority government speeches are positioned near Wilson’s mod-
erate second term speeches. The budget included spending on maintaining 
the currently projected growth rates for transfers to persons through elderly 
benefits and Employment Insurance, and transfers to other levels of govern-
ment for health, social programs, equalization, and municipal infrastructure, 
decreasing the GST, and increased spending on Canadian Defence.
The Conservatives were able to maintain support in the House in 2006 by 
spending on NDP social programs when it served their interests, and by 
targeting the Liberals on their past spending failures while they were going 
through a change in leadership. For the 2007 Budget, Flanagan (2009) noted 
how important the balancing act of using other parties was in these terms:
getting the BQ to support his budget and softwood lumber agreement 
with the United States; the BQ and the NDP to support the Accountability 
Act (the Liberals supported it in the House but delayed it in the Senate); 
one faction of the Liberals to support extension of Canada’s mission in 
Afghanistan; and all three opposition parties to support his motion “That 
this House recognize that the Québécois form a nation within a united 
Canada.” (Budget Speech 2009, 275)
These strategies allowed the 2006-2008 agenda to pass for the most part, with 
exceptions to the government’s crime and gun legislation which were stalled 
in committees. Harper asked the Governor General for an election in 2008, 
circumventing his relatively new fixed election date rule, when it was clear 
no agreements could be made with opposition parties to move the agenda 
forward. The 2006 Conservatives had governed with the smallest minority 
ever in the Canadian House of Commons (just 40.6% of the seats).
Notably, Flaherty’s 2008 through 2011 recession speeches migrate further into 
the same Liberal area as Mazankowski’s 1993 speech in Figure 1, signaling 
a more middle-of-the-road approach, particularly as the minority Harper 
government would eventually prepare to call for an election in 2011. Flaherty 
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delivered 10 budget speeches in the House, though his 2011 speech was deliv-
ered twice due to the election, making him the longest serving finance minis-
ter in this period. Martin comes second with nine budget speeches.
4) The “Maverick” Speeches
The RéseauLu mapping also clearly isolates “maverick” speeches as hubs 
that sit at a distance of other speeches, or within opposing speech families, 
sharing words with many other speeches. The overlapping vocabulary in these 
maverick speeches can be discerned both in the broad thematic discourse 
analysis provided in Figure 1 (and also by looking at the unique lexicons of 
key economic terms in Part II below). These were speeches delivered typically 
at transition points, or at points of more extreme stress for the governments. 
The standouts are, in chronological order, Crosbie 1979, Flaherty 2008 and 
Morneau 2016, three speeches that aimed to strike a bi-partisan balance (see 
Figure 1).
Perhaps the most obvious one in this regard is the controversial Crosbie 
speech of 1979. Though it borrowed heavily from Liberal rhetoric, it was insuf-
ficient to win the support of the House and the Clark minority government was 
defeated on a vote of confidence following the speech. Crosbie’s budget was 
the first Progressive Conservative budget in 17 years. The speech assessed the 
current economic situation passed on to him from the previous Liberal gov-
ernments under Pearson and Trudeau. The economy had suffered throughout 
the 70s due to an “increase in energy prices and the unhappy combination of 
slower economic growth and general price inflation found in most countries” 
(Budget Speech 1979, 2). The second energy crisis had reached its peak in the 
fall of 1979, leading the PCs to boldly aim to have Canada self-sufficient in oil 
production by the 1990s (Budget Speech 1979, 3).
In Figure 1, Crosbie’s speech appears as a standout maverick and also rep-
resents, as noted above, a major hub connecting both of the partisan camps. 
Thematically, Crosbie’s budget aimed to reduce the deficit and create a system 
of incentives that would “encourage Canadians to work, to save, to invest, to 
take risks in Canada, to become more efficient in production and to conserve 
energy and other scarce resources” (Budget Speech 1979, 3). He announced a 
plan to limit growth in government expenditures to 10 per cent a year. Cros-
bie’s plan also focused on raising oil and gas prices though an energy tax and 
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an excise tax, which would allow the government to “assist in developing alter-
nate energy sources, conservation methods and to assist regions and people in 
Canada in absorbing these higher costs” (Budget Speech 1979, 4). The energy 
tax was supplemented with a refundable tax credit for lower- and middle-in-
come Canadians. Sin tax increases on alcohol and tobacco were introduced, 
and unemployment insurance contribution rates were also increased at the 
time. It was a maverick in that its particular use of rhetoric had no followers.
II. Tracing the Development of the “Permanent Campaign”
The second and perhaps more convincing reflection of the increasing influence 
of political marketing was apparent in the Principal Components Analysis 
(PCA) of the top 250 key words in each speech. Hugh Craig’s Intelligent 
Archive software (2002) reduces the documents to the top 250 key words, 
excluding stop words, creating coefficients based on each document’s total 
words, and then transforms the variables based on the top two factors in the 
set (in this case, frequency and similarity of use within the documents). The 
PCA created three clear periods of speeches:
1) The Liberal and PC speeches, 1978 to 1992: The first period identified was 
the volatile deficit decade of speeches. These speeches called for creative 
responses and word use in this period, as compared to the increasing con-
sistency of voices in Martin and Flaherty’s budget speeches, depicted in the 
latter two periods below. The words that pulled the first decade of speeches 
together use PCA included “funding,” “need,” “strength,” “support,” and 
“provide.”
2) The Liberal Speeches, 1993 through 2017: The professional use of political 
marketing language to create the Liberal Red Book was evident using 
PCA, inclusive of Martin, Goodale, and Manley’s speeches. Words such as 
“burden,” “programs,” “prosperity,” “reduce,” “reform,” and “strategy” are 
representative of this Liberal era’s lexicon. Similarly, the Morneau speeches 
plotted in this area as well.
3) Flaherty and Oliver’s Speeches, 2006 to 2015: The very controlled, repeti-
tive language in the Conservative party era was identified through PCA to 
include the words “competition,” “costs,” “gas,” “industry,” “insufficient,” 
“recession,” and “revenues.”
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Previous studies have identified how PCA can be used to identify historical 
grouping of similar documents (for example, Craig 2002; Dutil and Ryan 
2013).
Table 2 below demonstrates this similar historical relationship by aggregating 
the PCA coefficients for words representative of “spending,” then subtracting 
them from “cutting” budgets (not including stop words; this algorithm follows 
Dutil et al. 2010). In particular, the algorithm adds together the coefficients 
for all root word variations of a discrete set of “spending” terms as ratio of the 
total number of words in each document (that is, the words “asset,” “develop,” 
“increase,” “invest,” “outlay,” and “spend”), then subtracts that value from a 
group of austerity budgetary terms (specifically, “cut,” “decrease,” “reduce,” 
“saving,” and “recession”). Table 2 identifies that the spending budgets include 
Lalonde’s, and some of Wilson, Mazankowski, and MacEachen, during the 
high deficit years between 1978 and 1992. Martin’s 2005 and Harper’s 2009 
budgets were also spending budgets, as they were forced into amendments to 
retain power (that is, Martin’s 2005 minority deals with the NDP, and Fla-
herty’s 2009 recession stimulus budget).
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TABLE 2
THE FEDERAL BUDGET SPEECHES ANALYZED FOR ECONOMIC TERMS














































































**NOTE: The two asterisks depict minority government years above. 
Similarly, many of Flaherty and Martin’s budgets dominate the austerity list 
in Table 2, as might be expected due to their deficit fighting years. Most of the 
majority government budgets are “neutral” or “austerity” budgets, depending 
on the time period. Flaherty’s 2010 and Crosbie’s 1979 budgets are the only 
two minority budgets presented in the “austerity” category; the former reflect-
ing how the 2010 budget was used during the 2011 election campaign, while 
the latter reflecting Clark’s response to the previous Trudeau spending budget. 
Not surprisingly, Morneau’s 2016 stimulus budget is among the highest in the 
“spending” category.
MICRO-TARGETING LANGUAGE
Strategic micro-targeting language trends that align with each party’s master 
brands are also represented using word list searches by era focusing on eco-
nomic key words outside of the top 35 words (see Table 3). Simply using the 
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raw frequencies in Table 3 (due to space restrictions for the coefficients), the 
1980s to ’90s can be shown as the era of struggling with debts and deficits. 
The later Martin leadership era starts to include new focuses on accountability, 
education, health care, surpluses, transparency, and research that match the 
Liberal “caring” brand (as identified in Marland 2016; 2017); and Flaherty’s era 
focuses on the Economic Action Plan, globalization, infrastructure, jobs, and 
stimulus, matching the Conservatives “strong leadership and economy” brand 
(as identified in Marland 2016; 2017).
TABLE 3
ECONOMIC KEY WORDS RAW FREQUENCIES






















accountability 0 0 0 1 13 12 0
city/cities 0 1 4 3 17 20 1
debt(s) 7 11 11 212 135 44 2
deficit(s) 5 52 82 247 131 31 0
economic  
action plan
0 0 0 0 0 111 0
education* 0 0 7 17 127 48 10
efficiency* 1 2 15 38 19 20 1
equity 0 4 13 14 6 0 0
employment 8 14 68 48 36 60 3
expenditures 27 62 50 162 33 3 1
global / globalization 0 0 0 11 40 90 0
growth 18 71 108 302 110 115 19
GST 0 0 0 17 7 12 0
health care 0 1 1 3 90 31 12
inefficiency 0 0 0 10 3 0 1
infrastructure 0 0 1 4 58 77 11
jobs 3 4 68 127 105 183 22
labour 1 4 31 62 11 11 0
military/defence 0 0 11 4 21 10 8
transparency 0 0 0 0 10 3 2
revenue(s) 14 68 37 123 54 8 1
rural 0 0 0 1 29 6 6
stimulus 3 0 7 1 6 21 0
surplus 3 10 5 15 17 17 0
unemployed* 6 29 43 55 45 10 1
union(s) 0 0 8 5 1 0 1
urban 0 1 1 1 18 2 1
NOTE: The coefficient ratios based on the total word count in each set of documents were not listed above due to space limitations, 
and only the raw frequencies are provided in the above table.
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Topical key words can also be applied to distinguish the speeches (Dutil and 
Ryan 2013; Dutil et al. 2010). Again, a split in framing lexicons is evident (see 
Table 4). It may not be surprising, but clearly demonstrates conscious decisions 
about the branding language being used to communicate the federal budget 
speech, while also reflecting the time period.
TABLE 4
TOPICAL KEY WORDS RAW FREQUENCIES






















Aboriginal(s) 0 0 0 2 40 15 0
Child care/ child tax credit 3 (tax credit) 3 (tax credit) 3 13 16 17 6
Climate change 0 0 0 0 20 4 7
Computer(s) 0 0 0 1 4 5 0
Disabled/ disability 1 0 0 39 44 21 1
Diversity 0 0 1  
(diversification)
4 9 3 5
Ethnic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Family/families 1 12 26 62 124 150 29
First Nation(s) 0 0 0 0 7 17 4
Grandchildren 0 0 0 0 3 7 0
Handicapped 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Homosexual/ Sexuality 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Human rights 0 0 0 2 1 1 0
Immigrants/ Immigration 1 0 7 6 16 12 1
Indian(s)/ Indigenous 0 0 2 16 5 0 0
Information technology 0 0 0 0 7 0 0
Man/Men 1 0 0 4 5 8 3
Religion 0 0 0 0 3 0 0











Youth/young 0 2 30 7 70 28 7
Woman/women 0 1 7 12 21 17 15
COUNTRIES
China 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
India 0 0 0 0 0 4 0
United States 7 7 13 34 16 14 3
NOTE: The coefficient ratios based on the total word count in each set of documents were not listed above due to space limitations, and only 
the raw frequencies are provided in the above table.
For example, the Liberals used “climate change,” whereas the PCs and CPCs 
avoid it. Similarly, the dominance of the middle-class “family” grows with 
the professionalization of political marketing language over time, in Table 4. 
The shifting cultural use for Indigenous representation terms is also present 
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in Table 4, moving from “Indians,” to “Aboriginals” under Martin, to “First 
Nations” under Flaherty, based on cultural identity discussions, where pres-
ently “First Nations” and “Indigenous” have been identified through the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission’s efforts to be used in government profes-
sionalization and respectful consensus based communication among nations. 
In this way, digital humanities techniques quickly identify omissions, which 
were possibly at times reflective of the era (for example, women’s issues), or by 
conscious choice (for example, “climate change”).
PERSONALIZATION
Finally, a change in personalization is apparent when using words beyond the 
top 35 words analyzed in the RéseauLu visualization above (see Table 5).
TABLE 5

































































NOTE: The coefficient ratios based on the total word count in each set of documents are presented in parentheses below the raw 
frequencies in the above table.
In fact, Table 5 presents the diminishing use of “I” each period until the 
present, and in contrast the third person “we” voice increases in use (see 
Figure 2). In 1985, there is a shift to the inclusive “we” over that of the 
first-person voice, so that the finance minister is a part of a team, inclusive of 
“Canadians” as a part of the team.
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FIGURE 2
PERSONALIZATION OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET SPEECHES BY ERA
This change was similarly identified in other budget speech and platform doc-
uments from the same time period (see Dutil et al. 2010; Pennebaker, Slatcher 
and Chung 2005; Ryan 2015), reflecting a historical transition of the trend 
away from grand leaders to that of a team brand, which followed market anal-
yses of successful framing language uses. The trend also documents a starting 
point for the centralization of power in the PMO affecting the micro-targeting 
of language, as the “permanent campaign” regime consolidated under Harper.
CONCLUSION
The use of political communication and DH textual analysis methods allows 
for an insightful visualization of the partisan lexical families in the Canada 
budget speeches. The RéseauLu network demonstrated how speeches formed 
partisan families, drawing on similarities in word use. The other statistical 
methods further demonstrated how some speeches were “anchors” in terms of 
starting trends (that is, MacEachan, Wilson, Martin, and Flaherty’s, in chrono-
logical order), while others were “followers” in the continuation of trends 
(that is, Mazankowski, Manley, Goodale, and Oliver’s). Finally, the techniques 
allowed a discernment of “maverick” speeches (for example, Crosbie, Lalonde, 
and Wilson’s 1985 speech). The “mavericks” noticeably belonged to the earlier 
era under scrutiny in this study, written during the volatile period when cre-
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ative responses were being explored to aid with the economic difficulties of the 
1970s and early 1980s.
The analysis also reveals the fingerprints of the developing strategic commu-
nications approaches used by the government, a trend found in other political 
marketing research and discourse institutionalism analyses. The Liberals’ 
budget speeches fell into two broad categories from 1993 to 2005, and the 
Conservative party’s consistent language from 2006 to 2015, demonstrated 
two distinct clusters of key words used to attract potential voters. The Liber-
als’ “caring” brand focused on aboriginal issues, education, health care, and 
research funding, whereas the Conservatives’ “strong leadership and economy” 
brand consistently highlighted their Economic Action Plan goals of boosting 
jobs, building infrastructure, and dealing with the impacts of the 2009 global 
recession.
During these periods, the first speech created by the finance ministers led 
the others in terms of developing dominant themes. The decrease in lexical 
choice afterwards demonstrates a reduced level of creativity and a decision 
to stick with “the tried and true” in order not to confuse the electorate with a 
multiplicity of messages, which reflects common critiques of the diminishing 
intellectual capital at the center of government over time, leading to Canadians 
voting out, or firing, governments for their longstanding ways of thinking (and 
more specifically, “speaking” in this case). In other words, digital textual anal-
ysis methods measure and illustrate patterns that are not captured by hearing 
a budget speech. They also isolate clearly the rise of “permanent campaign” 
tactics, the dominant political innovation of the past generation. Overall, the 
analysis above provides a platform for on-going research into the use of rhet-
oric in the budget speech document that notably sets the future path for each 
federal government.
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ENDNOTES
1  Please see Appendix 1 online for the full list of speeches cited and used in this analysis. The 
original document sources of the budgets and budget speeches for this research mainly came 
from the Government of Canada’s online archive, which includes records back to 1968 (see 
Government of Canada, “Archived Budget Documents” at:  
http://www.budget.gc.ca/pdfarch/index-eng.html). Laval University’s POLTEXT online 
archive also includes copies back to 1958 of the verbatim Hansard transcripts as spoken in 
the House (see POLTEXT, “Canadian Budget Speeches” retrieved from: https://www.poltext.
org/en/part-1-electronic-political-texts/canadian-budget-speeches). All verbatim speech 
transcripts are also available as part of Hansard, going back to 1901 (see Hirst et al. 2014). 
At the provincial level, the Government of Ontario has led the way with its 2018 Digitized 
Government Publications initiative, which will eventually include all of Ontario’s budgets, 
including handwritten versions going back to 1868, when the total provincial budget was 
less than three million dollars (available at: http://www.archives.gov.on.ca/en/historical_
documents_project/historical_document_project.aspx). 
2  To note, more network visualizations were run with a higher sample of words (e.g., the 
top 250 words), as well as using iterations breaking the speeches up by decade, to check and 
ensure the accuracy of these interpretations. For space purposes, we did not include more 
network images.
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET SPEECHES 1978 - 2016
Finance Minister Date Title Page Count 
(Word Count)
Bill Morneau, LPC March 22, 2017 Building a Strong Middle Class 11 
(3,370)




Joe Oliver, CPC April 21, 2015 Strong Leadership: A Balanced Budget, Low-Tax 




Jim Flaherty, CPC February 11, 
2014
The Road to Balance: Creating Jobs and Opportuni-
ties. Canada’s Economic Action Plan 2014
10 
(2,215)
Jim Flaherty, CPC March 21, 2013 Jobs, Growth and Long-Term Prosperity the Top 
Priority of Canada’s Economic Action Plan 2013
21 
(3,737)
Jim Flaherty, CPC March 29, 2012 Jobs, Growth and Long-Term Prosperity the Top 
Priority of Canada’s Economic Action Plan 2012
9
(3,619)
Jim Flaherty, CPC June 6, 2011 The Next Phase of Canada’s Economic Action Plan 




Jim Flaherty, CPC March 22, 2011 The Next Phase of Canada’s Economic Action Plan 




Jim Flaherty, CPC March 4, 2010 Leading the Way on Jobs and Growth 19
(3,551)
Jim Flaherty, CPC January 27, 2009 Canada’s Economic Action Plan 24
(5,163)




Jim Flaherty, CPC March 19, 2007 Aspire to a Stronger, Safer, Better Canada 22
(5,425)
Jim Flaherty, CPC May 2, 2006 Focusing on Priorities 23
(6,029)
Ralph Goodale, LPC February 23, 
2005
Delivering on Commitments 22
(6,955)
Ralph Goodale, LPC March 23, 2004 New Agenda for Achievement 17
(6,077)
John Manley, LPC February 18, 
2003
Building the Canada We Want 18
(6,685)
-- 2002 -- --
Paul Martin, LPC December 10, 
2001
Securing Progress in an Uncertain World 21
(7,400)
Paul Martin, LPC* October 18, 2000 Economic Statement and Budget Update 11
(4,838)
Paul Martin, LPC February 28, 
2000
Better Finances, Better Lives 24
(6,816)
Paul Martin, LPC February 16, 
1999
Building Today for a Better Tomorrow 29
(8,855)
Paul Martin, LPC February 24, 
1998
Strong Economy & Secure Society 30
(9,412)
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THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET SPEECHES 1978 - 2016
Finance Minister Date Title Page Count 
(Word Count)
Paul Martin, LPC February 18, 
1997
Building the Future for Canadians 30
(9,400)
Paul Martin, LPC March 6, 1996 Securing the Future: Budget 1996 32
(8,779)
Paul Martin, LPC February 27, 
1995
Seizing Opportunity Today: Budget 1995 36
(9,853)
Paul Martin, LPC February 22, 
1994








Don Mazankowski, PC February 25, 
1992
The Budget 1992 28
(6,296)
Michael Wilson, PC February 26, 
1991
The Budget Speech 33
(6,948)
Michael Wilson, PC February 20, 
1990
The Budget Speech 29
(5,192)
Michael Wilson, PC April 27, 1989 The Budget Speech 27
(6,119)
Michael Wilson, PC February 10, 
1988
Securing Economic Renewal: The Budget Speech 16
(4,677)
Michael Wilson, PC February 18, 
1987
Securing Economic Renewal: The Budget Speech 29
(5,377)
Michael Wilson, PC February 26, 
1986
Securing Economic Renewal: The Budget Speech 29
(8,511)
Michael Wilson, PC May 23, 1985 Securing Economic Renewal: The Budget Speech 30
(17,731)
Marc Lalonde, LPC February 15, 
1984
The Budget Speech 23
(7,732)
Marc Lalonde, LPC April 19, 1983 Budget Speech 27
(10,640)
Allan MacEachen, LPC June 28, 1982 Budget Speech 9
(6,221)**




Allan MacEachen, LPC October 28, 1980 Budget Speech 11 
(9,555)**








The Average Budget 




Source: Government of Canada. “Archived Budget Documents.” Retrieved from http://www.budget.gc.ca/pdfarch/
index-eng.html 
Notes: 
*Martin’s lone budget update is available in the archive and denoted with one asterisk to signify that it was not 
included in this analysis, but is listed here as a reference for those interested in the current completed archives. Its 
language notably fit right in with the other Martin budgets, if we were to include it in the sample.   
**Hansard transcripts are the only versions available for these documents, and there is no separate speech docu-
ment available based on our archival research to date.
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Chapter 3 




The federal government has been attempting to implement an analytical tool, 
gender-based analysis plus (GBA+), to assess how groups of women, men, and 
gender-diverse people may experience the policies, programs, and initiatives 
of the federal government. This Policy Brief argues that GBA+ needs to include 
the differential impact of public policies on people living in the various regions 
of Canada.
The “plus” of GBA+ recognizes that gender-based analysis must go beyond 
biological (sex) and socio-cultural (gender) differences and must recognize the 
intersection of multiple identity factors like race, ethnicity, religion, age, and 
mental or physical disability (Canada 2017a). One identity factor that is also 
often included is “geography,” the importance of where people live in Canada, 
and it is on this factor that the following analysis will focus (Canada 2016b).
When formulating public policy, the federal government is applying this ana-
lytical tool, GBA+, in its budgetary processes by taking into account the differ-
ential impact of its fiscal measures on individuals. The federal government’s 
analysts, researchers, evaluators, and decision-makers need to account for the 
regional impact of its programs, analyze those differing effects, and report to 
Parliament on how the various provinces and territories fare. This would also 
make officials more aware of the regional impacts of any new programs being 
considered or changes to existing ones.
ANALYSYS
Gender-Based Analysis Plus
In 2015, the Auditor General of Canada released a report on gender-based 
analysis (GBA). Two standing committees of Parliament, Public Accounts and 
the Status of Women, released reports in 2016 on the implementation of GBA+ 
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(Canada 2016a; Canada 2016b). Among the recommendations of the Status of 
Women’s committee report was a call to implement a GBA+
framework focused on ‘intersectionality’ whereby individuals are under-
stood as being shaped by an interaction of different identity factors, 
including but not limited to gender, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, indigeneity, class, sexuality, geography, age, mental or physical 
disability, and migration status. (Canada 2016b, 16).
The federal government has been working to ensure that GBA+ is being 
“applied comprehensively to all aspects of policy development and deci-
sion-making” (Canada 2018a, 219). Government departments and agencies are 
required to conduct a GBA+ analysis on proposals that go to Cabinet.
In the 2017 federal budget, the Finance department suggested that a gen-
der-based analysis of budgetary measures had evolved into GBA+ and should 
include intersecting identity factors (e.g., ethnicity, age, income, sexual orien-
tation) (Canada 2017b, 217). In the 2018 budget, the federal government incor-
porated gender budgeting as a core pillar of budget-making, outlined a Gender 
Results Framework, and laid out its approach to gender budgeting. It also 
suggested that implementation of “a GBA+ analysis of the budget documents” 
must accompany each budget and that the Gender Results Framework must 
enshrine gender budgeting in everything from tax expenditures to federal 
transfers and the existing spending base (Canada 2018a).
However, there are other important identity factors that did not make 
Finance’s list, including the spatial distribution of people across Canada. These 
identity factors involve the type of community or environment, be it urban, 
suburban, rural, or remote. Each major policy change also will have a differen-
tial impact on each province and territory and, indeed, on the different areas 
within each jurisdiction.
Equalization Within Canada
Perhaps the most explicit recognition of the regional nature of Canada is the 
federal government’s fiscal Equalization program. However, the equalizing 
provisions of federal programs are not restricted to the Equalization program. 
In many federations, various strategies to improve fiscal equity and discourage 
centrifugal forces within society, including progressive forms of taxation, 
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central government expenditure programs, and intergovernmental grants, 
produce an asymmetrical distribution of fiscal resources. They have the effect 
of transferring financial resources from taxpayers in some states, provinces, or 
regions to residents in other sub-national jurisdictions in the federation.
In the Canadian federation, a policy change may be implemented without 
accounting for regional impacts because the program is delivered in precisely 
or almost the same way in every province and territory. For example, a policy 
change like increasing or reducing the age of eligibility for Old Age Security 
(OAS) benefits or expanding the Canada Pension Plan (CPP)/Quebec Pension 
Plan (QPP) may have a greater impact in some parts of the country than in 
others. Even a technical change, such as revising the provisions of the federal 
fiscal Equalization program, will most certainly affect some provinces differ-
ently than others.
A review of some of the various means through which equalization takes 
place in Canada will demonstrate which provinces and territories benefit 
most extensively. In the analysis that follows, a clear distinction will be made 
between those programs that explicitly identify equalization as their primary 
purpose, programs like fiscal Equalization, Territorial Formula Financing 
(TFF), and regional economic development agencies, and those programs 
where equalization is implicit or its secondary purpose, programs like the 
Canada Health Transfer (CHT), Canada Social Transfer (CST), Employment 
Insurance (EI), OAS and the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), and the 
CPP/QPP.
Data will be drawn from various sources, including the most recent federal 
budget and the EI Monitoring and Assessment Report, but the analysis will 
depend most heavily on Statistics Canada’s reporting of federal revenues and 
spending in each of the provinces and territories in its Government Finance 
Statistics. It converted the previous Provincial Economic Accounts (PEA) data 
set to be compatible with internationally accepted accrual accounting frame-
works for government financial statistics.1 Beginning publication in 2016, the 
Government Finance Statistics for provinces and territories currently makes it 
possible to analyze federal, provincial, territorial and local government reve-
nues and expenditures between 2010 and 2016.
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Using Statistics Canada’s data on federal revenue and spending by province 
and territory provides an estimate of how much revenue the federal govern-
ment expects to collect for the current fiscal year, 2018-19, and how much 
it anticipates spending in each province and territory during the same year. 
These data are provided in Table 1. Of course, neither the federal government 
nor Statistics Canada publishes its budgetary information in this format, but 
by using the Statistics Canada distribution of revenues and expenditures, it 
is possible to generate useful estimates. Note that these revenue and expense 
data include all revenues raised by the federal government in each province 
and territory, federal transfer payments to provincial and territorial govern-
ments, transfer payments to individuals, and all remaining federal spending.
Table 1
TOTAL FEDERAL EQUALIZATION BY PROVINCE AND TERRITORY 
2018-19 ($ BILLIONS)
Federal Revenues Federal Expenses Budgetary 
Balance
Zero Balance*
BC 41.5 37.3 4.1 6.0
Alberta 55.5 24.1 24.1 26.7
Saskatchewan 11.0 10.4 0.5 1.0
Manitoba 9.9 14.9 -5.0 -4.5
Ontario 128.7 120.4 8.2 14.2
Quebec 56.9 76.4 -19.5 -16.8
New Brunswick 5.4 10.7 -5.3 -5.1
PEI 1.0 2.4 -1.4 -1.3
Nova Scotia 7.1 14.7 -7.5 -7.2
Newfoundland 5.0 6.7 -1.6 -1.4
Yukon 0.4 1.6 -1.3 -1.3
NWT 0.7 2.4 -1.8 -1.7
Nunavut 0.3 2.1 -1.8 -1.8
CANADA 323.4 338.5 -15.1 0
The results for 2018-19 are not significantly different from those generated 
for previous years and by various researchers (Hartmann and Thirgood 2017; 
Granofsky and Zon 2014; Zon 2013; McAllister 2011; Quebec 2011; Quebec 
2010; Quebec 2002). In every year, for at least several decades, the federal 
government has raised a great deal more money than it spends in three prov-
inces—British Columbia, Alberta, and Ontario—while it spends more money 
than it raises in the other provinces and in the territories. The most recent 
years, including 2018-19, have been somewhat unique in that in Saskatchewan 
the federal government has been collecting more revenue than it has been 
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spending (Statistics Canada 2018). The difference is not great, but is in marked 
contrast to the many decades in which the federal government spent more 
money than it raised in Saskatchewan.
Equalization and Territorial Funding
The federal government’s fiscal Equalization program is the most explicit and 
often the most controversial means by which the federal government equalizes 
fiscal resources geographically or horizontally to reduce regional disparities 
between provincial governments through cash payments to certain prov-
inces (Beland 2017). The program is protected by a 1982 amendment to the 
Canadian Constitution that enshrines “the principle of making equalization 
payments to ensure that provincial governments have sufficient revenues to 
provide reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably com-
parable levels of taxation” (Section 36 (2)). The TFF program has a similar 
rationale, recognizes the higher cost of providing programs and services in 
remote northern communities and provides the three northern territories with 
a significant amount of funding. Of the $22.7 billion that will be paid to prov-
inces and territories in 2018-19 in Equalization and TFF cash transfers, over 
half will go to the province of Quebec. The three Maritime provinces receive 
more per capita than the other provinces, but the territories receive TFF pay-
ments which, on a per capita basis, are more than any of the provinces will 
receive in Equalization payments.
There is another way of looking at the Equalization and TFF programs. That is 
to ask the question: How much each jurisdiction’s taxpayers contribute to the 
federal government in financing the current programs versus how much their 
respective governments receive in Equalization or TFF payments? In the four 
provinces that do not receive Equalization—BC, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and 
Newfoundland and Labrador—taxpayers will contribute close to $8 billion in 
the current year to fund the two programs. Ontario, which will receive $963 
million in Equalization payments, will contribute another $9 billion to fund 
the program, for a net contribution from its taxpayers of over $8 billion in the 
current year. Each of the other Equalization and TFF recipients contribute 
less than they receive, but even the largest recipient of Equalization payments, 
Quebec, contributes over $4 billion to funding the program for a net benefit of 
$7.7 billion.
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In other words, it is not enough to simply identify how much each province 
and territory is receiving in Equalization and TFF payments. It is also neces-
sary to ask which provinces’ residents are funding those programs. Ontario, 
for example, appears to be a “have not” province because its provincial govern-
ment is receiving Equalization payments, but in fact its taxpayers are funding 
those payments and a lot of the payments received by other provinces and 
territories.
Other Major Federal Block Transfers
In 1977, support for postsecondary education, hospital insurance, and medical 
care insurance was merged into the Established Programs Financing (EPF) 
transfer. The EPF program involved a transfer of cash and personal and corpo-
rate income tax points that effectively meant that the governments of the most 
prosperous provinces, usually BC, Alberta, and Ontario, received less cash 
per capita than the other provinces and territories’ governments. The Canada 
Assistance Plan (CAP) for income maintenance and social services was sub-
jected in 1990 to a “cap on CAP” which reduced transfers to BC, Alberta, and 
Ontario.
The EPF and CAP programs were merged in 1995 into the Canada Health and 
Social Transfer (CHST). The provisions of the EPF transfer which limited cash 
transfers to BC, Alberta, and Ontario were carried forward into the CHST. 
Even when that program was split into the CHT and the CST in 2004, these 
same provisions still applied. It was not for another decade before both the 
CHT and the CST were fully based on a distribution of cash transfers that was 
equal per capita for all provinces and territories.
Both the CHT and the CST programs still entail the federal government raising 
more revenues in some jurisdictions than it transfers to those jurisdictions. In 
the case of the CHT, the residents of Alberta are contributing in excess of $2 
billion annually to the program, more than their government is receiving in 
federal transfers from the program. Lesser net amounts are being contributed 
by the residents of Saskatchewan, Ontario, Newfoundland and Labrador, and 
each of the territories. Meanwhile, the government of Quebec is receiving 
close to $2 billion more than its residents are paying to support the CHT. The 
governments of BC, Manitoba, and the Maritime provinces are receiving lesser 
amounts in excess of what their residents are paying the federal government. 
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Similar results are obtained for the CST, but because the program is smaller, 
no province or territory’s entitlements are a billion dollars more or less than 
the revenue raised from their respective taxpayers.
Social Programs
Milestone programs like EI, the CPP/QPP, OAS, and the GIS involve payments 
by the federal government directly to unemployed, elderly, or disabled individ-
uals. Those payments may treat individuals equally no matter where they live, 
but they do not benefit each province or territory equally. Either intentionally, 
as in the case of EI, or as a function of the design of the program, they may 
operate much like regional development programs in providing greater assis-
tance to individuals living in certain jurisdictions. Those differences among 
provinces and territories also mean that any changes to those programs will 
have different impacts on different jurisdictions.
One major program that is not delivered in precisely or even almost the same 
way in every province and territory is EI. It is designed to provide support to 
individuals during short term periods of unemployment, but in comparing the 
benefits received with the contributions paid into the program, the federal gov-
ernment has found that “the EI program has a considerable positive income 
redistribution effect, with lower income families having a higher adjusted total 
benefits-to-contribution ratio than higher income families (Canada 2018b: 
32).”
The federal government also has found that EI equalizes incomes between 
regions of low unemployment and regions of high unemployment (Canada 
2018b). Benefits-to-contributions ratios vary widely across provinces and terri-
tories. Individuals and businesses in some jurisdictions contribute more than 
those living elsewhere to financing the EI program and individuals in some 
jurisdictions benefit more than elsewhere. The program accomplishes this by 
designating certain EI regions, often in rural and remote parts of the country, 
to receive more favourable treatment. Among those receiving regular benefits, 
as of 2015, benefits-to-contributions ratios were as low as 0.69 in Ontario and 
0.60 in the Northwest Territories and as high as 3.48 in Prince Edward Island 
and 4.07 in Newfoundland and Labrador. Total benefits-to-contributions 
ratios, which include other benefits, did not differ to the same degree, but still 
varied substantially (Canada 2018b: 28).
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In 2015, “Ontario, the western provinces, the Northwest Territories, and 
Nunavut received less EI (total) benefits and regular benefits per dollar con-
tributed in premiums than Canada as a whole (Canada 2018b: 27).” The four 
Atlantic provinces and Quebec received more in EI regular and total benefits 
per dollar contributed in premiums. Most recently, Alberta and, to a lesser 
extent Saskatchewan, have benefited to a greater degree because low oil prices 
and a sluggish economy have resulted in significant increases in EI benefits in 
those provinces.
Given this regional distribution of EI premiums and benefits, any increases of 
benefits or premiums will disproportionately benefit the Atlantic provinces, 
Quebec and, at least most recently, Alberta and Saskatchewan. Concomitantly, 
any cutbacks or restrictions to the EI program will have their greatest negative 
impact in those same provinces.
Similar sorts of comparisons can be made for other social programs, although 
in most instances regional disparities are not an explicit feature of the 
program. The CPP is outside the federal fiscal plan and is administered pretty 
much the same way in every jurisdiction outside Quebec. However, the CPP 
consistently collects more in the way of contributions (not to mention income 
from interest and other earnings on investments), than it pays out to individu-
als and does so just about everywhere except Atlantic Canada. In those prov-
inces, transfers to households exceed contributions by individuals and firms. It 
is likely that any major increases to CPP benefits, as are currently planned, will 
be of greatest benefit to people living in those same Atlantic provinces.
OAS is available to Canadians in all provinces and territories who are over the 
age of 65 with the GIS available to low income seniors as well as an Allowance 
for Survivors. However, payments to seniors have a greater economic impact 
in the Atlantic provinces, Quebec, Manitoba, and BC because OAS and GIS 
payments flow disproportionately to individuals in those provinces. In the 
current year, of the $54 billion to be spent on elderly benefits, those provinces 
will receive about $7 billion more than their share of taxpayers’ contributions 
to federal revenues would suggest. Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, and the 
three territories will receive a smaller share of old age pension payments than 
their taxpayers contribute in revenues.
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This means that cutbacks to these programs, as the government of Stephen 
Harper tried to implement by raising the age of eligibility to 67, would have 
resulted in the people and the economies of Atlantic Canada, Quebec, and BC 
being negatively impacted to a greater extent than would the rest of Canada. 
A major exception was the Progressive Conservative government of Brian 
Mulroney’s “clawback” of OAS benefits from high-income seniors, beginning in 
1989. It would have likely affected the more affluent jurisdictions to a greater 
degree than the low-income provinces.
Economic and Financial Policy
As per Section 36 of the Constitution Act of 1982, federal, provincial, and 
territorial governments are committed to promote economic growth and pros-
perity in specific regions of the country. Regional development agencies now 
pretty much cover the whole of the country and spend about a billion dollars 
annually. The most money being spent by these regional development agencies, 
in per capita terms, has been in the northern territories and Atlantic Canada, 
with smaller but still substantial amounts for western Canada, Ontario, and 
Quebec.
In committing funds for infrastructure, the federal government precisely 
directs where the money is to go and it, or rather the federal Cabinet, can 
proceed on the basis of its own priorities. The federal gas tax fund, when it was 
initiated in 2005, was intended to allow municipal governments to finance the 
infrastructure and other costs of running local governments. The funds were 
to be distributed among provinces on an equal per capita basis, but the small-
est jurisdictions (PEI and the territories) argued successfully that they needed 
a minimum amount of funding, a base fund, regardless of their population. 
The federal government responded accordingly and the $2 billion dollars 
involved each year flows disproportionately to the smaller jurisdictions.
Sometimes, industrial policy requires the federal government to provide 
extraordinary assistance to certain firms which are based solely or largely in 
one or a few regions of the country. During the Great Recession a decade or 
so ago, assistance to General Motors and Chrysler Corporation was largely for 
the benefit of Ontario. Aid to the aerospace industry may disproportionately 
benefit Quebec, aid to the fisheries may benefit the Atlantic provinces, while 
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tax expenditures that benefit the mining, oil, and gas sectors may benefit BC, 
Alberta, and Saskatchewan more than other provinces.
Governments also use the tax system to achieve certain policy goals and those 
goals often involve the equalization of fiscal resources. Raising or lowering 
federal tax rates, particularly for personal and corporate income taxes, but 
also for the GST, or implementing various tax expenditures will have a differ-
ent impact in the various parts of the country. This occurs even as the same 
overall tax rate and credits are applied across Canada. The greater the share of 
tax revenue collected by the federal government, the greater the equalization 
that will occur.
The provinces and territories with the highest personal incomes, for example, 
can be expected to contribute more income tax revenue than the national 
average. The federal government is heavily reliant on taxpayers in the four 
largest provinces. Close to 90 percent of federal individual and corporate 
income tax revenue comes from Ontario, Quebec, BC, and Alberta. In fact, 
almost 60 percent of federal revenue from individual and corporate income 
taxes comes from people living in just two provinces, Ontario and Alberta. 
Outside of the four largest provinces, only in Saskatchewan and Manitoba does 
the federal government collect more than about three percent of its revenue 
from individuals or corporations.
In per capita terms, the federal government collects 65 percent more personal 
income tax in Alberta than the national average, more than double the per 
capita amounts collected from residents of Manitoba, Quebec, or the Maritime 
provinces. It also collects 59 percent more corporate income tax revenue per 
capita in Alberta than the national average, more than double what it raises in 
Manitoba, Quebec, and Atlantic Canada.
The federal government also collects about five percent more personal income 
tax per capita in Ontario and Saskatchewan than the national average, five 
percent more corporate income tax in Ontario, and 22 percent more cor-
porate income tax in Saskatchewan than the national average. The federal 
government is similarly reliant on taxpayers in the four largest provinces for 
revenue from the Goods and Services Tax (GST). In per capita terms, it collects 
27 percent more GST revenue in Alberta, nine percent more in BC, and four 
percent more in Saskatchewan than the national average (Statistics Canada 
2018).
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All of this means that any major changes to federal tax rates will have a dif-
ferential impact on the various provinces and territories. A political party or 
government that campaigns on a promise of lower taxes should be aware that 
their message is likely to be seen as more important in some provinces than in 
others. The major cuts to the GST undertaken by the Harper government, for 
example, were likely more beneficial to people in BC, Alberta, and Saskatche-
wan than in the other provinces.
CONCLUSIONS
The federal government has made a commitment to pursue GBA+. It requires 
a systematic use of data to identify the ways in which public policies affect 
women and men differently. This tool includes the intersecting identity factors 
that must be considered when formulating public policy along with and in 
relation to factors like ethnicity, religion, class, age, mental or physical disabil-
ity, and geography.
This Policy Brief has argued that the federal government should be required 
to report to Parliament on the specific regional fiscal impacts of each major 
piece of legislation, each existing major federal program and each significant 
modification to those federal programs. The federal government needs to 
account for the differential impact of these programs and should analyze those 
differing effects and report on how the various regions, provinces, and territo-
ries fare. This would make explicit the impact on each province and territory 
of the various measures the federal government undertakes. It would also 
make officials more aware of the regional impacts of any new programs being 
considered or changes to existing ones.
ENDNOTES
1 A complete explanation of these changes can be found at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/13- 
605-x/2010001/article/11155-eng.htm Zero Balance Assumes Revenues Plus Deficit Equals 
Expenses and is used to compensate for federal government surpluses or deficits. Source: 
Statistics Canada. 2018; Canada. 2018a. The total for the provinces and territories will not 
add to the total for Canada because of federal revenues and expenditures outside of Canada.
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Chapter 4 
Amplifying Indigenous Voices in 
National Energy Governance and 
the Sustainable Development 
Strategy
Mary Gramiak and Stephan Schott
INTRODUCTION
The 2008 Federal Sustainable Development Act was a great breakthrough as it 
finally created a legal framework for developing and implementing the Federal 
Sustainable Development Strategy (FSDS). The FSDS is the primary vehicle 
used by the federal government to outline the country’s sustainable devel-
opment priorities in the short and medium-term. Under the Act, the federal 
government is mandated to produce a FSDS progress report every three years, 
which tracks progress and updates the goals as necessary (Federal Sustainable 
Development Act 2008).
The most recent FSDS was published in 2016, and outlined thirteen goals 
ranging from action on climate change and prioritizing clean energy sources, 
to infrastructure development, to protection of water, wildlife, and natural 
habitats (Government of Canada 2016). The goals are designed to link with the 
seventeen global sustainable development goals (SDGS) outlined in the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development (Government of Canada 2016). However, 
unlike the SDGs which takes a holistic approach to sustainable development 
based on social, economic, and environmental dimensions, the FSDS is mostly 
approached from an environmental perspective. Although consultation for 
the FSDS requires three representatives each from Indigenous groups, envi-
ronmental NGOs, business organizations, and organizations representative of 
labour, the government opted to expand the consultation process to the wider 
public. In 2016 it launched their online discussion space “Let’s Talk Sustain-
ability” and received more than 540 written comments and 900 social media 
posts regarding the draft of the FSDS (Government of Canada 2016).
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The public consultation process resulted in guidance for the prioritization of 
specific goals such as a plan to transition to a low-carbon economy, a more 
ambitious target for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from federal 
government operations, pricing carbon, and using more renewable energy. In 
addition, there was support for a renewed emphasis on strategic environmen-
tal assessment that should incorporate environmental sustainability consider-
ations on a daily basis in key social and economic policy areas. The Sustainable 
Development Advisory Council (hereafter the “Council”), which is comprised 
of three representatives each from environmental non-governmental organi-
zations, organizations representative of business, organizations representative 
of labour, and Indigenous peoples, highlighted the role of Indigenous peoples 
in the FSDS, and encouraged enhanced nation-to-nation collaboration and 
greater integration of Indigenous Traditional Knowledge. Council members 
identified the FSDS as “having the potential to recognize regional differences 
while helping to unify Canada,” as they emphasized the importance of develop-
ing a long-term vision for Canada.
As we are nearing the end of this three-year strategy, we are in the midst of 
important decisions that require sustainability assessments, clear directions, 
and benchmarks, particularly as we are witnessing legacy energy projects 
such as Muskrat Falls (in Labrador), the Site C Clean Energy Project (in BC), 
and the Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain Pipeline from Alberta to Vancouver. 
Premier Trudeau claims that the TransMountain Pipeline is in the national 
interest, but whose national interest? Are Site C and Muskrat Falls, two pro-
vincially sponsored projects, also in the national interest? How can the next 
FSDS help to better guide decision-making, better incorporate a nation-to-
nation dialogue, and provide the right sustainability criteria and enforcements 
for large provincial legacy projects and provincial autonomy over energy 
policy? These are some of the questions we wish to address.
CONTEXT AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TRADITIONAL 
ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE
Throughout the last 50 years, traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) and 
participation of Indigenous peoples has been slowly institutionalized into 
public policy and environmental management processes both within Canada 
and across the world due, in large part, to a number of key international 
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agreements. Although agreements like the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
Agenda 21 or the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP) have helped to advance the institutionalization of TEK 
in environmental and natural resource management in principle, significant 
challenges in defining what meaningful participation of Indigenous peoples in 
environmental governance looks like in practice still remain.
The concept of “sustainable development” originated in the Brundtland 
Report, also known as Our Common Future, in 1987. The report, commis-
sioned by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 
argued that environment and development should be viewed as interlinked, 
and development must be balanced with environmental conservation (Sanya 
2011). Now a seminal document in the legitimization of sustainable develop-
ment, the report further acted as a catalyst for the recognition of the potential 
for TEK to be incorporated into sustainable development, with the WCED 
Global Agenda of Change describing Indigenous communities as having “vast 
repositories of knowledge” (McGregor 2012).
Since the Brundtland Report made its debut on the world stage various inter-
national agreements have sought to incorporate TEK into sustainable devel-
opment including: the 1992 Earth Summit and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity; the 2002 adoption of Agenda 21 at the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development in Johannesburg; and the annual Council of 
Parties sessions. However, few documents have been able to direct the role of 
Indigenous peoples in sustainable development like the 2007 United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). The latter serves 
as a culmination of previous international efforts which strived for the rec-
ognition of the inherent rights of Indigenous peoples in environmental man-
agement and beyond. The 46-article declaration was adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September of 2007, but it was originally 
opposed by the Canadian government until a decision to reverse the position 
and officially endorse, but not adopt or implement, the document was made 
in 2010 (Canada endorses indigenous rights declaration 2010). At the time, 
control over resource management and land claims settlement was considered 
one of the main points of contention with the Canadian government.
Though the declaration is broad and non-binding, and was only officially 
adopted by the Canadian government in May of 2016, the legal implications 
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with respect to the role of TEK in environmental governance are expansive. 
For example, UNDRIP grants Indigenous peoples the right to self-determina-
tion (Article 4) and to participate in decision-making in matters which have 
the potential to affect their rights (Article 18). Further, Article 19 reads: “States 
shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous [sic] peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain 
their free, prior, and informed consent before adopting and implementing 
legislative or administrative measures that may affect them” (United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007). Within Canadian envi-
ronmental governance, Article 19 of UNDRIP has the potential to dramatically 
alter the consultation process and act as a legal precedent for the incorporation 
of TEK into the decision-making processes.
Despite the fact that UNDRIP was only adopted by the UNGA in 2007 and 
by Canada in 2016, incorporation of Indigenous peoples into environmental 
management practices on the national level can be traced back to the Mack-
enzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, also known as the Berger Inquiry (1974-1977). 
The Berger Inquiry marked the first attempt by the national government to 
determine the impact of large-scale frontier projects before the project was 
undertaken (Berger 1987), and concluded with a ten-year moratorium on 
pipeline development in order for the government to settle land claims along 
the proposed route (Stanton 2012). However, it still took nearly 20 years before 
the “meaningful participation” of Indigenous peoples in federal and provincial 
environmental assessments became mandated under federal law in the 1992 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (C-15.2).
While well-intentioned, the 1992 federal environmental assessment act and its 
provincial counterparts are limited by their lack of Indigenous perspectives, 
an inability to address Treaty and Indigenous rights and Indigenous titles, 
and a lack of cumulative assessment requirements, among others (Booth and 
Skelton 2012, 52). Though British Columba has adopted its own environmental 
assessment act, other provinces have been slow to follow and there remains no 
nationally consistent approach or policy regarding the use of TEK in environ-
mental governance (McGregor 2014).
The Harper government streamlined the environmental assessment process. 
Recently, the Trudeau government has adopted legislation poised to over-
haul the process, which will supposedly offer the opportunity to balance 
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the economy and the environment while protecting Indigenous rights and 
assessing overall sustainability (McCarthy 2018). With respect to Indigenous 
peoples specifically, the revamped environmental assessment process would 
mandate that Indigenous rights must be acknowledged throughout any review 
process, and consideration of Indigenous traditional knowledge would be 
mandatory (McCarthy 2018). Perry Bellegarde, current National Chief of the 
Assembly of First Nations responded that he “welcomed the recognition of 
Indigenous peoples’ rights at every stage of the process” but noted “room for 
improvement” remains (McCarthy 2018). Critics of the overhaul come from all 
sides of the political spectrum, including executives from resource-extractive 
industries who warn the proposed legislation would make it “virtually impos-
sible to build oil and gas pipelines,” and environmental activists who lament 
the Liberal approach of positioning themselves as climate leaders, while simul-
taneously financially-backing pipeline projects like the Kinder Morgan project 
currently underway between Alberta and British Columbia (Olive 2018).
This contradiction of positions, simultaneously positioning themselves as 
“climate leaders” while betting billions on the Kinder Morgan pipeline, may 
prove to be too tight of a rope for the Liberal government to walk come the 
2019 federal election next year. While the Trudeau government ensured voters 
back in 2016 that a balance could be struck between economic prosperity and 
stringent environmental protection, the financial and political support the 
government has offered the Kinder Morgan pipeline project will likely alienate 
uncommitted voters who are disappointed by the federal government’s deci-
sion to support such a contentious project.
Additionally, in the last decade Canada has experienced a return to large-scale 
hydro projects and refurbishments of nuclear reactors in an effort to mitigate 
greenhouse gas emissions. The top four infrastructure investments at the 
moment in Canada are Bruce Power refurbishment ($13 billion), followed by 
Darlington nuclear refurbishment ($12.8 billion), Muskrat Falls ($12.7 billion), 
and Site C Clean Energy Project ($9.4 billion) (see top100project.ca). Two 
further hydropower projects are in the top seven investments, only one of 
which has direct Indigenous involvement (Keeyask Hydroelectric Project [$8.7 
billion]). Next, we will briefly review two of these major projects to highlight 
shortcomings in the involvement of Indigenous decision-makers and the 
definition of sustainable development.
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RECENT QUESTIONABLE LANDMARK DEVELOPMENTS
A. Muskrat Falls
With federal commitments to reduce national greenhouse gas emissions by 
30% below 2005 levels1, there has been a renewed push toward large-scale 
hydroelectric investment across the country (Storey et al. 2011). The Muskrat 
Falls Hydro Project, located in Lower Churchill Falls, Labrador, was first 
approved in 2012, and committed to building four turbines generating 4.9 
million MWh of energy per year—enough to close the Holyrood thermal plant 
to the south, and offsetting 96 million tonnes of emissions by 2065 (Storey et 
al. 2011). While 40% of the power generated would be consumed by Newfound-
land and Labrador residents, another 20% would be transmitted via subma-
rine cables to Nova Scotia in an effort to reduce the province’s dependence on 
coal-fired generation plants, which currently make up nearly half the power 
generated in Nova Scotia (Weill et al. 2012). The remaining 40% is expected to 
largely be exported to New England.
While originally approved in 2012, the project is billions of dollars over budget 
and years behind schedule (Bailey 2017). This can largely be attributed to the 
failure to account for, and consult with, Indigenous groups in the area, includ-
ing the Innu, the Inuit, and the Metis, on the social, health, and environmental 
impacts they would face as a result of construction of the project. Indigenous 
protestors have warned the flooding of the Churchill River will result in the 
affected vegetation decomposing underwater, and releasing methyl mercury, a 
harmful toxin which could make its way into the fish, seals, and birds, which 
the surrounding 200-person community relies on for food, in addition to 
the Inuit and Innu communities located downstream (Delaney and Boone 
2016). Protests against the project have been ongoing, with fall 2016 protests 
resulting in a nearly two-week standoff, concluding with a deal between the 
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador and the concerned Indigenous 
groups to establish an independent panel tasked with reducing health impacts 
(Goodyear 2016). Most recently, in May of 2018 several protesters and Indig-
enous elders from Newfoundland and Labrador were detained on Parliament 
Hill after breaching a designated perimeter, indicating the battle over Muskrat 
Falls is far from over (Dickson 2018). The Government of Nunatsiavut initiated 
the Lake Melville: Avativut, Kanuittailinnivut (Our Environment, Our Health) 
Review with independent researchers to assess the potential impacts of the 
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hydropower project (Nunatsiavut Government 2016). Unfortunately results 
of the study indicated significant risk to food security and food consump-
tion to Indigenous people in the area. This risk was not factored in by either 
Nalcor, the crown-corporation responsible for managing the provinces energy 
resources, or the provincial review process. As Trevor Bell (2016) puts it quite 
eloquently: “Must Labrador Inuit be given a chronic dose of methyl mercury 
in order to provide “clean” energy to the rest of the province and beyond?” 
This summarizes the issues with provincial-federal-Indigenous relations very 
well in this country. There seems to be a lack of direction and consideration 
of standing of different groups in this country, and it is often the most vul-
nerable groups that are losing out on major provincial projects. The federal 
government has a clear mandate here but either fails to intervene because of 
provincial sovereignty over energy policy or because greenhouse gas mitigation 
trumps other environmental impacts.
B. Site C
On the opposite end of the country a similar scenario is playing out following 
the 2014 approval of British Columbia’s contentious Site C dam in the north-
east region of the province. The 1,100 MW site would flood nearly 5,500 hect-
ares of land in the Peace River district, submerging traditional lands of First 
Nations in the region and sensitive ecological habitats, and threatening local 
food supplies (Ball 2014). Like in the case of Muskrat Falls, methyl mercury 
released by flooding could contaminate waters and food sources for a period of 
between 20 and 30 years (Amnesty International 2016).
While the provincial government is portraying the Site C project as a way to 
match increasing demands for electricity in a renewable way, the opposition 
from First Nations and others has been intense. According to one group of 
Canadian academics, “the number and scope” of harms identified by the 
independent environmental assessment of federal and provincial governments 
was “unprecedented in the history of environmental assessment in Canada” 
(Amnesty International 2016). Others, including First Nations groups in the 
region, have filed lawsuits and legal motions—though these have been unsuc-
cessful in halting the project. Amnesty International has pointed out that the 
Peace River Valley falls within the bounds of Treaty 8, which recognizes the 
right of First Nations to “pursue their usual vocations of hunting, trapping and 
fishing,” as well as a continued obligation for federal and provincial govern-
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ments to uphold rights guaranteed under the UNDRIP (Amnesty International 
2016).
It may seem strange that the provincial governments would forge ahead with 
such a contentious project and the federal government would give its approval 
for a project that was already rejected in 1983 due to the intense opposition 
from First Nations groups (Evenden 2009). However, in a similar sentiment 
to Muskrat Falls, the provincial commitments to the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions from electricity projects appear to be the principal factor for 
federal approval. The 2007 BC Energy Plan aims to reduce dependence on 
imported electricity and to find new sources of emissions-free generation 
(Evenden 2009), in part by pledging “all new electricity generation projects 
will have zero-net GHG emissions” (Peacock 2009). According to BC Hydro, 
Site C would be a source of clean, renewable, and cost-effective electricity for 
more than 100 years, and would have a small carbon-footprint relative to how 
much electricity it would produce (Ball 2014). There is no doubt, however, that 
the BC government is in need of additional clean energy for their LNG projects 
that require large amounts of energy as BC is striving to become a significant 
player on the trade and export of LNG (The Government of BC 2017). While 
current BC Premier John Horgan campaigned on opposing Site C, it appears 
even his newly-minted NDP government will reluctantly move forward with 
the project (Kurjata 2017).
OUR RECOMMENDATIONS
As contentious energy projects like large-scale hydro and pipeline projects 
make a notable return to the Canadian development landscape, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that there is a vacuum for strong public policy which priori-
tizes a cross-cutting interpretation of sustainable development and prioritizes 
Indigenous involvement in environmental management. In the absence of such 
federal legislation, we feel there is room for the FSDS to be revamped in a way 
which begins to address some of the shortcomings in the federal government’s 
approach to sustainable development and protects Indigenous communities 
from exploitation and harassment at the hands of provincial governments and 
corporations, the Crown or otherwise. Organized into six recommendations, 
it is our intention to create greater space for Indigenous voices in the consul-
tation process of resource management projects, and to build a strategy which 
embodies a wider definition of sustainable development.
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Recommendation 1
First and foremost, the term “sustainable development” within the strategy 
must be widened to include social, cultural, environmental, and economic 
factors that include Indigenous views and preferences. In the current FSDS, 
the priorities are overwhelmingly environmental, with the focus of eleven 
of the thirteen goals focusing strictly on the environment (Government of 
Canada 2016). In addition, while utterly important, reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions should not be the sole priority without consideration of all 
aspects of sustainable development. This broadening would also allow the 
Strategy to better reflect the Sustainable Development Goals, to which the 
FSDS is supposedly trying to steer.
As the development of large-scale hydro projects such as Muskrat Falls and 
Site-C, which threaten to poison the water and food sources for Indigenous 
communities, make a notable return on Canada’s development spectrum, there 
is a demonstrable need for a Federal Sustainable Development Strategy which 
goes beyond strictly environmental considerations, energy needs, and carbon 
reduction targets to include broader elements of sustainable development.
Recommendation 2
Within the same tone, there is a need within Canada for the interactions 
between Indigenous communities and their provincial governments to be 
better facilitated in order to prevent short-sighted decisions made in the 
narrow interest of provincial politics. Highlighted by both the Muskrat Falls 
and Site-C example of the past few years, it is clear that, despite promises 
of a “renewed nation-to-nation” approach and total adoption of UNDRIP by 
the Trudeau government, truly meaningful consultation remains an elusive 
concept. Beyond just provincial politics, in 2017 the Supreme Court of Canada 
ruled that Indigenous groups were not properly consulted before the National 
Energy Board gave oil companies the green light to conduct seismic testing in 
Nunavut (Fontaine 2017). There is room here for the FSDS to come into play 
in a way which potentially spells out guiding principles, at the very least, for 
how provinces and federal bodies like the National Energy Board, soon to 
be the Canadian Energy Regulator, interact with Indigenous communities. 
More importantly, it could provide a much-needed opportunity to provide 
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Indigenous groups in Canada with an equal voice as part of a nation-to-nation 
approach in federal and provincial/territorial regulations and negotiations.
Recommendation 3
Next, within the consultation process for the development of the FSDS, it is 
important to approach Indigenous advisors as “rights-holders” rather than 
“stakeholders.” This is an important distinction, which recognizes the inalien-
able connection between Indigenous communities and the environment, as 
well as their historic claims to the land. This would represent a major shift in 
the way consultation with Indigenous actors is approached, and would create 
an environment more focused on genuine engagement and explicit authori-
ties in decision-making processes. One of the biggest criticisms of the Site C 
consultation process, voiced by Chief Wilson of West Moberly First Nations, 
was that the provincial government “had already made their decision, and 
then they came to talk to use and told us what their decision was” (Amnesty 
International 2016). While this is a province-specific example, it represents 
a broader pattern throughout the entire country of treating the consultation 
process as “no more than a box to check off” (Bowie 2014). In order to combat 
these nationwide patterns, there must be change in the mentality behind 
consultation of Indigenous communities and groups. Shifting the dialogue 
to address Indigenous partners in consultation from “stakeholders” to 
“rights-holders” throughout the development of the FSDS can serve to start to 
shift these ways of thinking.
Recommendation 4
To create a more inclusive consultation process, the responsible parties should 
allow for contributions to be submitted in a variety of ways, rather than exclu-
sively through written recommendations. Traditional knowledge in Indige-
nous communities is passed down through an oral tradition, and comprises 
thousands of years of knowledge, lessons, and experience. To try to take these 
principles of sustainability which are embedded in Indigenous culture and 
distill them into policy briefs does not do these forms of knowledge justice, 
and weakens their ability to inform development of the strategy in a mean-
ingful way. Not only does this alienate Indigenous groups, but it means the 
strategy itself is missing out on principles and lessons which could strengthen 
its ability to guide sustainable development. We need to engage in meaningful 
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knowledge co-production process with Indigenous communities and govern-
ments to redefine sustainable development (von der Porten et al. 2016; Tengo 
et al. 2016; Parsons et al. 2016). This will involve the collection of stories, the 
use of alternative interactive spatial mapping data tools and other knowledge 
sharing processes.
Recommendation 5
Further, adopting a change in the way in Indigenous groups are consulted 
aligns with the current federal government’s promises to develop a “renewed 
nation-to-nation relationship with Indigenous Peoples” (Liberal Party of 
Canada 2018), while also tying into the recommendations of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission—a document which the federal government has 
sworn to uphold. One of the major recommendations of the Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission is to implement the UNDRIP, which calls on states 
to go beyond just consultation of Indigenous people, and instead to take an 
approach which facilitates collaboration (Amnesty International 2016).
Recommendation 6
Finally, there is the potential for the FSDS to be linked to a National Energy 
Strategy (currently being debated), which guides energy management priorities 
across Canada. In 2010, the Banff Dialogue was convened by Canada’s leading 
environmental think tanks and concluded with three overarching themes: (1) a 
need for a “Canadian Clean Energy Strategy;” (2) a need to emphasize conser-
vation and reduction of energy demand; and finally (3) a need to put a price on 
carbon to highlight the relationship between energy and the environment (The 
Council of the Federation 2015). Since then, the “Canadian Energy Strategy” 
was adopted by the premiers of Canada’s provinces and territories at the 2015 
annual Council of the Federation meeting in St. John’s, Newfoundland (The 
Council of the Federation 2015). The strategy focused on the collaboration of 
provinces and territories to shape an energy future, which is environmentally 
and socially responsible, contributes to economic growth, and provides energy 
security (The Council of the Federation 2015). However, since then there is 
little evidence the strategy has been utilized in any kind of impactful way. 
By linking the FSDS with a revamped national energy strategy, there can be 
greater space for Indigenous consultation on matters related to sustainability 
definitions and energy transition policies.
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CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS
Throughout this paper, we have argued the 2016 Federal Sustainable Develop-
ment Strategy falls short in multiple aspects, hindering its ability to effectively 
guide sustainable development across the country. The next FSDS needs to 
actively involve the true stewards of our land who have different concepts of 
sustainability, and needs to effectively incorporate TEK in decision-making 
and guidance. The FSDS also needs to link with any functional national energy 
strategy which is being developed and provide guidance for provinces on inter-
acting with Indigenous communities throughout the course of energy projects. 
This is particularly important in light of the continued absence of legislation 
which prevents the exploitation of communities and the proper protection of 
Indigenous hunting and fishing grounds.
Finally, there needs to be a fundamental shift in the way in which “sustain-
able development” is conceptualized and practiced both within the FSDS and 
across the country. At its inception, “sustainable development” was a holistic 
term, encompassing social, political, cultural, economic, and environmental 
elements. However, over the course of recent decades we have seen the term 
denigrated to a purely environmental concept, abandoning these additional 
components, which makes it challenging for the FSDS to link with the 2030 
Sustainable Development Goals. Broadening the definition and practice of sus-
tainable development will help guide Canada towards a future which is com-
prised of not only a clean environment, but sustainable political, economic, 
and social systems as well.
Going forward, energy issues, climate change, and truth and reconciliation will 
undoubtedly play a central role in public policy and the upcoming federal elec-
tion, as the Trudeau Liberals will be challenged on their track record on both 
the environment and the economy. The Liberals will have to convince weary 
supporters that Truth and Reconciliation, environmental protection, and the 
implementation of UNDRIP remain key priorities following the recent Kinder 
Morgan, Muskrat Falls, and Site C dilemmas. However, this will be a tough 
case to make should the current federal and provincial governments continue 
on a path of poorly thought-out and inappropriately prescribed energy proj-
ects which threaten Indigenous communities, result in undue delays and cost 
burdens, additional emissions or contamination, and are not necessarily in the 
complete national interest.
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ENDNOTES
1 As of COP 21 (the Paris meeting in 2015) this was what Canada committed to. Previously 
the federal government had a less ambitious goal but individual provinces had their own 
targets.
66 How Ottawa Spends
REFERENCES
Amnesty International “The Point of No Return: The Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 
Canada Threatened by the Site C Dam.” 2016.
BC Government 2018. https://lnginbc.gov.bc.ca/, accessed May 28 2018. Canada. 
Environment and Climate Change. “Achieving a Sustainable Future.” 2016.
Bailey, Sue. “Residents demand review as fears grow over Muskrat Falls dam.” CBC News, 17 
July 2017.
Ball, David P. “West Moberly nation vows lawsuit over Site C dam.” Windspeaker, vol. 32, no. 
4, 2014, pp. 7.
Bell, Trevor. “The Muskrat Falls Project: New evidence supports a precautionary approach 
and social justice for Labrador Inuit.” Memorial University Gazette, 2016. Op-ed: https://
gazette.mun.ca/research/op-ed-dr-trevor-bell/
Berger, Thomas R.. “The Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry.” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 16.3 
(1978) : 639-647.
Booth, Annie L., and Norman W. Skelton. “Improving First Nations’ Participation in 
Environmental Assessment Processes: Recommendations from the Field”. Impact 
Assessment and Project Appraisal, vol. 29, no. 1, Mar. 2011, pp. 49–58.
Bowie, Ryan. “Indigenous Self-Governance and the Deployment of Knowledge in 
Collaborative Environmental Management in Canada.” Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue 
D’études Canadiennes, vol. 47, no. 1, 2013, pp. 91–121.
The Council of the Federation: Canada’s Premiers. “Canadian Energy Strategy.” 2015.
Delaney, Anna and Marilyn Boone. “Protestors arrested at Muskrat Falls site released.” CBC 
News, 17 October 2016.
Dickson, Janice. “Indigenous Protesters Angry over Muskrat Falls Detained on Parliament 
Hill.” CTV News, 7 May 2018.
Evenden, Matthew. “Site C forum: considering the prospect of another dam on the Pace 
River.” BC Studies, vol. 161, 2009, pp. 93.
Federal Sustainable Development Act. Statutes of Canada, c.33. Canada. Department of 
Justice. 2008.
Fontaine, Tim. “We’re concerned’: After Supreme Court rulings, duty to consult a hot topic at 
AFN meeting.” CBC News, 26 July 2017.
Goodyear, Sheena. “Scientists back Inuit efforts to limit mercury poisoning from Muskrat 
Falls hydro project.” CBC News, 26 October 2016.
Kurjata, Andrew. “John Horgan Disappoints Both Site C Opponents and Supporters in 
Northeast B.C.” CBC News, 11 Dec. 2017.
67 How Ottawa Spends
Liberal Party of Canada, 2018. “A New Nation-to-Nation Process.” 
https://www.liberal.ca/realchange/a-new-nation-to-nation-process/
McCarthy, Shawn. “Liberals Unveil Overhaul of Environmental Legislation for Major 
Resource Projects.” The Globe and Mail, 8 Feb. 2018.
McGregor, Deborah. “Lessons for Collaboration Involving Tradition Knowledge and 
Environmental Governance in Ontario, Canada.” Alternative, vol. 10, no. 4, 2014.
Nunatsiavut Government. “Lake Melville: Avativut, Kanuittailinnivut (Our Environment, 
Our Health).” Scientific Report: 80 pages, 2016.
Olive, David. “How B.C. Blocking the Kinder Morgan Pipeline Does Damage to Us All.” 
Toronto Star, 19 Apr. 2018.
Parsons, Meg, et al. “Alternative Perspectives on Sustainability: Indigenous Knowledge and 
Methodologies.” Challenges in Sustainability, vol. 5, no. 1, 2017, pp. 7–14.
Peacock, Adrienne. “The Case Against Site C.” BC Studies, vol. 161, 2009, pp. 111-114.
Sanya, Tom. “Brundtland Report.” Green Education: An A-to-Z Guide, SAGE Publications, 
Inc., 2011, pp. 54–56.
Stanton, Kim. “Looking Forward, Looking Back: The Canadian Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry.” Canadian Journal of Law and 
Society, vol. 27, no. 1, 2012, pp. 81–99.
Storey, Keith et al. “Action Canada papers on Labrador mining, Aboriginal governance 
and Muskrat Falls.” Leslie Harris Centre of Regional Policy and Development, Memorial 
University, 2011.
Tengö, Maria, et al. “Connecting Diverse Knowledge Systems for Enhanced Ecosystem 
Governance: The Multiple Evidence Base Approach.” Ambio, vol. 43, Mar. 2014, pp. 579–591. 
United Nations. “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” 2007.
Storey, Keith, et al. “Action Canada Papers on Labrador Mining, Aboriginal Governance and 
Muskrat Falls.” The Harris Centre, 2011, pp. 1–56.
Von der Porten, Suzanne, et al. “Incorporation Indigenous Knowledge Systems into 
Collaborative Governance for Water: Challenges and Opportunities.” Journal of Canadian 
Studies/Revue D’études Canadiennes, vol. 50, no. 1, 2016, pp. 214–243.
Weil, Gordon Lee. “The Muskrat Falls hydro project: opportunities and risks.” Atlantic 
Institute for Market Studies, 2012, pp. 1-12.
68 How Ottawa Spends
Chapter 5 
Radical Transformation or 
Incremental Tinkering: 
The Vision and Potential of 
Canada’s New Impact Assessment 
Process
Matthew Retallack, Graeme Auld, Lisa Mills, and Alexandra Mallett
INTRODUCTION
A dramatic series of policy changes has unfolded in Canada over the past 
decade. Successive governments have reworked the environmental assessment 
and associated regulatory processes, a set of mechanisms designed to assess 
and minimize the environmental harms of proposed projects, such as a new 
mine or pipeline. This is a challenging policy area. Competing norms exist over 
the appropriate path for governments as they seek to balance different prior-
ities. Economic growth is necessitated on getting resources to markets—an 
abiding concern for a resource-based economy such as Canada, where natural 
resources accounted for 16% of nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 1.74 
million jobs and $CDN201 billion in exports in 2016.1 Yet protecting the envi-
ronment is also a critical imperative, as stipulated in international agreements 
like the Convention on Biological Diversity’s Achi Biodiversity Targets that 
inter alia push governments to reduce “direct pressures on biodiversity and 
promote sustainable use.”2 Moreover, where land-based resource development 
projects are proposed for traditional territories that sustain Indigenous live-
lihoods and cultures, the federal government faces additional requirements 
arising out of constitutional obligations and international norms.
Canadian governments have held different views on how best to reconcile 
and balance these priorities. The Harper government’s 2012 changes to the 
environmental assessment process reflected the salience of expedient market 
access for Canadian resources in a post-recession economic context, as well as 
a desire to streamline regulation and improve the efficiency of environmental 
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oversight mechanisms (Kirchoff, 2016). Scholars have since argued that these 
policies were heavy-handed, in particular given the manner in which they were 
designed and introduced. Criticism is levelled at the limited opportunities 
for review given to parliamentary committees (Doelle 2012) and the use of 
omnibus budget bills, a tactic characterized as an abuse of Parliament (Toner 
et al., 2016). Successful grassroots political action to impede projects moving 
forward under this regime (for example, Northern Gateway and Keystone 
XL), has brought renewed attention to the importance of project proponents 
seeking and receiving social license to operate (Forrester et al., 2015). Wider 
concerns around the rights and treatment of Indigenous peoples and the 
impacts of government cuts on the capacity for evidence-based decision 
making offered additional historical context for the 2015 election.
The Trudeau government sought to advance a different balance on this file. 
Restoring public trust in environmental oversight became a key platform 
plank for the Liberal Party (Liberal Party, 2015), while reconciliation with 
Indigenous peoples comprised a closely linked political commitment. Given 
Canada’s constitutional obligations to Indigenous peoples as the Crown’s 
representative, and its consistent underperformance on issues affecting Indig-
enous peoples (including the outcomes of environmental regulatory processes), 
the Trudeau liberals proposed a different path. They have become full support-
ers of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), an 
international declaration rejected by the Harper government, with the stated 
intention of adopting and implementing the declaration in a manner consistent 
with Canada’s constitutional and legal context (Fontaine, 2016). We thus see a 
rebalancing of priorities between competing norms, a repositioning that has 
implications for how the federal government scopes the challenge of regaining 
public trust in environmental oversight mechanisms.
Our chapter reviews changes made to environmental assessment. The purpose 
is not to establish causation but rather to interpret the alignment of cur-
rently proposed legislative changes with evolving norms and expectations, 
and comment on the degree to which proposed legislation may strike a new 
balance, potentially embodying a radical departure from business as usual in 
Canada. We pay particular attention to Canada’s changing views on the role of 
Indigenous peoples, governance systems, and knowledge. We do so cognizant 
of our position as non-Indigenous scholars. In this light, we attempt to docu-
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ment the changes occurring, allowing others, particularly Indigenous peoples, 
to draw conclusions about the appropriate way forward. Document analysis 
and stakeholder interviews form the basis of our analysis, which proceeds in 
three parts. First, key features of three successive iterations of federal envi-
ronmental assessment legislation (CEAA 1992, CEAA 2012 and Bill C-69) are 
discussed with particular attention paid to what changed and what did not 
from one era to the next. Second, we draw on empirical examples and norma-
tive discourses around environment, development, rights, and justice to help 
conceptualize what “radical” transformation might look like in the Canadian 
case. The final section develops this conceptualization and assesses whether 
and to what degree the proposed legislation, Bill C-69, is consistent with inter-
national best practices and may thereby lead Canadian environmental assess-
ment into new territory, or whether and how it may fall short of expectations. 
We close with policy implications for environmental assessment in Canada and 
the challenge of balancing environmental protection, economic development, 
and Indigenous rights.
HISTORIAL REVIEW
Prior to CEAA 1992, the federal environmental assessment process was trig-
gered by the existence of a definable federal interest (e.g. federal government 
as the proponent, regulator, land-owner, or financier). With CEAA 1992, 
“affirmative regulatory duty” (arising out of the Supreme Court of Canada 
verdict, Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada; SCC, 1992) was 
replaced with the Law List Regulations. These regulations clarified the federal 
role by specifying which provisions under various federal Acts and regulations 
would, when exercised, trigger an environmental assessment (Olszyski, 2017). 
With its project list regulation (Regulations Designating Physical Activities, 
SOR/2012-147), CEAA 2012 shifted the focus to designated project types 
as being the primary triggering mechanism. However, CEAA 2012 did not 
operate in isolation from other legislation: changes to the Fisheries Act and the 
Navigable Waters Protection Act reduced the expected number of listed proj-
ects that needed to undergo assessment from thousands to hundreds (Kirchoff 
et al., 2013; Gibson, 2012). The project list has been retained in Bill C-69, with 
regulations currently under development (Canada, 2018).
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The opportunity for public participation was narrowed considerably under 
CEAA 2012, with participation being limited to people “directly affected by the 
carrying out of the designated projects,” or someone with relevant information 
or expertise (Valiante, 2016). This contrasts with the old language focused on 
giving voice to interested parties (Salomons & Hoberg, 2014). In conjunction 
with projects being narrowly defined, this had the effect of limiting public 
access to decision making (Doelle, 2012), a move seen to undermine the ability 
of the process to determine the public interest (Salomons & Hoberg, 2014). 
Timelines introduced in CEAA 2012 have largely been retained in Bill C-69. 
However, the addition of a mandatory early planning and engagement phase 
broadens the opportunity for public participation, allowing stakeholders to 
engage earlier in the process and closer to the project design stage.
Three areas where Bill C-69 diverges substantially from CEAA 2012 are: (1) 
the scope of impacts under assessment; (2) the introduction of strategic assess-
ments alongside regional assessments of cumulative effects; and (3) the role 
of Indigenous peoples, governance systems, and knowledge. With the first two 
points, the stated purpose of the Act is “to foster sustainability,”3 encompassing 
health, social, and economic impacts, as well as environmental impacts (Bill 
C-69, s.6(1)a-b), a move recognizing a broader view of environmental impacts. 
Provisions for considering cumulative effects are not new. However, consid-
eration for them has been limited in previous laws, in the case of CEAA 1992 
because of the limited capacity and perhaps limited interest of proponents in 
a proponent-driven process (e.g. Duinker & Greig, 2006), and in the case of 
CEAA 2012 because of narrowly scoped project assessments (e.g. Valiante, 
2016). The Act (Bill C-69, s.6(1)m) aims to address the management of cumu-
lative effects through regional assessments and implications for other federal 
policy priorities through strategic assessments, but the specifics of how this 
will be done have yet to be developed.
Arguably, the most significant changes proposed in Bill C-69 concern the 
role and rights of Indigenous peoples. CEAA 2012 does identify a range of 
environmental impacts that may affect Indigenous peoples and should be 
taken into account by the environmental assessment process (Canada, 2012, 
s.5(1)c). These generally correspond to areas of constitutional responsibility. 
Additional provisions include a commitment to communicate and consult with 
Indigenous peoples, though this does not extend their position appreciably 
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beyond that of the general public. There is one reference to traditional knowl-
edge, but incorporating it in assessments is not mandatory. By comparison, 
Bill C-69 and the entire federal review process is framed within the Trudeau 
government’s stated commitment to reconciliation with Indigenous peoples. 
The involvement of Indigenous peoples throughout the environmental assess-
ment process has been a consistent feature at all stages of the review process, 
including in Bill C-69. Provisions in the proposed legislation include: partici-
pation of Indigenous peoples from the beginning to end of the impact assess-
ment process; recognition of Indigenous rights from the outset; being respon-
sive to Indigenous rights, jurisdiction, and decision making; cooperation and 
coordination between all levels of government and Indigenous governing 
bodies; allowing for the sharing of administrative authority with Indigenous 
peoples; and incorporation of Indigenous knowledge (Bill C-69, s.6(1),e-g, j).
The balance of this chapter will centre on this third difference between Bill 
C-69 and CEAA 2012—the role of Indigenous peoples, governance systems, 
and knowledge. We will first present a concise review of relevant normative 
concepts and case studies, before circling back to reinterpret changes proposed 
within Bill C-69 relative to best practices. It is important to note the Bill may 
well change before it receives Royal Assent. Certain details of the new regime 
will not become clear until after the regulatory process has concluded, and 
its broader impact will take still longer to discern, as actors and institutions 
working within the larger environmental assessment regime adjust to policy 
changes introduced through Bill C-69.
INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES AND  
NORMATIVE DISCOURSES
Environmental assessment presents a policy file where competing norms 
about the environment, rights, development, and justice are at play. We discuss 
these competing norms to help establish what a “radical” transformation of 
the environmental assessment process might look like in Canada. This effort 
is aided by brief reviews of how Indigenous peoples engage and affect envi-
ronmental assessments in the Canadian north, in particular in the MacKenzie 
Valley and Nunavut, how this differs from the rest of Canada, and what are 
some key mediating factors. Current practices in these cases help establish 
how far Bill C-69 might take us in a transformative direction.
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The broad scope and apparent alignment of Bill C-69, the Impact Assessment 
Act, with sustainable development provides a ready access point. Sustainable 
development has been called a simple concept that in practice is anything 
but simple (Langhelle, 2017). Emerging onto the world stage in 1987 with 
the Brundtland report (WECD, 1987) —a process that defined the concept 
as development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the needs of future generations—the conceptual strands reach further back 
in environmental discourse. The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 1972) 
established clear linkages between the environment and economy. In 1976 
the World Council of Churches elaborated on the intersection of ecology and 
justice, stating: “A[n] [ecologically] sustainable society which is unjust can 
hardly be worth sustaining. A just society that is unsustainable is self-defeat-
ing” (Birch et al., 1979, cited from Langhelle, 2000). Nevertheless, growth, 
and in particular economic growth (the change over time in a jurisdiction’s 
production of goods and services), is very much a dominant economic princi-
ple and the central goal of most governments, including Canada. As a result, 
Canada has built its environmental apparatus in a manner that is aligned 
with the norm of sustainable development, i.e. environmental protection that 
assumes development in the pursuit of economic growth (Lafferty & Mead-
owcroft, 2000). This normative position has been termed the compromise 
of liberal environmentalism, as it accepted markets and economic growth as 
reconcilable with environmental conservation goals, a position that downplays 
potentially irreconcilable trade-offs between development and sustainability 
(Bernstein 2001).
As with sustainable development, the concept of environmental rights arose 
in the early 1970s during the formative stages of modern environmental 
governance. Stone (1972), following on Darwin’s observation that the circle of 
human morality is ever-expanding, traced a similar development in the history 
of law and legal rights. Until the rights of children, all humans, corporations, 
etc were established, their rightlessness was assumed and apparent, and 
actions against these entities were deemed morally acceptable in a way that 
would no longer be acceptable today. The debate around rights and environ-
ment has developed considerably during the intervening decades. For instance, 
we can distinguish between environmental rights as an extension of human 
rights, i.e. the right to a healthy environment, and rights of the environment 
itself (Shelton, 1991). However, where people maintain traditional land-based 
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livelihoods, preserving nature is (quite directly) preserving people, and the 
rights of nature and the rights of people converge.
Environmental justice is a related concept that refocuses on the human 
dimensions of environmental degradation, both in terms of attribution and the 
distribution of harms and benefits. There is a good deal of scholarship from 
the United States that demonstrates a connection between marginalized com-
munities and the location of environmental harms (Baehler, 2017). A related 
concern is that of procedural justice and access to decision making that deter-
mines these outcomes. Environmental rights in some form (either rights of or 
rights to) can provide the legal basis for more just processes and outcomes. 
Moreover, referring back to attribution and the underlying premise of an 
expanding moral circle (Crimston et al., 2016), the capacity of humans to effect 
lasting harm raises issues of responsibility and the possibility of an obligation 
to care for the environment (Clayton, 2000). However, while moral boundaries 
are generally expanding, the moral concern for animals, rivers, and other 
natural entities varies widely at an individual level (Crimston et al., 2016), with 
the rights of some being paramount relative to those of others (Pizarro et al., 
2006). Accordingly, any sense of obligation is also likely to vary widely.
Turning back to Canada to establish current practices of environmental 
assessment, a first case is that of the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact 
Review Board (MVRB) that conducts environmental assessments in the Mack-
enzie Valley. This agency is the result of land claims agreements that were 
forged during the 1990s. A co-management institution, the seat of its authority 
is in the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act (Canada, 1998). The 
Board comprises a minimum of seven members appointed by the Minister of 
Indigenous and Northern Affairs: three representing Indigenous communities 
directly, two nominated by the Government of the Northwest Territories, 
and two from the federal government.4 The design and practice of the MVRB 
do still adhere to western governance norms (a feature for which they have 
received criticism, e.g. King, 2013; Nadasky, 2003). Within this constraint, 
the design does attempt to ensure Indigenous perspectives and priorities are 
mainstreamed from the top down, throughout the MVRB’s activities (White, 
2008). Indigenous peoples are not stakeholders who should be consulted and 
accommodated (to the degree deemed reasonable by responsible authorities). 
Rather, they are at the decision-making table; their authority is legislated, 
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and they have a great deal of influence on the process and information upon 
which decisions are being made. It is a similar situation in Nunavut where the 
Nunavut Impact Review Board (NIRB) was established in 1993 through the 
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA). The NIRB is also a co-management 
institution with four of nine members being nominated by Designated Inuit 
Organizations, and preference for chairperson being given to individuals resid-
ing in the Nunavut Settlement Area (NLCA, s.12.2.6). The NLCA also classifies 
356,000 km2 as being Inuit Owned Lands (NLCA, s.19.3.1; NPC, 2016). There-
fore, in addition to significant decision-making authority, Inuit also have the 
right of exclusion on these lands.
The land-based authority and co-management decision making bodies found 
in the Canadian north set these areas apart from the rest of Canada where 
there exists a diversity of arrangements, largely arising from historical factors 
such as the timing of colonial expansion, and the era and nature of any exist-
ing treaty, land claims, or self-governance agreement that may be in place, if 
at all. As a result, the level of assurance around strong procedural rights that 
results from co-management arrangements is not the norm everywhere in 
Canada. However, when Indigenous culture and values are central to the deci-
sion-making process, formal authority can serve to backstop the environmen-
tal rights of Indigenous people. The manner in which Indigenous knowledge is 
understood and brought to bear on the assessment process is a fundamental 
consideration in this regard.
Discussions of Indigenous knowledge in the literature underscore a few critical 
features of this form of knowledge. First and foremost, the word “traditional” 
embodies a sense of the past. While much is made of the nature of Indigenous 
ecological knowledge in terms of its encompassing long time periods, it is not 
static and does not belong to the past (Irlbacher-Fox, 2009). Rather, Indige-
nous knowledge is being continually created and recreated by processes such 
as “walking the land” (McCreary et al., 2014). Moreover, Indigenous ecological 
knowledge is not separate from Indigenous culture and values. Rather, they 
are parts of an interrelated whole. Culture and oral histories embody knowl-
edge which informs and reconstitutes cultural practices, together ensuring the 
survival of their way of life, at an individual and group level (Stevenson, 1996). 
These characteristics of Indigenous knowledge, of which “traditional knowl-
edge” typically refers to some subset comprising largely ecological knowledge, 
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set it apart from western science in fundamental and important ways. The 
two may complement one another, but Indigenous knowledge requires inter-
pretation on a case-by-case basis by knowledge holders who understand the 
larger ontological structure within which the ecological subset takes on its full 
meaning. Thus, attempts to store Indigenous knowledge in large databases are 
understood to be operationally inappropriate, with the larger issue being that 
of its interrelationships and importance for ongoing cultural survival.
The preceding case studies and discussion of contrasting normative perspec-
tives on human-environment relationships, and associated rights and justice 
considerations, provide a number of criteria that can be used to distinguish 
radical transformation from incremental improvement as we examine changes 
to Canada’s federal environmental assessment process. In the following section 
we will draw on these ideas to examine the proposed role of Indigenous 
peoples within decision making processes, and the manner in which Indige-
nous knowledge is brought to bear on these decisions.
REVOLUTIONARY POTENTIAL, PITFALLS AND  
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
There are a number of areas where Bill C-69, the proposed Impact Assess-
ment Act, appears to be oriented toward radical change. In this section we 
focus largely on provisions pertaining to shared governance and traditional 
knowledge.
One key area of change concerns using the assessment processes of Indige-
nous people as substitutes, and the inclusion of Indigenous governing bodies 
beyond those established through land claims agreements or under an Act of 
Parliament, subject to Ministerial discretion (Bill C-69, s.31(1) and s.2 jurisdic-
tion (g)). This provision has implications for meeting UNDRIP commitments 
under Article 32—the right of Indigenous peoples to determine development 
priorities on traditional territories—and for the use of Indigenous knowledge 
in determining these priorities and assessing their impacts. Substitution to 
Indigenous processes would help ensure Indigenous culture and values are 
central to decision making. As observed through the MVRB and NIRB, such 
conditions strengthen procedural and distributive justice. Moreover, where 
land-based cultures have a strong incentive to preserve the land, this may have 
positive benefits for the preservation of the environment and species, aligning 
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the process with positions of strong sustainability and perhaps providing a 
counterweight for the presumption of development embedded within Canada’s 
formal and informal institutions.5
Where substitution is not deemed appropriate, there are other provisions that 
may realize similar ends in terms of distributive and procedural justice, and 
the recognition and prioritization of environmental preservation. For instance, 
Bill C-69 embodies a distinct departure from the past around the integration 
of Indigenous knowledge, with consideration of Indigenous knowledge a man-
datory requirement (Bill C-69, s.22(1)g). A key and complementary change in 
the proposed legislation is the institution of a planning phase during which the 
federal Impact Assessment Agency must offer to consult with Indigenous juris-
dictions that have powers, duties, or functions in relation to the assessment of 
a designated project. This offer must be further extended to any Indigenous 
group that may be affected by the project (Bill C-69, s.12). This requirement 
has the potential to draw on Indigenous knowledge and identify issues of key 
concern, such as landscape features or ecological considerations, at the earliest 
stages before detailed project planning has been undertaken. According to a 
senior representative from the Mining Association of Canada, sector leaders 
are already undertaking discovery of this information prior to developing 
detailed project plans (personal communication, 2018). In that regard, Bill 
C-69 largely formalizes these practices. When considering the imposition of 
timelines for the planning phase (and other phases) of an impact assessment, 
and whether these timelines may undermine full participation of Indigenous 
peoples, a representative from NIRB indicated that this is not necessarily the 
case. Rather, the planning phase has the potential to actually improve process 
efficiency, if sincere efforts are made to respond to concerns expressed by 
Indigenous peoples (personal communication, 2018). These observations serve 
to underscore an important mediating factor. In the case of NIRB, the balance 
of power is such that proponents have a strong incentive to take Indigenous 
concerns seriously. If Indigenous organizations, actors, and representatives do 
not have some degree of veto power, the integration of Indigenous knowledge 
may be more procedural and perfunctory than genuine, which would clearly 
undermine the transformative potential of this legislation.
Regarding the contribution that Indigenous knowledge can make to inform 
the impact assessment process, Bill C-69 makes explicit provisions regarding 
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the confidentiality of such knowledge, reflecting serious concerns stemming 
from the close relationship between Indigenous knowledge and the survival of 
Indigenous cultures (Bill C-69, s.119(2)). This should provide some protection 
from knowledge appropriation and other misuses. However, the manner in 
which Indigenous knowledge will be considered relative to western knowledge 
is less clear. For instance, if it is confined to a gap-filling function this would 
be a subservient position and overlook the full contributions that may be 
realized. Instead, Indigenous knowledge should be viewed as another body 
of knowledge that may on occasion challenge the conclusions of western 
science, raising new considerations for decision makers. There are numerous 
documented instances where Indigenous practices are at odds with traditional 
western perspectives (Lewis, 1994; Rodriguez, 2007; Roba et al., 2008). An 
interesting case in Canada involves differing perspectives on management 
of beluga whale populations in the southeast Baffin area, where a co-man-
agement approach was adopted to help resolve a disagreement between Inuit 
hunters and government biologists (Stevenson, 1996). These cases speak to the 
value of ensuring that Indigenous knowledge is considered in its own right, as 
understood by knowledge holders themselves.
Ultimately, the degree to which Bill C-69’s potential is realized will depend on 
whether any changes are made, the nature of these changes, and how provisions 
in the Act are translated into implementing regulations. Our analysis has iden-
tified a number of specific provisions that could dramatically re-orient environ-
mental assessment toward radically different goals, prioritizing harmony with 
nature and respect for people relative to efficiency and resource development. 
Substitution to Indigenous assessment processes, and appropriate positioning 
and meaningful consideration of Indigenous knowledge could improve proce-
dural and distributional justice. When framed relative to these considerations, 
reconciliation with Indigenous peoples takes on additional scope. For instance, 
if reconciliation changes how assessment processes consider ideas around 
environmental conservation, this would have implications for what would be 
considered an acceptable environmental impact. This in turn may affect the 
institutional presumption that resources will be developed (albeit in a way that 
minimizes or at least contains certain impacts or promises). If combined with 
procedural justice, in terms of some degree of veto power, this reconsideration of 
acceptable impacts may be further enhanced, leading to deeper change.
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That is the crucial turning point. Incorporation of Indigenous knowledge on its 
own could lead to significant change but in the face of prevailing economic and 
political forces, in a country where the dominant narrative is one prioritizing 
resource development, we could reasonably expect the impact of mandatory 
consideration of Indigenous knowledge to be constrained. That is not to say 
that it will be of no value, only that changes will likely be incremental. If, 
however, decision-making structures move toward co-management or Indig-
enous-led processes, something that is consistent with Canada’s commitment 
to implement UNDRIP as well as international scholarship on environment 
rights and environmental justice, then the proposed legislation could lead to 
more transformative change. Change that, incidentally, has been observed 
and experienced in Canada’s north, and that we can see empirically has not 
stopped development. The government is working hard to have regulations in 
place early in 2019, prior to the upcoming 2019 federal election.6 As Bill C-69 
moves through the legislative and subsequent regulatory process, and the gov-
ernment seeks to realize its 2015 goals and commitments, these are important 
lessons to keep in mind.
ENDNOTES
1 Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/
files/pdf/10_key_facts_nrcan_2017_en.pdf
2  https://www.cbd.int/sp/targets/
3 Defined as “the ability to protect the environment, contribute to the social and economic 
well-being of the people of Canada and preserve their health in a manner that benefits 
present and future generations. (durabilité)” See http://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/
en/42-1/bill/C-69/first-reading under definitions, 2.
4 http://boardappointments.exec.gov.nt.ca/en/boards/
mackenzie-valley-environmental-impact-review-board/
5 See Daly, 1996; Dobson, 1998; and, Neumayer, 2010 for additional discussion of strong 
sustainability and critical natural capital.
6 https://www.impactassessmentregulations.ca/
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Chapter 6 
Environmental Assessment, 
Independent Review Panels, and 
Due Process: Turning Principle into 
Practice
Peter J. Usher and Frances Abele
And as part of efforts to restore public trust, the Government will intro-
duce new environmental assessment processes. Public input will be 
sought and considered. Environmental impacts will be understood and 
minimized. Decisions will be informed by scientific evidence. And Indig-
enous peoples will be more fully engaged in reviewing and monitoring 
major resource development projects.
Speech from the Throne December 4, 2015
In August 2016, Minister of Environment and Climate Change Catherine 
McKenna launched a review of existing environmental assessment legislation, 
aided by a multi-interest advisory committee and a series of public consulta-
tions including a review by an expert panel. The result was Bill C-69, which 
passed third reading in the House of Commons in June 2018. Now before 
Senate, the bill will amend the Impact Assessment Act, the Canadian Energy 
Regulator Act, and the Navigation Protection Act.1 Regulations will be devel-
oped starting in Fall 2018, with the whole process projected to be completed in 
spring 2019, ahead of the (likely) fall 2019 election.
The new legislation responds to widespread dissatisfaction with changes to 
environmental assessment and energy regulation procedures implemented 
by the Conservative government in 2012. These were generally understood to 
reduce capacity for public oversight, weaken environmental assessment, and 
move the National Energy Board towards industry capture. Bill C-69 replaces 
the National Energy Board with the Canadian Energy Regulator, revises 
environmental assessment procedures through the Impact Assessment Act, 
and makes significant changes to the Navigation Protection Act. Unfortunately, 
while the new legislation will resolve some of the deficiencies in the 2012 
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legislation, it does not retrieve all of the beneficial features of Canada’s envi-
ronmental assessment practices prior to 2012 and it misses the opportunity to 
institutionalize some better practices.
We focus here on one important aspect of Bill C-69’s complex suite of 
changes—the role of independent public reviews of major projects as envi-
sioned in the new Impact Assessment Act.2 Review panels3 will continue to be 
the flagships of the impact assessment system, as they have been under previ-
ous legislation. Strong, independent review capacity is critical to rehabilitating 
Canada’s environmental assessment system. Major projects are controversial 
because of their size and scope, and more importantly, for the purposes of 
assessment, because of their novelty in the receiving environment. Public 
concerns arise because such projects may bring unintended, unanticipated, 
and irreversible effects, and because these will be borne disproportionately by 
those for whom project benefits may be minimal. Often, though not always, 
those most affected are Indigenous Canadians in remote communities.
Review panels must be open, evidence-based, transparent, and above all inde-
pendent. Their credibility depends on these factors. They must be visibly sepa-
rate from and independent of the responsible authority, and most importantly 
not be agents of the Crown either in law or in public perception. The system 
for major project review must provide for due process, both in the creation and 
appointment of review panels, and in the conduct of review panels themselves.
After setting out the more specific standards against which Review Panels 
should be assessed, we comment below on three aspects of the new legislation: 
how Review Panels are structured, how they conduct their reviews, and how 
the government responds to panel recommendations.
PANEL DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The purpose of a Review Panel is to advise the Minister on three matters.4 The 
Panel must determine whether the project being assessed may have significant 
adverse effects (either on its own or by virtue of cumulative effects with other 
developments). It must decide whether the project could make durable and 
equitable contributions to social and economic well-being.5 Finally, the Review 
Panel’s report must recommend whether a project should be authorized to 
proceed, and if so, what measures should be taken to minimize or mitigate 
adverse effects, and enhance beneficial ones. To ensure those objectives are 
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achieved, post-approval measures must include monitoring and follow-up 
programs, which are crucial for ensuring that predictions about impact made 
during project assessment are verified, required mitigation measures are both 
implemented and effective, any unanticipated adverse effects are detected and 
addressed, and there exists a prescribed course of action to correct adverse 
effects.
Monitoring and follow-up thus provide the fundamental basis for ensuring 
that the review process actually produces tangible results with respect to envi-
ronmental integrity and sustainability. If effective monitoring and follow-up do 
not occur, then the public benefit of reviewing major projects is much reduced.
The Review Panel’s recommendations provide essential guidance for down-
stream regulators once a project, if approved, enters the permitting stage. 
The Review Panel’s recommendations are necessarily directed not only to 
the proponent (as permitting conditions), but also to responsible government 
authorities at all levels. There may be instances where a thorough review 
shows that a project proposal is so incapable of mitigation that it should not be 
approved at all. But for the most part, the result of a major project review is an 
improved project. While panel recommendations do not carry the force of law, 
if they are imposed as conditions by the relevant authorities, they may become 
enforceable. For this reason, panel recommendations should be directed 
towards specific parties (the proponent or a government) so that responsibil-
ities for action are plainly identified. The foregoing requirements have been 
more or less clearly stated in previous legislation, and have been reinforced by 
practice.6
Two key principles underlie a credible impact assessment system: a clear 
separation between assessment and regulation, and the visible independence 
of Review Panels. As we have observed elsewhere, these principles are partly 
but not entirely achieved under Bill C-69.7 Under Bill C-69, assessment of the 
environmental, economic, social, and health impacts of major projects will 
come under the sole authority of the Impact Assessment Agency of Canada 
(formerly the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency). The Canadian 
Energy Regulator (formerly the National Energy Board) and the Canadian 
Nuclear Safety Commission will continue as the regulators, but not the asses-
sors, of projects under their authority.
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Major project Review Panels are commonly characterized as “independent,” 
both by the public and by panels themselves, although that term is not actually 
applied to Review Panels either in previous or proposed legislation. Yet there 
is at least a two-fold basis for the term’s currency in popular usage. One is the 
Review Panel’s actual relationship to the Agency responsible for it. Under both 
current and proposed legislation, once a panel is established, the Agency by its 
own practice keeps a respectful distance from it. The Agency provides man-
agement services and financial administration to the panel, but provides no 
information or advice to it directly, least of all with respect to its findings.
The second is that, in both existing and proposed legislation, panel members 
must be “unbiased and free from any conflict of interest relative to the desig-
nated project” (s.41(1)). The strong perception is that Review Panels are free 
from government interference, regulatory capture, or closed-door accommo-
dation. It is precisely this perception of panel independence—whether or not 
it is grounded in law—that is crucial to both the authority of their gathering 
and analysis of evidence and opinion from all relevant sources, and to the 
credibility of their deliberations and findings, in the public eye. No legislation 
can guarantee perfection, of course, and it will always be necessary to guard 
against politically motivated appointments that undermine Panel impartiality.
STRUCTURING REVIEW PANELS
Review Panels are not standing bodies. Each is created on a one-off basis, in 
recognition of the distinctive nature of each major project and its potential 
impacts. While this is a wise and necessary arrangement, it brings certain 
structural and administrative challenges that are largely unaddressed in Bill 
C-69 (or its predecessors).
In practice, Panel members are appointed on the basis of familiarity with 
the type of project and/or the region in which the project occurs, and at least 
some should be able to bring local or Indigenous knowledge to bear. They 
are not required to have had legal, technical, or academic training. The key 
requirement, in addition to being unbiased and free of any conflict of interest, 
is having “knowledge or experience relevant to the designated project’s antic-
ipated effects or … knowledge of the interests and concerns of the Indigenous 
peoples of Canada that are relevant to the assessment” (s.41(1)).8 This require-
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ment is a key element for promoting the credibility of a federal environmental 
assessment within the project region.
Joint Review Panels are struck where multiple jurisdictions (e.g. federal, 
provincial, Indigenous) are involved.9 Joint review panels provide for more 
efficient assessment, by ensuring that a project undergoes a single rather than 
multiple assessments. Importantly, this provision has been a key means by 
which Indigenous communities have gained direct involvement in structuring 
the review process as well as participating in it. Most major resource develop-
ment projects occur in rural and remote areas where Indigenous peoples, and 
their rights and interests, may be the most adversely affected. As amended, 
Bill C-69 retains this arrangement.
HOW PANEL REVIEWS ARE CONDUCTED
Once a Review Panel has been struck, and its members appointed, how does it 
proceed?
The first matter to be addressed is the “hand-off” from the Minister to the 
Review Panel itself—that is, the conclusion of the process leading up to the 
transfer of responsibility for design and execution of the assessment to the 
Review Panel. Here Bill C-69 appears to leave much room for interpretation, 
and for Ministerial discretion. Under current legislation, Review Panels are 
responsible for the entire assessment process, to the exclusion of other parties, 
from the time of their appointment until they report. The provisions in C-69 
are less than clear on this point, as is evident in the assessment phases the Bill 
outlines.
The first of these is the planning phase, which begins when a proponent 
files an initial project description. During this phase the Impact Assessment 
Agency is required to solicit public comments for a fixed period and consult 
with other affected agencies and Indigenous groups. The relevant line depart-
ments are required to seek information from the proponent and provide their 
expert and specialist knowledge to the Agency. On this basis the Agency is 
to provide the proponent with a list of the issues raised, and the proponent 
is then to indicate how it proposes to address these issues, information that 
is filed in a more detailed project description (sections 10-15 of Bill C-69). 
At the end of this phase, the Minister decides whether a formal assessment 
is required and if so whether it should be referred to a Review Panel. Thus 
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project scoping based upon engagement with both the proponent and the 
public, and the iterative identification of key issues, will already have occurred 
by the time a panel is in place.
This is a marked change from past practice. It shifts to the Agency and min-
isterial discretion some of the work previously undertaken by Review Panels. 
Several elements of previous legislation and practice are conflated, including 
project screening by the Agency, scoping the review (whether by the Agency 
itself or by a Review Panel), and setting the terms of reference of the propo-
nent’s environmental impact statement (EIS).10 It may also subsume the early 
stages of discussions with affected provincial, territorial, and Indigenous 
governments about the scale and scope of the assessment and the establish-
ment of a joint review panel. Not only is all this going on before a Review Panel 
is appointed: Bill C-69 also provides for a three-year information gathering 
phase during which “the proponent must provide the required studies and 
information” (s.19.1). When exactly this phase begins, why the proponent needs 
or ought to be given this particular amount of time by legislation, and who sets 
these requirements—the Agency or the Panel, and if the former, whether on 
the public record—is entirely unclear.
Proponents do indeed require guidance on what is expected of them in an 
EIS. Under pre-2012 legislation (the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Act 1992), EIS guidance was sometimes provided by review panels themselves 
by means of a scoping phase that consisted of an initial round of commu-
nity hearings. This was the case in the Voisey’s Bay Mine and Mill review in 
Labrador (1997-99). However, the government and land claim bodies that 
established the Mackenzie Gas Project review in the NWT (2004-10) provided 
EIS guidelines to the proponents before the Review Panel was appointed. It is 
not obvious that this practice saves time. The Mackenzie Gas Project Review 
took 63 months from panel appointment to completion, while the Voisey’s Bay 
review took 26 months, including scoping hearings.
Assigning scoping to the Agency during the planning phase will very likely 
make the guidelines for the proponent’s impact assessment statement (IAS) 
guidelines more generic and less project-specific. Yet in principle at least, the 
more precise and less generic the EIS guidelines are, the more focused and 
responsive the EIS will be to the needs of the Review Panel, and the hence the 
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sooner the Panel can determine its sufficiency in order to proceed to public 
hearings.
The independence of Review Panels is essential to their legitimacy. Therefore, 
it should be the Review Panel’s exclusive responsibility to determine the suffi-
ciency of information provided by both the proponent and responsible author-
ities, in order to proceed to public hearings. It is not appropriate to restrict the 
Review Panel to assessing only material that others choose to provide. There 
is no guarantee that participants will, on their own initiative, identify and 
divulge all of the technical evidence required to assess the project. A Review 
Panel is not a jury. It must decide what evidence it requires. It must not only 
hear the evidence, it must probe it. If a Review Panel cannot fulfill these 
responsibilities, then its independent conduct and authority is undermined, 
and the credibility of the assessment process suffers.
In sum, assigning scoping responsibilities directly to Review Panels enhances 
efficiency in framing the requirements of the impact assessment statement, 
and the purposes of public and especially Indigenous engagement. Bill C-69 
does not justify or clarify why the planning phase should replace the perfectly 
functional—and from the point of view of panel effectiveness, preferable—
process of scoping hearings by the Review Panel itself. At this stage in the 
process, with legislation before the Senate, it is possible that this key weakness 
of the new legislation cannot be remedied. Thus we note that C-69 does not 
explicitly prohibit the Minister from appointing a Review Panel earlier in the 
process and charging it with holding scoping hearings. If the legislation itself 
is not changed, the Minister would be well advised to use his or her discretion 
to that end, and to institutionalize this as the general practice.
Secretariat assistance to panels
The one-off nature of Review Panels calls for particular attention to how they 
are to be supported in technical and legal respects. Most panel members have 
little or no legal training, and some panel members may have no post-second-
ary education. There are very good reasons for this practice: the diversity of 
membership brings invaluable local knowledge and wisdom to the table. But it 
does mean that Review Panels require both legal and technical support, both 
to prepare for and conduct hearings, and to prepare their reports. How much 
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and what type of support varies in each case and is not easily predictable in 
advance.
Because Review Panels are not standing bodies, they must obtain that support 
on an as-needed basis. The Agency provides panels with a manager and core 
secretariat support. In order to preserve panel independence, it does not 
provide direct support of its own standing legal and technical staff, although 
it may provide the Panel with analysts and/or a budget for same. Particular 
difficulties arise, however, when Review Panels must find experts who have 
not already been secured by the proponent or an intervening party, or must be 
taken on board quickly, or whose work must be extended beyond the limit of 
applicable government contracting provisions (usually sole source contracts). It 
will be a challenge for the Agency to find more flexible financial administration 
and procurement procedures for contracting expert advice and competent 
writers on a continuing basis, consistent with the panel’s independence. Bill 
C-69 is silent on this issue, but perhaps it can be addressed in the regulation 
phase.
Technical support to the review process
In addition, given the one-off nature of panel reviews, there needs to be a per-
manent institutional basis for learning from individual reviews and improving 
the assessment process itself. Bill C-69 appears to address this need by requir-
ing the Agency to establish an Expert Committee to advise it on issues relating 
to impact assessments, regional and strategic assessments, “including scien-
tific, environmental, health, social, or economic issues” (s.157). Presumably 
this unit would be charged with considering and improving the methods and 
practice of impact assessment, for example with respect to cumulative impact 
assessment, sustainability criteria, impact indicators, and the like. It remains 
to be seen how this body will be constituted, what mandate it is given, and 
whether it will be provided sufficient financial and staff resources to do its job 
effectively.
DURATION OF PANEL REVIEWS
CEAA 2012 introduced time limits for panel reviews of major projects. Bill 
C-69 shortens these limits to 600 days, and for what are often the most con-
troversial types of projects—energy and nuclear—300 days. It is reasonable 
that Review Panels should be expected to conduct their work expeditiously. Yet 
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the imposition of time limits is not the best means of promoting that objective, 
despite its superficial appeal.
The most important way a Review Panel gathers its information is through its 
public hearings. There are usually several categories of public hearings (i.e. 
technical, general, and community), each of which is tailored to gather specific 
types of information and ensure appropriate forms of public participation, and 
each requiring its own rules. Bill C-69 has rightly removed the more restric-
tive requirements for participation established by CEAA 2012.
It is for the Review Panel to set out the rules for its proceedings, including who 
may intervene and who may participate, within the requirements of natural 
justice and procedural fairness. These rules become the most visible aspect of 
due process while the Review Panel is in operation. If the Panel does not get 
the matters of procedural fairness, natural justice, and adherence to mandate 
right, it can be challenged. Panels need to be sufficiently confident that they 
can apply their rules without frequent threat of challenge, particularly by 
parties whose sole purpose is to stop the project, or to use the process as a 
lever for some other and not necessarily related objective. These rules must 
include reasonable limits on the hearing schedule and on the time allotted to 
each participant. Another means of streamlining the process would be to limit 
the number of intervenors by encouraging consolidation of effort by public 
interest groups. This would at once enhance the effectiveness of interest group 
interventions, and reduce duplication and repetition of questioning, espe-
cially at technical hearings. But perhaps the best way to ensure that a Panel 
can focus on its core mandate would be to ensure that regional and strategic 
reviews, newly provided for under Bill C-69, are effectively deployed to provide 
essential context for project-specific reviews.11
Ultimately, Review Panels must be satisfied that they have been able to obtain 
and test the information they require. If the time limits imposed under Bill 
C-69 are to accomplish their objectives, then measures must be in place to 
ensure that panels can complete their work fully and effectively in accordance 
with public trust. As already noted, the challenge for the Agency is how Review 
Panels, which are one-off in nature and supposed to be independent, should 
be supported to ensure they are able to process the information they receive in 
order to provide timely, sturdy, and persuasive results.
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RESPONSE TO PANEL REVIEWS
What happens after a panel files its report?
In principle, once the Review Panel has submitted its report, it is dissolved, 
except insofar as the Minister may ask it to clarify any of the conclusions and 
recommendations set out in its report (s.51(1)(f)). Under earlier legislation, 
upon receiving the panel’s report, the governments that established the panel 
were required to respond by stating, with reasons, whether they accepted, 
rejected, or modified each recommendation directed to it.12
Both the government response to the panel’s recommendations, and the 
panel’s comments, if requested, must be placed on the public record, consistent 
with the review process itself. Government can only be held accountable for 
the implementation of its commitments if these commitments are clearly and 
publicly stated. The receiving governments are then supposed to direct their 
responsible authorities to implement these recommendations, and their reg-
ulatory agencies (e.g. CER or CNSC) to adopt them as permitting conditions 
binding on the project operator. To the extent that the panel’s recommen-
dations for monitoring and follow-up are accepted, these programs must be 
implemented by the responsible authorities.
As Bill C-69 is largely silent on these procedures, perhaps they need to be 
specified through regulation. The public, and especially those participants 
(including the proponent) who invest their time and energy in the process, 
have a right to know what to expect of it in the outcome.
As already noted, the purpose of a panel review is not simply to deliver a 
thumbs up or thumbs down on a project, but to shape the responses and over-
sight of both regulators and governments respecting the project throughout 
its operation and abandonment. However, a concern consistently expressed at 
panel reviews is a lack of public confidence in either the project operators, or 
the government regulators, to ensure that the conditions of operation will be 
fulfilled and enforced.
Restoring the credibility of Canada’s environmental assessment system must 
include means to hold governments accountable for their own commitments 
with respect to project approvals. One solution would be that panel recommen-
dations adopted by government as project conditions be the subject of regular 
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progress reporting to Parliament by the Commissioner of the Environment 
and Sustainable Development, for example as was recommended by the Mac-
kenzie Gas Project Joint Review Panel in 2009. Without some such provision, 
panel reviews risk becoming mere performance, soon forgotten.
So does Canada’s new environmental assessment legislation meet the tests 
the Government set out for it? Does it improve and ensure the due process 
requirements necessary to restore public trust? Our analysis suggests that 
the legislation fails on grounds of commission—what it actually contains that 
runs counter to that objective—and of omission—of failing to grasp significant 
opportunities for improvement. The former will require legislative amend-
ments, the latter may be amenable to regulatory correction, at least for now.
We are grateful to Hugh Benevides, Meinhard Doelle, George Kinloch, and 
Pamela White for critical review and critical support.
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Chapter 7 
A Pan-Canadian Experiment: 
Pipelines, Carbon Pricing, and 
Partisan Politics Test the New 
Era of Energy/Environmental 
Federalism
Travis Dagg, Jonathan Lippett, Derek Masters, and Glen Toner
INTRODUCTION
This is the fourth in a series of How Ottawa Spends chapters analyzing the 
politics of the energy/environment policy domain under the Stephen Harper 
Conservative (2006-2015) and Justin Trudeau Liberal (2015-) governments. 
The three previous chapters underscored the close link between ideas, policy 
instruments, partisan politics, and federalism. The first chapter documented 
the Harper government’s wedge politics approach to governance and its 
attempt to systematically reverse the sustainable development (SD) policy 
innovations introduced by the Mulroney and Chretien governments. The 
Harper Conservatives did not take climate change seriously and steadfastly 
refused to price carbon while enthusiastically supporting oil and gas develop-
ment (Toner and McKee 2014). The second chapter explored the Trudeau Lib-
erals October 2015 defeat of the Harper Conservatives and the reestablishment 
of a policy agenda imbued with SD ideas and values including an intergovern-
mental engagement approach to governance (Toner et al. 2016a). The third 
chapter evaluated the Trudeau government’s first 18 months as it launched an 
intensive process of engagement with provincial and territorial governments to 
entrench sustainability values in the 2016 Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean 
Growth and Climate Change (PCF) (Chahal et al. 2017). Historically, federal 
governments have struggled to provide serious support to provinces pursuing 
sustainability goals (VanNijNatten 2016; Doern, Auld, and Stoney 2015). Given 
this history, the third chapter asked if the Trudeau government’s policies could 
deliver adequate support to provincial/territorial efforts to reduce emissions 
and strengthen low-carbon economic growth. The chapter concluded that the 
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Liberal’s approach and provincial/territorial actions did indeed represent a 
new era of cooperative energy/environmental federalism. Without question, 
the degree of intergovernmental coordination and cooperation represented by 
the PCF is a historic high for any period since climate change and greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emission reduction ascended to the national policy agenda in the 
early 1990s.
Events unfolding in 2018 and 2019 will severely test the will of the federal 
Liberals to see through the very substantial policy and expenditure commit-
ments made since 2016 to meet Canada’s GHG emissions reduction commit-
ments and transition Canada’s economy toward a low-carbon future. What 
makes this era of federalism particularly interesting and challenging is that 
the Trudeau Liberals are promoting a vision of a Canada that is simultaneously 
reducing domestic GHG emissions and increasing oil and natural gas exports. 
The Liberal’s clarion call has been that the environment and the economy are 
not in conflict and that the wealth produced by exporting GHG emitting fossil 
fuels to other countries over the next couple of decades can be used to fund 
the low-carbon transition at home. Many Canadians who take climate change 
science seriously and want to see an accelerated low-carbon transition con-
sider these dual goals to be a paradox that undermines the Liberal’s credibility. 
Other Canadians who are invested in the continued growth of the fossil fuel 
sector are also suspect of this vision and are coalescing around provincial and 
federal conservative parties who prioritize hydrocarbon production over GHG 
emission reductions. The federal Conservative party under Harper’s successor 
Andrew Scheer continues to oppose carbon pricing and can be expected to 
continue to oppose the principles of the PCF leading up to the October 2019 
federal election. After a brief flirtation with a carbon tax commitment in 
the campaign program of the Ontario Progressive Conservatives under then 
leader Patrick Brown, the newly elected Ontario Conservative Government 
under Premier Doug Ford has committed to both end the provincial Liberal’s 
cap-and-trade (C&T) system and challenge a federal carbon tax (Selley 2018). 
In a complex federation comprised of 14 governments, the change of a gov-
erning party in any jurisdiction that is a signatory to an inter-governmental 
agreement can present a challenge if the policies flowing from the agreement 
require significant coordination, like the PCF does. In this dynamic context, 
this chapter analyses the intergovernmental implementation effort from June 
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2017 to June 2018 and asks whether the positive momentum generated by the 
PCF can be sustained.
Part one explores in detail the multitude of policies, regulations, and programs 
put in place by the federal and provincial/territorial governments to: 1) insti-
tute policy instruments to put a price on carbon; 2) strengthen the resilience 
of the natural and built infrastructure threatened by extreme weather events 
and other climate change impacts; and 3) accelerate Canadian contributions to 
innovative low-carbon technologies. Part two will explore the challenges that 
are in play that have the potential to derail or at the very least diminish the 
short-term and long-term impacts of the PCF. The conclusion follows.
OPERATIONALIZING THE PAN CANADIAN FRAMEWORK: 
POLICIES, REGULATIONS AND INVESTMENTS
Carbon Pricing & the PCF
The PCF includes a suite of nationally applicable regulatory instruments meant 
to achieve the necessary emissions reductions. The federal government’s 
“Forward Regulatory Plan” for air emissions and greenhouse gases has 16 
listed regulations or amendments under development including regulations 
for methane in the oil and gas sector, a clean fuel standard, vehicle regulations 
and volatile organic compound (VOC) controls (ECCC 2017a). Of these regula-
tory instruments, carbon pricing has received the most attention.
Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) has been charged with 
creating national policy convergence through the implementation of the reg-
ulatory elements of the PCF. In May 2017, ECCC released its Technical Paper 
on the Federal Carbon Pricing Backstop, which was followed by its Guidance 
on the Pan-Canadian Carbon Pollution Pricing Benchmark in August. In 
December 2017 the Supplemental Benchmark Guidance was issued and federal 
Environment Minister Catherine McKenna and Finance Minister Bill Morneau 
announced a deadline of 1 September 2018 for each province to outline how it 
intends to implement a carbon pricing system that meets the federal standard 
(Canada 2017a). On 15 January 2018 the federal government published for 
public comment The Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, with the intention 
of officially codifying its proposed national carbon pricing system (Canada 
2018a). The legislation would require provinces and territories to implement 
carbon pricing systems by 1 January 2019 or adopt a federally administered 
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carbon pricing system that the federal government calls the “backstop.” The 
backstop, which is applicable to jurisdictions where no carbon pricing system 
is adopted or where the pricing system fails to meet the standards outlined 
under the Paris Agreement, would similarly come into effect 1 January 2019 
(Canada 2017b). At time of writing, four Canadian provinces—British Colum-
bia (BC), Alberta, Ontario and Quebec—covering over 80% of the Canadian 
population have adopted a price on carbon that is consistent with the federal 
guidelines (See Table 1). Apart from Saskatchewan, which has indicated its 
refusal to comply with the PCF and adopt a carbon pricing system, Canada’s 
remaining provinces and territories have either announced pricing systems, 
indicated their near-term adoption, or are studying the question.
Since the inception of the PCF, the Liberals have made a commitment to 
ensuring that provinces and territories have a measure of flexibility in the 
design and implementation of their regulations. To respect existing emissions 
pricing frameworks the Trudeau government allowed Canadian jurisdictions 
to choose between two pricing systems: a direct price-based system (BC and 
Alberta) or a cap-and-trade system (Ontario and Quebec). The federal govern-
ment is ambivalent as to which system is chosen as long as each jurisdiction 
adheres to pricing minimums and a 2030 emission reduction target equal to 
or greater than Canada’s emissions reduction target committed to in the Paris 
Agreement of 30% below 2005 levels by 2030. Direct pricing systems create 
a fixed price for GHG emissions, but leaves the actual quantity of emission 
reductions to be determined by the market, whereas C&T creates a regime 
where the quantity of emissions is fixed, but the price is determined by the 
market.
Under federal pricing, policy jurisdictions that choose an explicit price-based 
system must have a carbon price that starts at a minimum of $10 per ton in 
2018 and rises by $10 per year to $50 per ton in 2022. Hence, jurisdictions 
that currently do not have a price in place will begin on 1 January 2019 at $20 
per ton. Alternatively, jurisdictions that choose C&T must introduce an emis-
sions trading market that allows the jurisdiction to meet or exceed Canada’s 
emissions reduction goal.
In sum, between late 2016 and mid 2018 the Liberals successfully established 
a policy touchstone for the provinces/territories by introducing a carbon 
pricing instrument that accommodates both tax and trade jurisdictions. 
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Given that carbon pricing already covers most Canadian citizens, the federal 
government has rightly taken a hard line with provinces seeking exemptions 
(Manitoba, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick) with the carbon pricing backstop 
ensuring equitable treatment for all citizens regardless of where they live in 
Canada. In this way, the PCF does a good job of setting national policy bench-
marks, accommodating provincial preferences, but not too much, thereby 
weaving a delicate balance.
Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience
Understanding the nomenclature of climate adaptation is critical. The Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC 2014) 
defines “climate adaptation” as the process of adjustment to actual or expected 
climate change and its effects. “Adaptation deficits” are the gap between the 
current state of a system and a state that minimizes adverse impacts from 
existing climate conditions and variability. “Adaptive capacity” is the ability 
of systems, institutions, humans, and other organisms to adjust to potential 
damage, to take advantage of opportunities, or to respond to consequences. 
Regardless of the outcomes of GHG mitigation efforts, changes to the climate 
are already underway and adaptation action will be required.
The 7th National Communication and 3rd Biennial Report (Canada 2017d) notes 
that Canada will likely experience warmer temperatures, more rainfall, more 
extreme weather events, ocean rise, ocean acidification, and a loss of snow 
coverage in the coming decades. Although Canada is recognized as one of the 
least vulnerable nations in overall terms, it is one of the most exposed due to 
its large landmass and dispersed population (University of Notre Dame 2016). 
The Insurance Bureau of Canada (IBC 2016) highlighted the growing cost of 
natural disasters in Canada. The average insured losses from extreme weather 
events between 1983 and 2004 were roughly $370 million per year. While 
significant, these figures pale in comparison to the accelerating costs of twen-
ty-first century events. The Commissioner of Environment and Sustainable 
Development found that “over the past 6 fiscal years, the Disaster Financial 
Assistance Arrangements program provided more recovery funding than in its 
first 39 fiscal years combined” (CESD 2016). Indeed, insured losses for extreme 
weather events rose to an average of $1.2 billion per year between 2004-2015. 
This dramatic increase in costs has been linked to recent fires and floods 
across Canada (See Table 2). While already causing increasing amounts of 
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damage, experts predict the costs associated with climate change will continue 
to rise. The National Round Table on the Environment and Economy esti-
mated climate change could cost Canada roughly $5 billion per year by 2020, 
and between $21 and $43 billion a year by 2050 (NRTEE 2011).
In contrast to the historic reactive “clean up” approach, the Trudeau Liberals 
have chosen to use federal spending power to take a proactive approach to 
climate change adaptation by supporting capacity building to shrink the 
adaptation deficit. Table 3 illustrates the various adaptation-related spending 
commitments from the 2016, 2017, and 2018 Budgets. These commitments, 
particularly those aimed at improving information, infrastructure, and disas-
ter mitigation, represent a landmark shift in priorities that will close adapta-
tion deficits. The Canadian Centre for Climate Services (CCCS) will become 
the federal government’s “official source of reliable climate information, data 
and tools… and will provide training and user support to help increase climate 
resilience across Canada” (ECCC 2018). The Centre will support existing 
regional, provincial, and industry-led adaptation networks. The information 
products will be used by city planners, transport engineers, forest managers, 
farmers, Indigenous communities, and other relevant stakeholders. The $2 
billion earmarked for disaster mitigation and adaptation will help national, 
provincial/territorial, Indigenous, and municipal decision makers prepare for 
increasingly frequent extreme weather events. This funding for large scale 
infrastructure projects aimed at improving preparedness represents a paradig-
matic shift from reactive disaster management to proactive risk reduction. It 
also directly responds to the 2016 CESD Report which found that Canada was 
woefully unprepared for future climate-related disasters.
This shift to a proactive approach to climate adaptation has been notable. In 
April 2018 Infrastructure Canada identified 28,000 projects that have been 
approved ($11.8 billion), including 20,000 projects ($9.4 billion) that are 
already underway (Meyer 2018). Another significant success is the Liberal’s 
commitment to establishing a set of indicators for tracking adaptation efforts. 
The creation of an Expert Panel on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience 
Results should provide valuable tools for monitoring and evaluating adaptation 
efforts, as well as enhancing communications with Canadians.
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Low-Carbon and Clean Technology and Innovation
As Table 4 shows, the combined commitments from Budgets 2016, 2017, and 
2018 directed significant financial resources in support of the clean technology 
pillar of the PCF. Canada’s Innovation and Skills Plan also highlights cleantech 
as a priority sector of the Canadian economy (Canada 2017c). The Green Infra-
structure Fund will target projects that reduce GHG emissions, improve air 
and water quality, promote renewable power, and support adaptation mea-
sures. The Fund will distribute $21.9 billion over 11 years through: bilateral 
agreements with provinces and territories; the Canadian Infrastructure Bank; 
and through a series of national programs for Indigenous communities, smart 
grids, renewable energy technologies, electric vehicle infrastructure, energy 
efficiency technologies, and reducing the reliance of rural and remote com-
munities on diesel fuel. The Low-Carbon Economy Fund has two steams. The 
Leadership Fund provides $1.4 billion to support provinces and territories that 
adopt the PCF, starting with a base amount of $30 million and adding addi-
tional funding based on population. The second stream is the $500M Chal-
lenge Fund. It is open to all provinces, territories, municipalities, Indigenous 
communities, businesses, and not-for-profits and will be awarded based on a 
project’s ability to reduce GHG emissions thereby encouraging a wide variety 
of actors to support of the PCF.
The federal government is also embracing experimental approaches to funding 
by encouraging federal departments to devote a fixed percentage of funds to 
incentive based funding, challenge programs, and micro-funding (TBS 2017). 
These mechanisms are particularly useful when addressing complex policy 
problems by creating space for non-governmental actors to propose solutions. 
Budget 2017 builds on this new flexibility with the launch of the Clean Growth 
Program and the Impact Canada Initiative. The Clean Growth Program sup-
ports research, development, and demonstration of clean technologies in the 
mining, energy, forestry, agriculture, and fisheries sectors. For the first time, 
project proponents will be able to access federal research facilities to develop 
and test their technologies. The Impact Canada Initiative funds a series 
of prize-based challenges in collaboration with the private, academic, and 
non-governmental sectors to significantly advance clean technology solutions.
Clearly, the Liberals have backed up their political commitments with histori-
cally significant financial investments to ensure robust implementation of the 
102 How Ottawa Spends
PCF. The sheer number of programs and sizeable investments demonstrate 
this. Efforts to transition Canada towards a low-carbon, clean growth economy 
through the PCF have yielded early successes. In turn, provincial carbon 
pricing systems are facilitating Canada’s shift to a clean growth economy. 
In 2017, the four provinces with a price on carbon were the best performing 
provinces in Canada based on GDP growth, illustrating that a well-designed 
price on carbon does not significantly hurt economic growth (Kniewasser and 
Becker 2018) and reinforcing the OECD’s position that a price on carbon can 
spur investments in programs that will reduce emissions and continue to grow 
the economy (OECD 2017).
CHALLENGES FACING THE PCF
Clearly, there are both political and policy challenges associated with imple-
menting a federal-provincial-territorial action plan of historic proportions, 
while following a strategy that seeks to reduce domestic GHG emissions and 
shift Canada’s energy base from emissions intensive coal/oil/natural gas 
hydrocarbons to a clean energy system, while growing hydrocarbon exports.
Ideas and Partisanship
Despite demonstrable successes, the future of carbon pricing in Canada is still 
uncertain. The idea of carbon pricing has become a major wedge issue between 
conservative and non-conservative parties with the leader of the federal Con-
servative party, Andrew Scheer, vowing to repeal the national price on carbon 
should his party be elected in 2019. Ontario Premier Doug Ford has promised 
to work with the conservative government in Saskatchewan and Jason Ken-
ney’s United Conservative Party, if it forms government in Alberta in 2019, to 
provide a unified conservative front against carbon pricing while the Trudeau 
Liberals are still in power. Politically motivated conservative opposition to 
carbon pricing stands in contrast to a widespread consensus amongst mar-
ket-oriented economists about the benefits of pricing pollution and spreads 
pervasive misconceptions amongst Canadians (CEC 2018a). A 2018 Abacus 
Data survey on perceptions of carbon pricing in Canada found that 79 percent 
of respondents said they had a positive view of carbon pricing (46 percent 
calling it a “good idea” and 33 percent saying it is “acceptable”), but only half 
of respondents (52 percent) reported being familiar with the federal govern-
ment’s carbon pricing policy and among respondents whose home provinces 
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had a price on carbon only 49 percent reported having knowledge of their 
system. Furthermore, when asked about the purpose of a carbon tax, only 58 
percent said they thought that the primary purpose was to change behavior, 
compared to 42 percent who said the purpose was just to raise money (Abacus 
2018). This gap in popular understanding creates a window for conservative 
politicians to undermine the policy by framing carbon pricing negatively. 
Current conservative political rhetoric is not new, echoing Stephen Harper’s 
charge that carbon pricing is a “job killing tax.” The Abacus data suggests 
that one of the greatest challenges facing the PCF is the Liberal government’s 
apparent inability to effectively communicate the benefits of carbon pricing to 
citizens. The critical bottom line is that there has never been as much at stake 
before as Canada’s Paris climate commitments and the PCF risk being under-
mined if a national price on carbon is not maintained for ideological reasons.
Since the very inception of the PCF, Trudeau has maintained that Canadian 
action on climate change rests on a grand bargain between resource devel-
opment for export and emissions reductions domestically. The Liberal’s 2015 
electoral campaign and subsequent governance approach was built on an 
ideological foundation that increased production/export of oil and gas can 
be supported because it is coupled with enhanced environmental protection 
initiatives such as strengthened environmental assessment, regulatory instru-
ment improvements, and carbon pricing. Consequently, the Liberals are being 
attacked from both sides by the major opposition parties. The Kinder Morgan 
Trans Mountain Pipeline Expansion project has become a symbol of energy 
and environmental politics in Canada and, unsurprisingly, brought partisan 
politics to the fore. For the Conservatives, the Liberal’s decision to buy the 
pipeline was not about “investing in Canada’s future,” as stated by Finance 
Minister Bill Morneau, but was instead about Kinder Morgan divesting from 
Canada as part of a broader trend of capital flight from Canada amidst con-
cerns that Liberal environmental policy has made Canada an unwelcome place 
for hydrocarbon industries. Conversely, the Federal NDP and Green parties 
have criticized the Liberals for choosing to promote oilsands and pipeline 
development over environmental protection.
Clearly, climate change adaptation governance is complex. Henstra argues that 
“Adaptation requires action at all scales—from local to global—but coordinat-
ing these nested responses to achieve a vertically cohesive course of action is 
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a key challenge” (Henstra 2017). Politically, adaptation efforts are hampered 
by the difficulty of communicating the value of adaptation. While floods and 
fires highlight the salience of disaster mitigation and adaptation, the long-
term horizons of adaptation infrastructure often result in psychological gaps 
requiring strong communication campaigns. Contributing to these already 
weak political incentives to commit to long-term adaptation efforts is the 
“short-termism” of four-year electoral cycles which discourage prioritizing 
climate adaptation investments as the costs are immediate and the benefits 
long-term. Short-termism creates a regime that encourages a reactive clean-up 
mentality, rather than proactive long-term approach to adaptation; hence, the 
federal, provincial, and territorial leaders who signed the PCF deserve credit 
for looking over the horizon. Interestingly, all the signatory governments to the 
PCF were Liberal or NDP.
Canada’s municipal/territorial/provincial/national adaptation network will 
improve with the launch of the CCCS, but the serious policy coordination 
and coherence-building efforts that have been launched must be vigourously 
maintained if adaptation is to be mainstreamed into all policymaking, and this 
will require political will. These infrastructure investments will not be cheap 
and will be a major test of parties that form governments at all levels going 
forward. For political parties to commit to long term adaptation strategies, 
they must first believe the science of climate change.
Federalism and Intergovernmental Tensions
As implementation of the PCF ramps up in year three, challenges are emerg-
ing. Trudeau tied carbon pricing in the PCF to the successful completion of the 
Trans Mountain Pipeline expansion project (TMX) to dramatically increase 
bitumen exports from Edmonton to Vancouver to Asian markets, demonstrat-
ing his government’s dual focus on domestic GHG emission reductions and 
enhanced fossil fuel exports (Morgan 2018). TMX has become a major flash-
point for the Liberals precisely because it reflects the tensions in their core 
dual focus, with BC championing environment protection and Alberta bitumen 
development. The Trudeau government, which has final regulatory authority 
on the inter-provincial project, approved TMX in 2016 after the mandated 
assessment and review process, declaring the project to be in the national 
interest. In essentially guaranteeing Alberta that bitumen exports would reach 
tidewater and international markets, Trudeau allowed the then new Alberta 
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NDP Premier Rachel Notley to commit to a broad-based carbon pricing regime 
and sign onto the PCF. This was critical as Alberta produces most of Canada’s 
additional GHG through emissions-intensive oilsands bitumen operations and 
Alberta’s emission reductions are critical if Canada is to meet Canada’s Paris 
Agreement. The 2017 election of a NDP minority government in BC, supported 
by the Green Party, disrupted the planning of the TMX project by raising ques-
tions about the environmental risks of bitumen transport through BC coastal 
waters. In response, Houston-based Kinder Morgan suspended non-essential 
spending on the $7.5 billion TMX in April 2018 citing political challenges and 
uncertainty. This announcement divided the Western provinces with Alberta 
and Saskatchewan threatening legislation to restrict the flow of oil products to 
BC citizens.
The Liberals clearly feared that the delay or cancellation of TMX might harm 
its goal of attracting foreign investment to Canada by raising doubts about 
the ability of the Canadian government to ensure approved projects succeed. 
To counter this, the Liberals first committed to indemnify the project against 
politically triggered construction delays and then on 29 May 2018 announced 
that the federal government would buy the core assets associated with the 
existing pipeline system for $4.5 billion, and if no other private owner comes 
forward, will provide the financing to construct the new $7.5 billion TMX. 
The Liberal’s extraordinary decision places it in direct opposition to the BC 
government. TMX will proceed as a federal crown project in the national 
interest granting it special allowances that are not available to a private sector 
company, thereby significantly increasing the chances of project completion.
Canada’s judicial system plays a critical role in adjudicating jurisdictional 
disputes between provinces and between provinces and the federal govern-
ment. With a political resolution amongst the federal Liberal government, 
and the BC and Alberta NDP governments not forthcoming, BC resorted to 
the courts by posing a reference question to the BC Court of Appeal on the 
province’s jurisdictional authority to restrict the flow of bitumen to protect its 
environment, essentially asking in what circumstances, if any, provincial envi-
ronmental jurisdiction can prevail over national interest authority. Indeed, all 
actors are prepared to use the courts if they view it to be to their advantage. As 
discussed above, the federal government has crafted legislation allowing it to 
impose the legislated carbon price on provinces if they do not have their own 
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pricing systems. The conservative government of Saskatchewan, supported by 
the new Conservative government in Ontario, and potentially Alberta, have 
threatened to challenge the federal government’s power to do so before the 
Supreme Court. Moreover, there are many lawsuits by various First Nations 
and environmental groups challenging the approval of the TMX project before 
the Federal Court, potentially causing further delays and uncertainty.
There are also political risks for the Liberals in buying the Kinder Morgan 
pipeline. Alberta comes off as the big winner, yet the Liberals have modest 
hopes of adding seats there in the 2019 federal election. However, Trudeau’s 
dramatic show of support for TMX—and getting a bitumen export pipeline 
built (something Stephen Harper could not do)—could bolster support for 
climate policy ally Premier Rachel Notley and prove the Liberals support 
resource development as an engine of growth. Yet there are serious risks in BC 
for the Liberals in the 2019 federal election in the populous Lower Mainland 
where opposition to TMX is strongest. Losing his biggest climate policy ally 
in Liberal Premier Kathleen Wynne in the 7 June 2018 Ontario election was 
a blow. If Alberta Conservative leader Jason Kenney defeats Notley in 2019 
and forms a united provincial front with Ontario and Saskatchewan against 
the PCF, and with diminished goodwill in British Columbia, Trudeau may face 
a federal-provincial confrontation on implementing the climate change and 
clean growth pillars of the PCF.
CONCLUSION
As argued in the previous chapter of this How Ottawa Spends series, the 
adoption and early implementation of the PCF marked a new and positive era 
of energy/environmental federalism (Chahal et al. 2017). For the first time, 
Canada had a tangible roadmap for meeting its international climate com-
mitments supported by significant federal investments and resources, backed 
by every provincial and territorial government except Saskatchewan. Canada 
would join over 40 other countries with a national price on carbon, with most 
provinces and territories working with the federal government to enact clean 
growth and climate adaptation programs for citizens and businesses. To be 
clear, the PCF is one of the largest intergovernmental projects the Canadian 
federation has embarked upon in recent decades. Pushback and challenges 
are to be expected as governments change over time as happens in democra-
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cies, particularly in shared federal-provincial domains like environment and 
energy. And, historically, issues of shared jurisdiction often trigger political 
conflicts amongst governments and then rely on the judicial system for 
resolution.
The PCF was born at a politically opportune time in 2016 when the interests of 
federal and provincial governments on climate change coming out of the Paris 
COP 21 were in rare alignment. It has catalyzed a pace of change whose scale 
and fundamental nature are unprecedented. Given the challenges identified 
above with the PCF’s implementation, one must ask whether this paradigm 
shift is inherently fragile or has staying power.
The clash of ideas, conflicting interests, and questions of jurisdictional author-
ity are risks to the continued implementation of the PCF. Unwavering federal 
leadership will continue to be critical in the short to medium term as provin-
cial elections take place and some governments change. With respect to the 
2019 federal election, the PCF likely has staying power if the Trudeau Liberals 
retain power. The Conservative Party of Canada has offered no valid alterna-
tive to the PCF and the election of a Scheer Conservative government would 
end the critical PCF carbon pricing pillar.
Upon becoming Premier, Doug Ford announced that he would kill provincial 
carbon pricing by withdrawing Ontario from the C&T program even though 
it may be financially very costly for Ontarians. The large Ontario firms that 
have invested nearly $3 billion buying C&T allowances, which Ford would 
render worthless, may seek compensation (Coyne 2018). Moreover, Ford could 
be challenged in the courts by the governments of Quebec and California 
whose markets are linked to Ontario’s as “[i]t is much harder to dismantle a 
market than it is to repeal a tax” (McCarthy 2018). The federal government 
may also withdraw the $420 million that Ontario would have received from 
the $2 billion PCF Low Carbon Economy Fund to support projects that reduce 
emissions and create jobs in low-carbon clean tech sectors (Wechsler 2018a). 
Speculation is that Ford’s ideologically driven “on the fly” behaviour could cost 
Ontario up to $4 billion at the outset of his term (Reevely 2018). Moreover, 
Ford’s decision to kill the C&T program in Ontario despite these consid-
erations, will require the Trudeau Liberals to impose the backstop pricing 
system on Ontario as they have promised to do in Saskatchewan (Wechsler 
2018b). Trudeau, therefore, will be forced to walk the talk of his commitments 
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against both a small province and the largest one. In the end, Trudeau may 
relish the opportunity to run against Ford as well as Scheer.
On the surface, emerging partisan divisions amongst major federal-provincial 
actors and the position on climate change taken by the Trump Administration 
in the United States could impact the PCF. Three of the four major prov-
inces—whose support for the PCF is key—are prepared to challenge the federal 
government over key energy/environment issues. From bitumen pipeline and 
coastal tanker politics in BC to carbon pricing conflicts with Ontario and 
potentially Alberta, the Liberals’ climate change plan is under stress. In 2017 
the Trump Administration withdrew the United States from the Paris Agree-
ment and began an environmental deregulatory campaign (Brookings Insti-
tute 2018), prompting many Canadian conservatives and business executives 
to call for Canada to follow Trump’s lead to maintain the competitiveness of 
Canadian industry. But running against Trump’s approach may very well be an 
advantage for Trudeau in 2019.
The view that the actions catalyzed by the PCF are at risk due to provincial 
oscillation and/or pressure from the political right due to Trump’s actions 
may not, however, be determinative. The PCF, while being the central climate 
change/clean growth plan for the county, is part of a much larger global tran-
sition to a low-carbon economy; a transition whose momentum and durability 
outweigh the vulnerability of its individual parts (see Mission Innovation 
2018; Breakthrough Energy Coalition 2018). The Trudeau Liberals have taken 
several measures to ensure their efforts are sustained, including key legislative 
action and long-term spending. Bill C-68 will restore the Fisheries Act to its 
pre-Harper stringency. Bill C-69 will restore the Navigable Waters Act and 
reconfigure the federal major project review process to consider key climate, 
environmental, sustainability, and indigenous components, illustrating a legal 
commitment to balance energy and environmental priorities in the review 
process. The forthcoming clean fuel standard (CFS) is arguably the single 
largest mitigation instrument being undertaken in the PCF. Fuel suppliers will 
be required to use different fuels and modelling suggests that the CFS could 
deliver an additional 30 megatonnes of reductions, which is almost twice 
what the federal carbon price might deliver (CEC 2018b). Furthermore, should 
jurisdictions prove uncompliant with the federal government’s carbon pricing 
escalation schedule, the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Act will legally ensure that 
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emissions are priced in all jurisdictions so that all Canadians are engaged—not 
just some. The federal government may choose to return the revenues col-
lected from the carbon tax directly to citizens, rather than to the governments, 
in those provinces which refuse to deploy their own systems, like Ontario and 
Saskatchewan.
In addition to the strengthened legal and institutional capacity are the fiscal 
instruments already deployed to support billions of dollars of federal, provin-
cial, territorial, municipal, and private investments in climate change/clean 
growth programs, policies, and infrastructure projects for the next several 
years. It is unlikely that a different political party forming the federal govern-
ment in 2019 would claw this money back right away, if at all, as provinces, 
territories, municipalities, and businesses will have made significant and 
ongoing investments in infrastructure and R&D projects based on contracts 
with federal and provincial governments. Finally, though not a result of the 
federal Liberal’s efforts, is the determination of jurisdictions such as Quebec 
and BC to strive for climate goals and clean growth targets despite what their 
conservative peers may do. Though the PCF itself may be somewhat fragile, 
the clean growth and climate change activities it has catalyzed are well under-
way and, at present, embedded in legislation. As Don Lenihan argues in his 
assessment of Trudeau’s performance in this domain to date: “those who care 
about sustainable development should take the long view” (Lenihan 2018).
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APPENCICES




Direct pricing system – tax Direct pricing systems apply a transparent, explicit price on emissions by fuel based 
on GHG content.
Direct pricing system – “hybrid” Output-based pricing systems (OBPS) or “hybrid” systems create an incentive for 
GHG emitters to reduce emissions by exempting them from paying a carbon price 
on their fossil fuel consumption. Like C&T, facilities that exceed their annual limit 
under a hybrid system must acquire additional GHG credits.
Cap-and-trade system (C&T) C&T sets limit on the quantity of GHGs that may be emitted in an economy (or a 
sector of the economy) over a time period.
Governments issue a pool of emission allowance credits that corresponds with the 
GHG cap for that period. For each period, registered emitters must ensure they own 
sufficient emission allowance to cover their emissions.
JURISDICTION PRICING SYSTEM COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL 
CARBON PRICING POLICY
Alberta Hybrid system with a tax and OBPS for 
large industrial emitters
Compliant
British Colombia Tax with OBPS for Liquified Natural 
Gas sector
Compliant
Manitoba Tax with an OBPS for industry (begin-
ning in 2019).
No planned increase to tax rate 
beyond $25 over the period 
2018–2022
Compliant – Until January 2020
New Brunswick Proposed OBPS Currently uncompliant
Newfoundland & Labrador Proposed GHG emission limits for 
industrial facilities
Currently uncompliant
Nova Scotia Proposed C&T system Currently uncompliant
Ontario* C&T linked with Quebec and California Compliant
Prince Edward Island No system indicated Currently uncompliant
Quebec C&T linked with Ontario and California Compliant
Saskatchewan Proposed OBPS that exempts 
upstream oil and gas and electricity 
sectors
Currently uncompliant
Northwest Territories Tax Compliant – Beginning January 2019
Nunavut Tax Compliant – Beginning January 2019
Yukon Tax Compliant – Beginning January 2019
*A Progressive Conservative government was elected on 7 June 2018. Incoming Premier Doug Ford has pledged to 
end Ontario’s participation in the Ontario and California linked C&T system but no legislation to that effect had been 
implemented at time of writing (Coyne 2018).
Table 2: Major Canadian Natural Disaster Insured Losses
EVENT INSURED LOSSES
2013 Alberta Floods $1.9B
2016 For McMurray, Alberta 
Wildfires
$3.6B
2017 Ontario/Quebec Spring Floods $223M
2017 BC Wildfires $127M
(Swiss Reinsurance Company, 2016; Canadian Underwriter, 2016, 2017; IBC, 2017)
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Table 3: Adaptation Initiatives





Sustaining Healthy Communities Through a New Clean Water 
and Wastewater Fund
$129.5M/5 IC Broad adaptation program funding to 7 federal departments 
and agencies
$75M/1 N/A Federation of Canadian Municipalities’ Municipalities (FCM) for 
Climate Innovation Program
$2.65B/5 Global Affairs Canada International Climate Finance (part of which will help the 
poorest nations adapt to climate change)
$94M/2 IC Adaptation and Climate Resilient Infrastructure
$2.9B/5  (ECCC) Low-Carbon Economy Fund, and to advance science and 
understanding of climate change
2017 $73.5M/5 ECCC Canadian Centre for Climate Services (CCCS)
$47.0M/5 Health Canada (HC) National Climate Change Health Risk Plan
$18.0M/5 HC Climate change and health adaptation program for First 
Nations and Inuit communities
$21.6M/4 Fisheries and Oceans/
Transport Canada (TC)
Aquatic Climate Change Adaptation Services Program and the 
Northern Transportation Adaptation Initiative
$2B/10 IC Disaster Mitigation and Adaptation Fund
$9.2B/11 IC Bilateral infrastructure funding agreements with provinces (a 
portion to support adaptation)
$5B/11 IC Canada Infrastructure Bank (Green Infrastructure Projects)
2018 $131M/5 ECCC Adapting Canada’s Weather and Water Services to Climate 
Change
(Government of Canada 2016; 2017b; 2018)














 ECCC $2B/5 -support implementation of PCF by 
leveraging investments in projects that will 
generate clean growth and reduce GHG 
emissions
2017 Clean Growth 
Hub
NRCan and ISED $12M/4 -whole-of-government focal point for clean 
technology, focused on supporting compa-





ISED $950M/5 -accelerate growth and development of 
business-led innovation superclusters








$21.9B/11 -accelerate deployment of next-generation 
clean energy infrastructure by investing in: 
technology demonstrations, community 
capacity building, and targeted R&D












-challenge based approach for the federal 
government
-accelerate solutions to challenges like 
diesel use in remote communities.
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(BDC) and Export 
Development 
Bank (EDC)
$1.4B/3 -new financing, including equity invest-
ments, working capital and project finance 
to help Canada’s clean technology firms 
expand
2017 Recapitaliza-






$400M/5 -develop and demonstrate new clean 






Statistics Canada $14.5M/4 -measure impact of clean technologies 
and environmental goods and services on 
national level
- regular publication of data on clean 
technology
2017 Clean Growth 
Program
NRCan $155M/4 -support clean technology RD&D and 




ISED and NRCan n/a -industry-government collaboration, 








$13.5M/5 -provide expertise to federal departments 
to implement energy efficiency and clean 













$53.5M/10 -reduce Northern communities’ reliance 








ECCC and Canada 
Revenue Agency
$109M/5 -costs to implement, administer and 
enforce the
federal carbon pollution pricing system
2018 Review and 
assessment of 
PCF**
ECCC $20M/5 - external assessments of the effective-
ness of the PCF to identify best practices 
moving forward
*This table is not an exhaustive list of all programs that support the PCF but highlights a substantial majority. All 
programs are active unless otherwise stated.
**Planned
Sources: Government of Canada, 2016; Government of Canada, 2017; Government of Canada, 2018.
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Chapter 8 
A New Social Care Act for Canada
Allan Moscovitch and Ginette Thomas
INTRODUCTION
The cancellation of the Canada Assistance Plan in 1996 was a pivotal policy 
shift that was not only short-sighted as a cost-cutting measure, it also did not 
reduce the need for, nor the costs of, social care services. Instead, it fundamen-
tally changed the characteristics of the Canadian federal state that had evolved 
from the post World War II welfare state ideologies that were based on state 
provision.
Until the 1960s, social care in Canada was highly underdeveloped and largely 
dependent on the combination of provincial, municipal, and private charitable 
funding. The focus of the activities of what were largely non-profit organiza-
tions was to provide assistance to individuals and households with low and 
moderate incomes who were in need.
What changed this picture was the advent of the federal Canada Assistance 
Plan in 1966. The Canada Assistance Plan led to the consolidation of the 
funding and the delivery of income assistance programs. Substantially 
increased federal (50/50) cost-shared funding was made available to the prov-
inces to support their spending on social assistance programs on the basis that 
federal programs for people with disabilities would be terminated, and that 
Canadians who were dependent on such programs would receive provincial 
assistance instead. According to the preamble, the Canada Assistance Plan 
would provide funding for programs to alleviate poverty and for programs 
intended to prevent poverty. It was this phrase in the preamble that led to 
increased funding for the significant expansion of provincial social services.
WHEREAS the Parliament of Canada, recognizing that the provision of 
adequate assistance to persons in need and the prevention and removal 
of the causes of poverty and dependence on public assistance are the 
concern of all Canadians, is desirous of encouraging the further develop-
ment and extension of assistance and welfare services programs through-
out Canada by sharing more fully with the provinces in the cost thereof; 
(Canada Assistance Plan, l966-67, c.45, s.l, 711)
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Since the 1990s, beyond the social costs to Canadians due to reduced commu-
nity and social services incurred as a result of the Chrétien government’s cuts 
to federal funding, the true damage was the loss of the basic principles that 
had framed the Canada Assistance Plan for 30 years. These basic principles, 
inherent in the preamble to, and the text of, the Canada Assistance Plan went 
beyond simply framing a social program. They were a validation of Cana-
dian social values that were not replicated in the Canada Health and Social 
Transfer agreements that replaced the Canada Assistance Plan. Even with 
the 2000 Social Union Framework Agreement, under the guise of enhancing 
cross-Canada jurisdictional relations, the federal government’s negotiation 
objective shifted to one where it would only maintain the illusion of providing 
over-arching national guidance while still limiting its financial obligations. 
There were no underlying principles to bind provincial commitments to social 
services in the same manner that the five principles under the Canada Health 
Act (CHA) have assured Canadians of the government’s commitment to ensur-
ing their access to health services.
Throughout the period that followed the termination of the Canada Assistance 
Plan, poverty and socio-economic inequalities have persisted in Canada, 
although the Trudeau Liberal Government’s introduction of the Canada Child 
Benefit holds the promise for making a difference for lower income families 
with children. Growing concerns about the impact of poverty and persistent 
social inequalities is the reason that we believe that a new Social Care Act is a 
timely public policy approach.
The reductions in federal assistance to provinces for social services that served 
as austerity measures since the 1990s contributed to the conditions that have 
promoted poverty and social inequalities. Although there was a decline in 
the unemployment rate from 8.7% to 6.9% between July 2009 and July 2016 
(Statistics Canada 2017, January 6), more than 3 million Canadians continue 
to live in poverty.1 Statistics Canada’s 2014 Income Survey found that 1.9 
million families struggle to make ends meet because they do not have jobs that 
provide a living wage, workplace pension plans, predictable schedules to facil-
itate work-life balance, or opportunities for advancement (Statistics Canada 
2016). As a result, they have poorer health outcomes, lack access to healthy 
food, and do not live in safe, adequate, and affordable housing.
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The Income Survey confirms that, while the national low-income rate in 2014 
was 8.8%, changes to social programs over this period had a disproportionate 
impact on Canadians who were most likely to be poor: unattached people 
aged 45 to 64 (30.2%), single parents (23.7%), people with disabilities (22.5%) 
recent immigrants (20.3%), and Indigenous peoples (First Nations, Métis, and 
Inuit) living off reserve (18.7%).2
The Liberal Platform that led to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s win in the 
October 25, 2015 general election promoted a Keynesian approach to govern-
ment intervention aimed at ensuring Canadian prosperity. Following on the 
heels of the 2008 global economic downturn and 10 years of Prime Minister 
Harper’s fiscal constraints, the Liberal Platform with its promises of increased 
funding for social programs proved to be popular with voters.
Poverty and inequality are not just problems for individual Canadians—
all of us are affected. For Canadians, poverty makes it more difficult to 
get and stay healthy, and more difficult to find and keep good work. For 
Canada, the costs of poverty—seen in higher heath care costs and greater 
demand for social assistance—are immense. Our plan will lift Canadians 
out of poverty starting immediately after the next election. (Liberal Party 
of Canada 2018)
The purpose of this brief is to propose a new Social Care Act for Canada which 
would provide the federal government with a viable public policy framework 
to address the persistent social inequalities in Canada through ensuring a 
common set of principles for social care across the country.
WHAT IS SOCIAL CARE
We use the term social care to refer to the range of publicly provided personal 
and community social services which have become a key part of the fabric 
of Canadian society over the past 50 years. Social care encompasses more 
traditional services such as child care, child welfare, and services for people 
with physical, developmental, and psychiatric disabilities. It also encompasses 
services for homeless people, for women who are seeking shelter from abusive 
relationships, for the LGBTQQ population, for youth, for people with an addic-
tion, for families, for immigrants and migrants, for seniors, and for anyone in 
the community who is in need of special assistance. Services for people who 
are poor or who are likely to become poor are an important part of social care.
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Before 1970, social care was limited to a few publicly provided services and a 
few that were often funded jointly from public and charitable funds and pro-
vided by non-profit organizations. Public services were often strongly focussed 
on large scale institutions. Since 1970 there has been a rapid expansion of 
social care in a wide range of forms as community expectations have changed 
around what should be available publicly and what should be funded publicly. 
Unlike health care, provincial and territorial social care practices vary widely. 
While provincial and territorial health care is subject to agreed national 
principles contained in the Canada Health Act, there are no similar national 
principles for social care.
While some national principles were a part of the Canada Assistance Plan 
under which the federal government provided important support for provin-
cial expansion of social care, they were terminated with the end of the Plan in 
1996. The Canada Health and Social Transfer replaced the funding provisions 
of the Canada Assistance Plan and in part those of the Established Programs 
Financing and Fiscal Arrangements Act, but not the principles. In fact, the 
Canada Health and Social Transfer and its successor Act, the Canada Social 
Transfer, does not even mention that its purpose is to provide funding for 
social care. The federal government and the provinces came close to reaching 
an agreement on social care in the 1990s as part of the discussions around the 
idea of a social charter. It is now long past time for the federal government and 
the provinces to deal with this.3
BACKGROUND
Demographics
The population in Canada is not only growing, it is also changing. According to 
Statistics Canada, the total population in 2016 was 35.15 million, representing 
an increase of 1.70 million people from 2011. About two-thirds of that growth 
was the result of migratory increases (the difference between the number of 
immigrants and emigrants), with natural increases (the difference between 
the number of births and deaths) accounting for the remaining third. Statistics 
Canada estimates that in the coming years, population growth in Canada is 
projected to be increasingly linked to migratory rather than natural growth 
primarily because of low Canadian fertility rates and an aging population 
(Statistics Canada 2017, February 8).
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First, the aging population group of baby-boomers is cited as a predictor of 
increasing costs for health care and social care in Canada. Aging is considered 
one of the drivers of health care costs since seniors generally require more 
health care services than younger people.4 Aging will also be a key reason for 
increasing demand for social care in a variety of forms. From a socio-economic 
perspective, an aging population is expected to have an adverse effect on the 
labour market as seniors retire from the active workforce, and contribute to a 
significant increase in demand for government pensions (Édison 2011).
Economists believe that the effects of the aging population can be offset by 
market and institutional feedback mechanisms in the Canadian economy, 
and public policies to increase employment rates among population groups 
such as immigrants could help to mitigate the adverse effects of population 
aging on the overall employment rate (Édison 2011, 2-3). It should be noted 
that increasing immigration levels requires availability to social care services, 
especially in the first few years of their settlement in Canada.
Second, the scope of poverty in Canada is extensive, affecting the lives of many 
marginalized populations. According to the government’s own Discussion 
Paper, in 2015, 3.2 million Canadians (representing 9.2% of the population) 
lived with incomes below current standards of poverty. This included more 
than half a million children. As well, in 2015, about 701,000 Canadians lived 
in families that had family members in the labour force but were poor. While 
relatively low, Canada’s rate for seniors in poverty was still 4.4 percent (Liberal 
Party of Canada 2017). It is important to add that the federal government’s 
data, derived from Statistics Canada, likely underestimates poverty, especially 
profound poverty, because homeless people and many Indigenous peoples are 
not included in the surveys.
Poverty is presented as a political priority by the current government, with 
the need to move to action on behalf of all Canadians (Government of Canada 
2016). One of the key challenges of a national poverty strategy is its wide-rang-
ing reach into the complex division of authority and responsibility between the 
federal, provincial, and territorial governments for social issues such as health, 
housing, social welfare, social security, and the regulation of employment. It 
appears that the federal government has not yet engaged its provincial and 
territorial partners in the poverty discussion.
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Political shifts
The Canadian political landscape underwent major political shifts in the tran-
sition decades between the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The welfare 
state that took shape in the post World War II years gave way under the pres-
sure of neo-liberal governments which, by the end of the twentieth century had 
started to dismantle some of the legislation and principles of social security 
that had formed the basis of federal-provincial relations on health and social 
policies in the preceding decades.
By the turn of the twenty-first century, social welfare policies had been trans-
formed by neo-liberal governments that had focussed federally on reducing the 
funding for social programs and eliminating restrictions on how the provinces 
and territories spend within the cash transfers within their jurisdictions. The 
underlying principle of meeting the needs of individuals was replaced with a 
business model that was focused on containing spending. Without national 
standards, the provinces moved back towards the pre-Canada Assistance Plan 
model of separating welfare programs for people with disabilities who were 
to be considered unemployable, from those for everyone else, who were to be 
considered employable.
Only the health sector was provided some measure of protection, thanks to the 
five principles of the 1984 Canada Health Act (accessibility, comprehensive-
ness, portability, public administration, and universality) that spared insured 
medical and hospital health services from a total transformation. Each of 
these principles acted as a safeguard for citizens that the provincial govern-
ments would continue to be involved in their health care if they were to receive 
funding designated for that purpose.
The same could not be said for the provision of social care services. As part 
of its austerity measures to address the growing federal deficit, the Chrétien 
Liberal government announced the termination of the Canada Assistance 
Plan (CAP), along with significant reductions in federal funding for social 
assistance, social care services, post-secondary education, and health care. 
CAP was replaced in 1996 with a cash grant to the provinces for health, social 
assistance, and post-secondary education.
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A NEW CANADA SOCIAL CARE ACT
This instability in federal funding levels and the resultant cutbacks in social 
care services across the country has created considerable uncertainty and vari-
ability. New legislation should be brought forward by the federal government 
to outline the broad objectives for funds available through the Canada Social 
Transfer (CST) for the provincial and territorial provision of social care ser-
vices. Given the widespread support for the Canada Health Act, its five princi-
ples are a sound and logical starting point for a new Social Care Act. To these 
five principles we added another five which we believe are necessary to ensure 
a reasonable standard of social care for all Canadians across the country.5
The ten principles put forward here for a new Canada Social Care Act include 
the five which are a part of the Canada Health Act but adapted to the range 
of community and social services which are delivered and/or funded by the 
provinces and territories:
1. Public administration
 This principle requires that provincial and territorial social care services be 
managed by a public agency, on a not-for-profit basis. It also requires that 
social care be delivered by either a public or a private but non-profit organ-
ization. It is recognition that social care services are best made available 
when the profit motive has been removed.
2. Comprehensiveness
 This principle means that in each province or territory there is an agreed 
range of services included in social care. Each government is responsible 
for determining what comprehensiveness means within their jurisdic-
tion. At the same time, they are willing to engage in a public consultation 
process leading to the determination of what should be included within 
their jurisdiction.
3. Universality
 This principle means that all citizens can avail themselves of the same 
quality of social care services, as needed, throughout the province or 
territory. There remains the issue of authority and responsibility for social 
care for Indigenous people wherever they are resident within a province 
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or territory. This legislation does not settle the issue, it simply means that 
as citizens all Indigenous people have the same rights as all other citizens. 
Indigeneity will no longer be a barrier to the delivery of social services nor 
a reason for delivery in a culturally inappropriate way.
4. Portability
 This principle means that citizens who move within provinces/territories 
or between provinces/territories should experience uninterrupted access 
to social care services as needed. This principle incorporates the ban on 
residence requirements which is currently the only limitation in place in 
regard to the Canada Social Transfer.
5. Accessibility
 This principle means that there are no financial or other barriers to the 
provision of publicly funded social care services. Services are available to 
all Canadians as needed. Access does not preclude the possibility of a test 
of need, but this test has to do with the individual and social conditions 
of the applicant(s). Each province and territory must show that access to 
social care services is not limited by a financial barrier. Each province and 
territory must outline the range of social care services available to meet the 
basic needs of the citizenry (also see Comprehensiveness above).
6. Fairness
 This principle requires that all citizens have the right to apply for any 
publicly supported social program, and to have their application reviewed 
by an appropriate body within a reasonable period of time. Applicants have 
the right to a written decision within a reasonable period of time and the 
right to appeal any decisions taken within a reasonable period of time, to 
have their appeal heard within a reasonable period of time, and to receive 
a written appeal decision within a reasonable period of time. During the 
period of appeal, applicants have the right to temporary financial support 
and/or services.
7. Effectiveness
 Citizens have the right to be assured that every attempt will be made to 
ensure social care services will work for them. Some services rely upon the 
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relationship between a worker (service deliverer) and a client (consumer). 
Thus, the efficacy of social care services can sometimes depend on the 
efficacy of this relationship. Service effectiveness is dependent on the 
cooperation of both parties. Nonetheless, there is an agreement in the field 
that some approaches are more effective than others. Agencies and workers 
have an obligation to provide services as effectively as possible. At the same 
time, active participation is a responsibility of the citizen seeking service.
8. Accountability and Transparency
 The principles of accountability and transparency mean that each province 
and territory will publish an annual report explaining how CST funds have 
been expended on social care. The report will make it possible for citizens 
to understand the costs of each type of service and the numbers of people 
being served.
9. Rights and Responsibilities
 The principle of rights and responsibilities means that social care services 
are based on mutual responsibility where possible. Social care services 
should be established such that citizens have the right to apply for service, 
and the right to receive services if they meet the criteria for the service. 
They also have the right to appeal decisions that are made about their 
application. At the same time, and based on mutuality, organizations deliv-
ering social care services have the responsibility to establish contractual 
expectations about the active participation of the citizen being served.
10. Comparability
 The principle of comparability means that citizens should have a reason-
able expectation that the services available to them are comparable to those 
available elsewhere within their province or territory and their available 
range of choices is broadly comparable to those available to them in other 
parts of the country. Provinces and territories have an obligation to take 
account of what is being offered elsewhere in the country and ensure that 
their citizens have available a range of broadly available choices of services 
to meet their needs.
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CONCLUSION
The 2015 election saw a dramatic turn in the federal government approach to 
cut-backs in social programs in the name of austerity—the federal government 
has recognized increased social spending as a means to stimulate economic 
growth. There are, however, no standards in social care in Canada, and there 
is no leadership in trying to address inconsistencies in access to care and 
inequalities in outcomes. The market has not been successful in addressing 
these problems, and the austerity measures and the retrenchment of social 
policy in both the Chrétien and Harper forms of neo-liberalism failed to 
provide for social care at an appropriate level.
This lack of consistency of access to social care services across jurisdictional 
lines is not acceptable and needs to be addressed. As is the case in health care, 
Canadians need assurances that social care services will be available as a 
matter of policy, and not at the whim of a political ideology.
Canada’s experience in developing social policies offers valuable lessons which 
could serve to shape the principles guiding the development of twenty-first 
century legislation on social policy reform. A new Canada Social Care Act is 
an excellent way for the federal government to ensure that all Canadians can 
have access to a similar standard of social care. The original purpose of federal 
funding for social care services was to support people in need, and those who 
were likely to be in need in order to prevent poverty. The clear orientation 
of the Canada Assistance Plan was towards those people currently living in 
poverty, or those considered likely to be living in poverty due to factors such 
as precarious employment or other personal circumstances. It was further 
concluded that social care services should be available to all citizens, as any 
person may have a need for them at some time in their lives.
The principle of universality that is the hallmark of the Canadian health 
care system and citizens’ rights to access health care when they need it are 
protected. Universally available community and social services are equally 
important as they are directed to citizens who need them—not necessarily 
all citizens—without distinction. This approach conveys recognition that all 
citizens may need social services at some time.
Social care that is widely available, on an as-needed basis, can make an import-
ant contribution to the quality of life of all Canadians through assisting them 
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to exercise rights, assume responsibilities, and generally participate in the 
community. These are the same goals that are expressed in the National Poverty 
Reduction Strategy. Further, access to social care could be instrumental in 
assisting individuals, families, and communities to prevent or change the social 
conditions that adversely affect them. These points speak to the objectives of the 
Canada Social Transfer which should be incorporated into a new social care act. 
Just as the Canada Assistance Plan had a preamble to express the purpose of the 
legislation, we suggest that a new Social Care Act have one as well.
With a set of basic principles that mirror those established in the Canada 
Health Act, a new Canada Social Care Act would bring consistency to the pro-
vision of health and social services to all Canadians regardless of where they 
live, and would provide a framework for the availability of resources for prov-
inces and territories to manage the anticipated growth in the aging population, 
in the numbers of immigrants, and the reduction of poverty—all of which will 
require a growth in social resources.
RECOMMENDATIONS
A New Canada Social Care Act
The federal government should draft legislation to entrench a set of principles 
to which the provinces and territories must be willing to agree in the expendi-
tures of federal social transfer payments. The legislation would include the five 
principles of the Canada Health Act but adapted to social care as well as five 
additional principles which are outlined here in this brief.
A new federal department: Health and Social Care Canada
The federal government should expand Health Canada’s mandate to include 
the authority to ensure compliance under the new Canada Social Care Act. A 
new Directorate would duplicate the scope of responsibilities under Health 
Canada’s current Canada Health Act Division and would administer and 
provide policy advice related to the Social Care Act. It would monitor a broad 
range of sources to assess provincial/territorial compliance with the principles 
of the Act, inform the Minister of possible non-compliance with the Act and 
recommend appropriate action. The new department would work collabora-
tively with the Federal-Provincial Relations Directorate at the Department of 
Finance with respect to administration of payments under the Canada Social 
Transfer (CST).
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ENDNOTES
1 This information is based on after-tax Low Income Cut-offs (LICOs).
2 We do not have data on Indigenous people on reserve and on homeless people who together 
would raise the poverty rate. 
3 A more detailed discussion of the evolution of federal social programs in Canada is 
available in Moscovitch, & Thomas 2015.
4 Information provided by the Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI), National 
Health Expenditure Trends, 1975 to 2010 as cited in Deraspe 2011.
5 For a more detailed analysis of the 10 principles that are proposed for a new Social Care Act 
in Canada, please refer to Moscovitch & Thomas 2015.
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Chapter 9 
Implementing the New Innovation 
Agenda
Peter W. B. Phillips and Aaron Hertes
INTRODUCTION
The Liberal government’s “New Innovation Agenda,” introduced in the 2015 
election campaign, has been incrementally revealed and implemented in the 
2016, 2017, and 2018 budgets, but impacts remain unproven. One big challenge 
is that business engagement with R&D has dropped even as federal interest 
has accelerated. A self- assessment of progress delivered in 2017 identifies the 
appointment of Dr. Mona Nemer as the new Chief Science Advisor as the only 
definitive success. However, the initiatives in the 2017 and 2018 Budgets are 
both many and substantial, indicating a continued commitment by this gov-
ernment to research innovation.
There are two notable features of this government’s approach to innovation 
policy formulation and implementation. First, through the 2017 and 2018 
budgets, this government has shown a commitment to evidence-based policy 
by implementing many of the expert recommendations from recent reviews. 
Second, the effort is paced rather than rushed. The strategy is rolled out over 
multiple budget cycles, with major strategic initiatives such as the Innovation 
Superclusters Initiative (ISI) announced first as concepts, and then imple-
mented in following years.
This budget has been hailed both by government officials and some observers 
as an “historic” win for science and innovation, with approximately $7 billion 
in new or renewed funding for research and research infrastructure over five 
years and a soon to be streamlined suite of innovation programs. These initia-
tives are designed to drive higher productivity and strong economic growth. 
However, in addition to the traditional focus on business innovation, this 
budget delivered a strong focus on gender equity and social innovation.
This review first discusses the economic and scientific context for the 2018 
Budget, outlines the major science and innovation expenditures contained in 
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the budget, and compares these actions to the recommendations in a number 
of major recent expert reports. Overall, while the spin-doctors are claiming an 
historic win, there is little evidence this will move the dial in any significant 
way.
THE ECONOMICS CONTEXT FOR THE S&T MEASURES IN THE 
BUDGET
Since 2009, several influential reports have raised concerns over Canada’s 
slow post-recession recovery. The sluggish recovery drew attention to Canada’s 
long-term stagnation of multifactor productivity growth. The latest report 
from the OECD shows that whereas the United States and Australia enjoyed 
productivity growth of around 25% between 1990 and 2014, Canada realized 
gains of only 5% in the same period (OECD, 2016, p. 17). This has put the spot-
light on innovation, and specifically on spending on research and development.
Canada has a strong reputation for its ability to engage in research: between 
2009 and 2014, Canada ranked ninth in the world for production of research 
publications; from 2003 to 2014, Canada’s publication output increased by 
26%, greater than in many other developed countries; and 36% of top-cited 
researchers in the world identify Canada as one of the top five countries in 
their field. However, the composite indexes developed by the Expert Panel 
on the State of Science and Technology and Industrial Research in Canada 
show that while Canada is strong in the humanities, social sciences, medical, 
and environmental fields it is comparatively weak in the natural sciences, 
engineering, and enabling and strategic technologies. Weakness in these fields 
of critical importance to innovation is a concern (Council of Canadian Acade-
mies, 2018, pp. xviii-xxi).
Compounding this is the relative decrease in Canada’s Gross Expenditure on 
R&D (GERD) compared to other OECD countries. The average real growth in 
GERD for the OECD was 2.5% between 2006 and 2015, but Canada’s spend-
ing, adjusted for inflation, remained virtually unchanged (Council of Canadian 
Academies, 2018, p. 13). Between 2006 and 2016, Canada’s GERD as per-
centage of GDP fell from 1.95% to 1.60% (Table 1), while GERD for the OECD 
increased from 2.17% to 2.35%. Left unattended, this gap between Canada and 
its international peers is expected by many to erode Canada’s competitiveness 
in the global economy. Canada would need to almost double its investments 
131 How Ottawa Spends
in R&D in order to attain the OECD target of 3% of GDP, which would require 
more effective coordination of the government, business, and higher education 
sectors.
Canada has a significantly different R&D profile than most OECD countries. 
Our governments invest proportionately less in R&D than in other countries 
(about 0.53% of GDP, compared with about O.63% in the OECD), but due to 
other weaknesses, governments finance about one-third of Canada’s effort, 
compared with about a quarter elsewhere. Moreover, governments in Canada 
actually do less research themselves (less than 8%) compared with the OECD 
(11-12%). Meanwhile, firms financed only about 40% of total Canadian R&D, 
compared with more than 60% in the OECD as a whole, and performed only 
about 51%, compared with about 70% in the rest of the OECD. Foreign sources 
of capital were particularly important, funding about 10% of our effort, almost 
double the U.S. share. Both governments and business rely relatively heavily 
on our higher education sector to actually do the research—post-secondary 
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institutions do about 41% of all research in Canada, up about 25% in the past 
decade, and 2 to 3 times more than in the OECD and U.S.
The trends are equally problematic. Between 2006 and 2016, Canada’s Busi-
ness Enterprise R&D (BERD) as a percentage of GDP decreased by from 1.10% 
to 0.82% of GDP, equal to almost a 3% per year annual decline. In contrast, 
BERD for the OECD and the U.S. increased 9% over the same period, so that 
by 2016 business in Canada was investing less than half of what business in 
the OECD was doing. Moreover, domestic firms fund less than three quarters 
of their own effort; foreign capital funds almost 20% of the effort.
This evidence goes a long way to explaining the context for the budget—
Canada has created a research system that produces high-quality knowledge 
but, due to weak industrial engagement, it struggles with transferring that 
knowledge into economic gains. This presents two challenges—a need to 
increase overall spending on R&D and a need to improve knowledge transfer 
between academia and business.
THE FISCAL PLAN FOR S&T
As a reference point, it is worth noting that the federal government spending 
intentions based on decisions up to Budget 2017 showed that S&T outlays were 
estimated to have risen 9.4% in 2016/2017 and 5.7% in 2017/2018; expendi-
tures in the year just ended were projected to reach a record $12.1 billion, sur-
passing the previous high of $11.6 billion in 2009/2010 (http://www.statcan.
gc.ca/daily-quotidien/180327/dq180327c-eng.htm). Based on appropriations to 
that point, overall S&T outlays would have fallen 6.1% in 2018/2019, or about 
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$740 million, about 80% of which would have been withdrawn from support 
for external performers.
This budget allocated new or renewed funding of almost $7 billion over the 
next five years, which is unambiguously more than needed to make up the 
projected dip in outlays for this year but is probably not an “historic win” for 
science. Given the nature of budgeting, where authorizations lapse at different 
times, one cannot be sure how much of the $7 billion promised is new rather 
than sustaining existing effort. If we are charitable, removing the monies 
needed to make up the 2018/19 shortfall, we are looking at about $3.3 billion 
in new money, which spread over five years would translate into somewhat less 
than a 5% sustainable rise in effort.
Where and when the funds will be disbursed is more interesting. In many 
ways, the plan follows the advice laid out in the Fundamental Science Review 
(2017), a series of reports and recommendations from the Advisory Council 
on Economic Growth (2016, 2017, 2018), and the recommendations of the 
McKinsey Institute on diversity in science. This section first discusses some of 
the more prominent new science initiatives, then reviews the changes made to 
existing science and innovation programs, and finally examines some of the 
initiatives designed to promote women in research and business.
The science portion of the 2018 Budget allocates approximately $1.7 billion in 
incremental funds over five years for Canada’s granting councils and research 
institutes, and approximately $1.3 billion over five years for investments in lab-
oratories, equipment, and research infrastructure, both through the Canada 
Foundation for Innovation and directly to other ventures. The focus of the 
granting council and research institute allocation is on creating opportunities 
for researchers at the start of their careers, especially women. The allocation 
for the granting councils includes $275 million over five years for a Tri-Council 
Support Fund, administered by SSHRC, to promote multidisciplinary research 
and greater collaboration between the councils and to support investment in 
high-risk, high-return (hr2) research. The budget allocates a further $572.5 
million over five years for the Digital Research Initiative to increase accessi-
bility to big data, $140 million over five years for the College and Community 
Innovation Program to facilitate collaboration between business and academia, 
$540 million over five years to restructure the NRC in a way that facilitates 
international and multidisciplinary collaboration and provides greater support 
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for projects with high potential benefits, and $58 million on an accrual basis 
over five years to support a new science infrastructure program manage-
ment office. The funding for the $950 million, five-year, ISI was included in 
ISED’s allocation, and the five winning applications were announced a week 
before the budget speech: Ocean Supercluster in Atlantic Canada, SCALE.
AI in Quebec, New Generation Manufacturing in Ontario, Protein Industries 
Canada in the Prairies, and Digital Technology Supercluster in BC.
Beyond the science initiatives, this budget also includes plans for a new Intel-
lectual Property (IP) Strategy, regulatory reform, and a new procurement 
strategy designed to promote Canadian innovations. The new IP Strategy 
includes $30 million in 2019/20 to pilot a Patent Collective to pool patents and 
facilitate access to intellectual property for small and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs), and $21.5 million over five years to ISED to develop increased 
intellectual property expertise and capacity to provide legal advice to the 
innovation community. Additionally, the IP Strategy includes $33.8 million 
over five years for ISED to develop an intellectual property marketplace which 
will provide a single point of access to a list of all public-sector owned intellec-
tual property. Beyond the IP Strategy, the budget allocates $11.5 million over 
three years to review Canada’s regulatory system and its impact on innovation, 
in part to provide online access to regulations. Finally, the Build in Canada 
Innovation program is merging with Innovative Solutions Canada to develop 
and implement an electronic procurement platform ($196.8 million over five 
years).
The budget also introduced a range of reforms to existing initiatives in 
response to recommendations of the Advisory Council on Economic Growth 
(ACEG). The stated goal is to treat business as the primary client of the 
government’s innovation programs. First, this involves consolidating the 
Accelerated Growth Service and the Industrial Research Assistance Program’s 
(IRAP) Concierge Service into Innovation Canada to create a single-window 
service for businesses seeking to access government programs. Second, four 
flagship platforms will consolidate and streamline programming through the 
single portal offered by Innovation Canada: IRAP; Strategic Innovation Fund 
(SIF); Canadian Trade Commissioner Service (TCS); and Regional Develop-
ment Agencies (RDAs). IRAP will be responsible for R&D projects under $10 
million, while SIF will support projects costing more than $10 million. The 
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TCS will be modified to include numerous trade promotion programs such as 
CanExport and the Canadian Technology Accelerators program. The RDAs—
Western Economic Diversification (WD), CanNor, FedNor, FedDev Ontario, 
Canada Economic Development for Quebec Regions (CED), and ACOA—will 
manage strategic ventures, such as women’s entrepreneurship, skills develop-
ment, and economic diversification. The government also announced plans to 
simplify its programming, targeting to reduce from an estimated 92 programs 
to about 36. This affects most agencies in executive government.
The budget put a significant emphasis on social innovation and gender equity 
in science. The funds allocated to the granting agencies and the $210 million 
for the CRC program come with an emphasis on promoting women’s involve-
ment in research. In addition, several new programs designed to promote 
women’s entrepreneurship and women-led businesses have been consolidated 
into the Women Entrepreneurship Strategy. The budget provided the RDAs 
with $150 million over five years to promote women-led businesses and 
regional innovation systems, $10 million over five years for the Business 
Women in International Trade Program to support women’s business activities 
in foreign markets, $1.4 billion for the Business Development Bank of Canada 
to finance women entrepreneurs, and $250 million over three years for Export 
Development Canada to provide financing for women-led businesses looking 
to begin exporting. The Strategy also commits to increase the level of govern-
ment procurement from women-led businesses, with $9.5 million over three 
years for gathering data on women-led businesses and women entrepreneurs 
in Canada.
ANALYSIS
One of the prominent aspects of this budget is the extent to which it is driven 
by evidence and professional advice. The science and innovation and program 
review portions of the budget were obviously influenced by the findings of 
the Fundamental Science Review (hereafter the Naylor Report) and a series 
of reports from the ACEG while the overall gender focus drew heavily on the 
McKinsey Institute report, The Power of Parity: Advancing Women’s Equality 
in Canada. This section reviews the recommendations of these reports and 
analyzes how they have been fulfilled by this budget and, in the case of the 
ACEG recommendations, previous budgets.
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The recommendations of the Naylor Report are wide-ranging (Table 5). Budget 
2018 includes initiatives which address most of these recommendations in 
some way or another and includes several initiatives not suggested in the 
report. These initiatives have already been described in the previous section 
and so will not be discussed again. The budget allocations themselves only 
address a portion of the Naylor recommendations—many are addressed 
through non-financial measures such as the changes in mandates to the 
granting councils and the reforms to the NRC. Overall, this budget was more 
focused on reforming and streamlining existing administrative bodies rather 
than introducing new ones, hence the structural advice was ignored (for now 
at least).
Table 3: Recommendations of the Naylor Report and corresponding Budget 2018 
initiatives (Naylor Report, 2017)
NAYLOR REPORT RECOMMENDATION BUDGET INITIATIVE
Review innovation-related programming Horizontal Business Innovation and Clean Technology 
Review conducted and completed in 2017
Improve mechanisms for collaboration and coordination 
in research between departments
$2.6 billion for new federal research facilities
Create of Four Agency Coordinating Board to improve 
coordination and collaboration between granting councils
$275 million Tri-Council Support Fund, administered by 
SSHRC, and mandates more focused on collaboration
New mandate for granting councils which encourages 
support for high-risk research
$275 million Tri-Council Support Fund, administered by 
SSHRC, to support fast-breaking, higher-risk research
Increase level of funding for granting councils and CRC 
program
$925 million for granting councils, $210 million for CRC
Increase funding for independent investigator-led 
research
No action taken. Focus is still on priority-driven research.
Implement policies to promote diversity in allocation of 
research funding
New funding and mandates for granting councils and CRC
Implement policies to support early-career researchers $210 million over five years to the Canada Research 
Chairs Program to support early-career researchers
Develop strategic plan to support Indigenous researchers $3.8 million for SSHRC to develop a strategic plan that 
identifies new ways of doing research with Indigenous 
communities and to support Indigenous research capacity
Create[AM3] Standing Committee on Major Research 
Facilities to oversee federal investment in research 
projects
No action taken
Create National Advisory Council on Research and 
Innovation to provide oversight for federal research and 
innovation ecosystems
No action taken
Many reforms can also be traced to the recommendations of the ACEG. Unlike 
the Naylor Report, the ACEG recommendations were released over the course 
of several reviews. In all, it has made eleven recommendations, mostly initia-
tives unrelated to science and innovation, such as investing in infrastructure, 
increasing Canada’s trade access and increasing immigration. The ISI, the 
review of innovation-related programming and the economic strategy tables 
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are already being implemented, while streamlining innovation-related pro-
gramming, the new procurement strategy, and the planned regulatory review 
are clearly responding to the ACEG. Two further recommendations warrant 
some discussion. The focus on increasing skills and diversity of the workforce 
were both first mooted by the Advisory Council. Budget 2018 responded with 
$225 million over four years to establish the FutureSkills Lab to work with 
provinces, the private and non-profit sectors, and educational institutions to 
identify skills needed by employers, develop new approaches to skill devel-
opment and training, and collect and share information to inform future 
training programs. In addition to the gender-directed programming described 
earlier, the budget also allocated $2 billion over five years for the creation of a 
new Indigenous Skills and Employment Training Program to replace existing 
programming, to strengthen the focus on training for high-quality jobs rather 
than focusing on rapid employment. Other parts of this volume review these 
initiatives in more detail.
Taken together, this analysis suggests that this government is committed not 
only to evidence-based policy, but also to a more heterogeneous mix of objec-
tives and mechanisms. The emphasis on accelerating commercial activity at 
the same time as promoting social innovation and greater inclusivity is innova-
tive in its own way.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In the context of Canada’s declining productivity and recent sluggish economic 
recovery following the 2008-09 recession, the emphasis on innovation in the 
modern economy has become even more forceful. Several prominent reports 
have argued that Canada’s long-term trend of reduced spending in R&D, 
particularly reduced business expenditures on R&D, is a major impediment 
to innovation and that this trend must be reversed if Canada is to retain its 
international competitiveness. The science and innovation initiatives taken in 
the 2018 Budget represent the federal government accepting this challenge and 
trying to start a process of renewal.
While this budget certainly represents progress, we should be cautious in 
labelling it an “historic” win. Most of the allocations are weighted to the latter 
half of the five-year period, after the 2019 election. For example, of the approx-
imately $3 billion allocated for the granting agencies and research infrastruc-
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ture, only $803 million will be mobilized before the 2019 election. Further-
more, and more substantively, the science and innovation initiatives and their 
underlying recommendations are premised on the idea that there is a discon-
nect between academia and industry, whereby Canada produces high-quality 
knowledge but struggles to transfer it to economic gains. However, a new 
Council of Canadian Academies (CCA) report suggests the transfer of knowl-
edge between academia and business may not be the issue. The data presented 
above shows that business financing in Higher Education R&D (HERD), while 
down, is greater proportionally than the OECD average and recent partnership 
programs have demonstrated firms are able and willing to engage with aca-
demia (Council of Canadian Academies, 2018, pp. 21-22). The CCA argues that 
the relationship between academia and business is not the problem; rather it is 
that Canadian firms are unable to grow innovations to scale, preventing busi-
nesses from realizing the benefits of R&D. The lack of return is thus the reason 
firms invest less (Council of Canadian Academies, 2018, p. 148). The CCA 
identifies several factors contributing to this deficiency, including the nature of 
the integration of the Canada and U.S. economies, shorter-term time and risk 
preferences that lead entrepreneurs to sell their businesses rather than grow 
them to scale[AM4], an R&D tax-credit structure which favours firm start-ups 
over firm growth, and a lack of managerial experience and skills to carry firms 
through the period of rapid expansion into global markets (Council of Cana-
dian Academies, 2018, p.167). None of these measures are addressed in any 
substantive way in this budget, which may mean we are treating symptoms 
and not causes.
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